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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents an economic and institutional study
of the dual housing market through a case study of the black home own-
ership market in transitional neighborhoods in Chicago between 1952-
1968. White and black components of the housing market interact in
neighborhoods experiencing racial change. Although economic incentives
fuel neighborhood transition, ownership transfers in these areas must
overcome the institutional factors that previously maintained residen-
tial segregation. Differential access to mortgage credit has been an
important enforcement mechanism. The "redlining" policy of mortgage-
granting institutions has maintained the color line by restricting
lending activity to established segregated neighborhoods.
Alternative, private sources of housing credit, such as land
installment contracts, have, in the past, filled the institutional
credit vacuum in residential neighborhoods of impending racial change
and have provided the means for black entry into white neighborhoods.
The land installment contract is a legitimate, long-term finance instru-
ment in which the seller retains title until the last payment has been
made. By combining both purchase and finance arrangements, the land
installment contract provided the means to transfer ownership units
between black and white markets, From the speculator's perspective,
the institutional arrangements of a contract sale did not differ
greatly from a rental. However, it offered an important economic
advantage. The contract sale yielded greater long-term profits than
had the property been rented because it offered a means of locking in
the initial price surges associated with limited, block-by-block
ghetto expansion.
Contract sales in transitional neighborhoods in Chicago were
characterized by speculative real estate activity and developed into
a specialized market for the transfer, finance and management of con-
tract ownership units. Professional real estate investors with know-
ledge of specialized lending sources engaged in an arbitrage process
capturing the profits arising from discriminatory supply constraints
on free market transfers. The source of above-normal profits was the
different demand and supply relationships of the two market sectors.
Speculators were able to buy in the lower-price white market for cash
3and sell in the higher-price black market on credit. They were able
to benefit from racial constraints on direct transfers between market
sectors because they were willing to reject the professional norms of
the real estate industry; however, the ability to develop a large-
scale professional operation was dependent upon an ability to find a
continuous source of investment capital for their activities. Specu-
lators in this market financed the majority of the transactions with
mortgage loans from institutional lenders.
Price and profit relationships in the installment contract mar-
ket reflected a complex interaction of factors: a strong black demand
for ownership units unavailable in existing black neighborhoods, a lack
of institutional mortgage money for buyers in transitional neighbor-
hoods, the low-equity position of the average contract buyer, the risk
characteristics of the installment sale. Based on an analysis of 565
installment contract transactions, this study found that, to transfer
units to the black market, buyers contracted to pay prices which were,
on average, in excess of 80 percent of speculators' acquisition costs.
A large portion of this transfer premium was attributable to the nature
of the instrument, which in the absence of independent lending activity,
allowed the speculator to inflate prices grossly. Despite the fact
that profits from these sales were received over the term of the
contract, the estimated annual rate of return exceeded 80 percent.
These enormous returns were dependent to a large degree upon favorable
mortgage finance arrangements which minimized the equity requirements
and in many cases, yielded negative equities. The legal provisions
of the contract further reduced the ascribed risks to the speculator
from the low-equity transaction.
The major risks of contract sales were borne by the buyers.
While the obvious risk was a deferred title claim, the unanticipated
consequences of this feature were a lack of mobility and an inability
to recapture stored equity. Homeownership through contract finance
failed to provide the same type of forced savings and capital accumu-
lation that it had for middle-class mortgagors.
The development and organization of the installment contract
market in Chicago represents a specialized response to institutional
discrimination and economic arbitrage incentives. A brief review of
the characteristics of the transition process after 1966, at the time
FHA-insured mortgage money became available in inner-city neighborhoods,
indicated that the installment sale was the most suitable, but not
unique, financing instrument with which to capture profits from the
dual housing market.
Thesis Advisor: Bernard J. Frieden
Title; Professor of Urban Studies
4PREFACE
I began my dissertation studies researching the topic of neigh-
borhood lending risk at a time when "disinvestment" and "redlining"
had become key words in the debate on the causes of neighborhood
decline. After several research outlines in that direction I kept
returning to the question: If institutional mortgage credit was unavail-
able in the central city areas of minority residence, what forms of
credit facilitated the large growth in non-white, urban homeownership
between 1950 and 1970? Even if lenders followed a "redlining" lending
policy, an analysis of lending risks based on the experience of insti-
tutional mortgage lending would present only a partial understanding
of the nature of urban lending risk. An analysis of the economic and
institutional characteristics of alternative finance instruments would
compliment the existing literature and provide an understanding of the
costs and servicing requirements of the "risky" residential finance
sector.
The topic expanded beyond the focus on lending risk due to the
nature of my data source. To research the use of alternative finance
instruments in urban neighborhoods I was fortunate in benefiting from
the data collection activities of a major class action, civil rights
lawsuit involving black purchasers in installment contract sales in
Chicago, filed in early 1969 and brought to trial in 1975. Thousands
of hours of research devoted to gathering and processing the voluminous
original documents required for litigation had been completed long
before I began my research. Without the volunteer work contributed by
numerous persons, a systematic study of private, non-recorded finance
arrangements in credit-short urban neighborhoods would have remained
an obscure subject for "future research".
Several people helped me unravel the dynamics of housing trans-
fers in the installment contract market, notably Richard T. Franch and
John C. Tucker of Jenner and Block Law Offices of Chicago and Thomas
Boodell of Boodell, Sears, Surgrue, Giambalvo, Crowley, also of Chicago.
I owe a particular debt of gratitude to these persons and to the firm
of Jenner and Block; by providing me with office space, clerical and
paralegal assistance in the early stages of the data collection process,
they continued a commitment to the contract buyers of Chicago made nine
years earlier.
Others in Chicago at Jenner and Block who were generous with
their time and information included Carol R. Thigpen, attorney and
Maureen McDonald and Ellen Dugan, legal assistants. Without question,
I have benefited from the earlier work of the Contract Buyers League
and the Gamaliel Foundation. However, I remain responsible for all
interpretations of the data.
5My advisors, Bernard J. Frieden, Robert M. Fogelson, Langley
C. Keyes, Jr. and Arthur P. Solomon, patiently listened as I recon-
structed the story of installment sales and neighborhood racial change
in Chicago and the wealth of detail characteristic of a case study
before I could extract the important, generalizable components for an
analysis. They gave me the benefit of their advice and were a source
of encouragement in an otherwise lonely endeavor.
Financial support in the form of a Charles Abrams Doctoral
Fellowship was provided by the Joint Center for Urban Studies of M.I.T.
and Harvard University. Jan Lent, Ann Aubrey, and Irene Goodsell of
the Joint Center graciously assisted me with typing and graphic dis-
plays. Penny Johnson of the M.I.T. Department of Urban Studies and
Planning took particular care of the final typing and last minute
revisions.
Finally, I am deeply grateful to my husband Jim for his constant
encouragement during my many years of graduate study and his thoughtful
questioning which contributed to this dissertation. A special warmth
is reserved for my young daughter who delighted in independent play
while I worked.
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CHAPTER 1
Credit for Homeownership:
The Neglected Component of the Black Housing Problem
13
[D]efendants [contract sellers] exploited a system of de facto
segregation that existed in the City of Chicago [in] that by
taking advantage of the scarcity of housing for negroes in the
City of Chicago [they] secured unlawful advantage in the
contracts executed by plaintiffs [contract buyers].
Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment,
300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
Indeed, there is no difference in results between the tradi-
tional type of discrimination and defendants' exploitation
of a discriminatory situation. Under the former situation
blackseither pay excessive prices, or are refused altogether
from purchasing housing, while under the latter situation
they encounter oppressive terms and exhorbitant prices rela-
tive to the terms and prices available to white citizens for
comparable housing.
Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.,
No. 69 C 115 (N.D. Ill. 1969), U. S. Court of
Appeals, 7th Circuit, 501 F 2d 324 (1974).
INTRODUCTION
If you were white and interested in homeownership in Chicago in
the two decades following World War II, mortgage finance was readily
available, provided the neighborhood was not in the immediate path of
ghetto expansion. Purchase and mortgage finance were separate transac-
tions through which the buyer immediately acquired title to the property,
which he then pledged as security for payment of the mortgage debt. In
1960, the terms of an FHA-insured mortgage loan written at the statutory
maximum interest rate of 5 3/4 percent for 30 years, on an average
$11,000 property, would have been $330 downpayment and $64 monthly for
payment of principal, interest and insurance premiurm. The loan dis-
count would have been approximately $330.
14
If you were black and interested in homeownership in Chicago
in the two decades following World War II, mortgage finance was not
readily available. A buyer either proceeded with a frustrating search
for such funds or avoided the search costs by accepting the real
estate agent's "knowledge" about housing finance. This knowledge meant
that many black homebuyers signed installment sale contracts for the
purchase of a home under financing terms similar to those for purchas-
ing a consumer item such as a vacuum cleaner. Sale terms on an 8-room,
2-story brick property in a transitional neighborhood: $950 down, $130
monthly, $17,900 full price. What the advertisement did not acknowledge
was that at 7 percent interest with regular payments it would take
more than 20 years to complete repayment and only at that time would
the contract buyer secure title to the property. If at any time prior
to title transfer the buyer was delinquent, the seller had the right
to repossess the property and retain all prior contract payments.
There were two housing markets in Chicago -- one for whites,
the other for blacks. The dual market structure was characterized by
a segregated residential pattern, defined by separate economic rela-
tionships between housing demand and supply, and supported by separate
institutions, real estate actors, and available market information.
There were two sets of real estate brokers, two sets of capital sup-
pliers, and sometimes two sets of property listing books for the pro-
fessionals who conducted business in both markets.
While the scale and complexity of the black market increased
after World War II, its existence had long been part of Chicago's
historical record. Market segmentation by race was evident as early
15
as 1920, five years after the Great Migration of rural blacks into
that city.1  Residential segregation continued over the succeeding
decades such that by 1950, Chicago was one of the most intensely
segregated cities in the United States. At that time, 81 percent
of the non-white population lived in census tract areas which were
50 - 100 percent non-white; 18 percent, in mixed areas, and only 1
percent in white areas.2
Social and economic factors initially funneled black migrants
into the older central city locations which characterized previous
immigrant housing. This type of ethnic segregation was not uncommon
to cities with large immigrant populations. Immigrants had tradition-
ally clustered together because of low income, cultural heritage, de-
sires for group cohesion and external pressures from the native
majority. But with succeeding generations, residential dispersion
commonly accompanied cultural assimilation and socio-economic advance-
ment.
Black assimilation was different because it was thwarted by the
reaction of a white majority based on the visible and unchangeable fact
of race.3 Associational preferences4 and socio-economic differences 5
have explained only a fraction of the observed pattern of black residen-
tial segregation. Black segregation was not completely "voluntary",
but enforced through a series of formal and informal mechanisms --
real estate and money-lending practices, restrictive covenants, and
violence.
As early as 1908, a white property-owner organization had been
formed to prevent negro "invasion".6 The growing black population and
16
accompanying competition for living space made white property owners
hostile toward the black masses which began pouring into Chicago
after 1914. In 1917, a committee of the Chicago Real Estate Board
translated this white hostility into an explicit policy of residential
segregation. This policy -- the block-by-block negro expansion
policy -- provided the framework for limiting dispersion and perpetu-
ating the segregated residential pattern by directing ghetto expansion
into adjacent blocks.7
The ethical acceptability of the committee's policy rested upon
a negative correlation of racial change with property values. Accord-
ing to the committee, providing housing on a segregated basis was a
"financial business proposition" which did not reflect "racial preju-
dice." Dispersed sales in scattered blocks meant an "unwarranted
and unjustifiable destruction of values." Realtors had claimed that
property values dropped 30 to 60 percent "the moment the first colored
family moves into a block." To stop the scattered, "promiscuous sales,"
the committee recommended, and the Board adopted, that "in the interest
of all" every block in the Black Belt was to be "filled solidly" before
realtors could place blacks in "contiguous blocks." 8
The realtors' expansion policy did not eliminate the racial
violence which typically accompanied neighborhood transition. Violence
subsided only when large-scale construction made it possible for whites
in the areas bordering the Black Belt to move elsewhere. However,
after 1927, the legal and more respectable racial restrictive covenant
became the critical instrument to limit negro dispersion.9 Within
three years, by 1930, three-fourths of all the residential property
17
in Chicago was bound by restrictive covenants,10
By 1948, on the eve of the Supreme Court decision declaring
such restrictive covenants unenforceable in the courts, historical
restrictions on black access to housing in white areas formed the
basis of the postwar dual housing market. Real estate brokers, money
lenders, and white property owners had been conditioned to expect a
pattern of "mass invasion" and declining property values (in the white
market) when racial transition began. At the same point in time, the
intolerable housing congestion and strong housing demand of the Black
Belt provided the economic incentive for a major shift of housing
units from white to black occupancy.
War-related employment and the following years of prosperity
caused southern migration to increase above prewar years and the
ghetto problem, already evident, was exacerbated by the war-time re-
strictions on new construction. Between 1940 and 1950, the black
population of Chicago nearly doubled in size, from 227,731 to
492,265 persons. In the next decade, growth was slower but still
enormous; by 1960, the black population had grown to 812,637 and
comprised 23 percent of the city's population. 1 1
DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Until 1950, population growth had been accommodated within the
general outline of the classic Black Belt of the restrictive covenant
area. 12 By this time, the black ghetto was severely overcrowded; 24
percent of the occupied dwelling units were overcrowded. This was
six times the respective white proportion.13 During the next decade
18
the postwar building boom added 450,000 housing units to the metro-
politan area with one-fifth of them in the city, the remainder in the
suburbs, but almost all of them were for whites. 14 Given the tight,
geographically confined deteriorated housing stock, blacks were willing
to pay inflated prices for property outside the ghetto, and risk
violence to themselves and their property by entering white neighbor-
hoods. 15
The distinguishing characteristic of the black market after
World War II was the expanded financial capability for homeownership.
Although increased employment and war prosperity had not eliminated
the black-white wage and occupational differential, it had substan-
tially increased the purchasing power of the black household. Non-
white male unemployment in Chicago declined from 35 percent in 1940
to 11 percent in 1950 and remained at this level in 1960. Median non-
white family income increased from $2,500 in 1950 to $4,740 in 1960.16
Such economic improvements created new demands for homeownership
among an emerging black middle class at a time when existing ghetto
housing supply was overcrowded and of inferior quality.
From an aggregate perspective, the strong demand for additional
housing and the increased economic resources of black households
provided the push, and the growth of white suburban housing opportunities
provided the pull for neighborhood racial transition. Yet there was a
low probability fo a direct property transfer between a black "entering"
a "new" neighborhood and a white resident-seller. Two conditions
immobilized conventional real estate transactions in racially changing
neighborhoods: the racial preferences of white owners and local real-
19
tors, and the absence of institutional mortgage money. Real estate
brokers and institutional lenders, by virture of their positions as
intermediaries in the transfer process, maintained the segregated
residential pattern by their refusal to be the first to cross the
color line. In so doing, they created a market for speculators who
did not care about the expansion policy of the Real Estate Board
nor its code of ethics. These persons made a speciality of opening
up all-white blocks.
Speculators, acting as both broker and financial intermediary,
facilitated racial transition by buying in the white market and selling
in the black market. They engaged in an arbitrage process, capturing
the profits arising from discriminatory supply constraints on free
market transfers. The potential for above-normal profits in racial
transition areas was to be found in the differential demand and supply
relationships of the dual housing market. Speculators were able to
buy in the lower-priced white market and sell in the higher-priced
black market. However, in the absence of institutional mortgage
money, some form of private finance was needed to transfer or clear the
market of ownership units. Installment contract sales matched the
need.
The installment contract was not the only form of private fi-
nancing available to speculators. Purchase money mortgages, multiple-
discounted mortgages, and kited and balloon mortgages have tradition-
ally been used in the risky, "low end" residential market.18  From
the seller's perspective, in Illinois, the installment contract sale
was far superior to these other arrangements because, unlike any mort-
20
gage contract, the seller did not relinquish title to the property
until the last payment had been made unless mortgage conversion,
at a specified conversion point, was part of the contractual agreement,
The installment contract sale was a legitimate instrument for
housing purchase and finance, one with an historic tradition in
Chicago. In 1919, the Chicago Commission on Race Relations noted
that widespread "installment buying of homes", which had begun during
the period of heavy negro migration, resulted in few contract forfei-
tures but that the high burden of payments meant a lack of funds for
maintenance and repairs, which led to property "deterioration",19
Even prior to the black migration of 1915, Upton Sinclair chronicled
the use of installment sales among former immigrant groups in the
stockyard neighborhoods. Installment sales were a form of "rental"
to "make it easier to turn the party out if he did not make the
payments." 20
The distortion of the installment sale from a security agreement
into what one lawyer termed "an instrument for unbridled overreaching
coincided with the advance of the color line as professional real
estate speculators used it to arbitrage price differentials in a racially
divided housing market.21 If there had been abuses in the past, the
scale was small. Homeownership was not within the reach of many black
households and the housing stock in earlier transitional neighborhoods
was not as suitable for resident ownership as the stock in the 1950-
1970 expansion neighborhoods. Furthermore, installment contract sales
had formerly served as the low-equity finance instrument for white and
21
black homebuyers alike. In the postwar decades, expanding white
homeownership was facilitated by the low-downpayment FHA-insured
and VA-guaranteed mortgage programs. However, the underwriting
criteria of these programs effectively excluded blacks from their
benefits.
The primary argument against installment contract sales
focuses upon their abuse in the dual market and the inequities of
the contractual risk-reward relationship over time. Blacks seeking
housing outside established residential areas were compelled to buy
on an installment sale because it was the only means of black entry
into white neighborhoods. Institutional mortgage finance was not
available until the area "stabilized". Discriminatory prices resulted,
not from the increment necessary to adjust for the fact that the
payment was spread over time, but from the unequal bargaining position
of black buyers in transitional neighborhoods.
Differential Access to Credit: A Neglected Problem
In the 1950s, differential access to credit was acknowledged as
a factor affecting the extent and cost of black homeownership,2  but
it was not widely perceived as a significant part of the black housing
problem. Some observers argued that differences in credit availability
during this period were fully explained by disparities in the economic
viability of black borrowers and property parcels.23 Furthermore, since
blacks were historically renters, the issue of credit availability
affected only a small proportion of black households. The major problem
for urban minorities was obvious: severe overcrowding and substandard
housing conditions.24
22
Continual increases in the level of black homeownership in
most urban centers between 1940 and 1960 were associated with a
significant improvement in housing conditions. By 1950, 33 percent
of all U. S. non-white urban households were homeowners, a percentage
increase of 64 percent since 1940. During the next decade black
homeownership climbed to 36 percent. In Chicago, the growth in non-
white homeownership was equally impressive; by 1960, 16 percent of
black households were homeowners, compared to 8 percent in 1940.25
The impressive rise in non-white homeownership was taken as
evidence of the ability of the mortgage finance system to meet the
needs of the new market despite known obstacles such as the scarcity
of loan money, high interest costs, unusually large loan commissions
and a restricted supply of available ownership units. 26 The scarcity
of mortgage money was discounted in light of the secular increase in
mortgage money available to minorities relative to past discriminatory
treatment. High finance costs were attributed to lender unfamiliarity
with the minority mortgage market. 27
The positive perspective of homeownership gains also over-
shadowed consideration of the locational characteristics of mortgage
availability for non-whites. The "common policy" of mortgage-lending
institutions of refusing to finance the purchase of housing by non-
whites in the white and early transition neighborhoods was considered
a short-term constraint inhibiting real estate transactions.28 By
the time neighborhood "stability" had been re-established, it had
become part of the black residential area but in the interim, profes-
sional real estate speculators had filled the financing vacuum.
23
Several field observers did not that black residential expan-
sion was constrained by the availability of mortgage finance and
purchases were characterized by inflated prices and financed with
land contracts or multiple mortgages.29 Blockbusting tactics, panic
peddling salesmanship and speculative transactions in transitional
neighborhoods were recognized, but the link between the real estate
transfer and the means to finance the black purchase was unquestioned
until the early sixties. Furthermore, contract sales were generally
unrecorded. Information on the structure of transitional market
profits was private and limited to individual cities. A paucity of
systematic data inhibited comprehension of the scale and dynamics of
the alternative market of housing finance.
Legislative recognition of discrimination in housing was slow.
Only in 1962 did the prevention of discrimination in federally
assisted housing become the policy of the federal government. Conven-
tionally financed housing transactions were not covered until the
Fair Housing Act of 1968, but certain categories were still excluded.
Not until the landmark U. S. Supreme Court decision of Jones v. Mayer,
in the same year, was all discrimination, private as well as public,
banned in the sale and rental of property.30 But the Jones decision,
based on an interpretation of Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, explicitly stated that Section 1982 "is not a comprehensive
open housing law" and that it "does not deal specifically with dis-
crimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection
with the sale or rental of a dwelling.. .It does not refer explicitly
to discrimination in financing arrangements or in the provision of
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brokerage services."31
Above all, the problem of differential access to credit was
bound up in the dynamics of the dual housing market as black sought
to expand the boundaries of their segregated residential area. Direct,
individual acts of discrimination were legally distinct from their
aggregate effects upon market structure and the resultant demand and
supply relationships governing price in the black market. The "race
inflated purchase prices" and "costly financing terms extracted from
Negro purchasers" in their efforts to "acquire better housing within
the existing supply,"32 did not fit the traditional definition of
discriminatory seller conduct. This traditional conceptual model of
discrimination visualized the offender (white seller or speculator
in the instant case) dealing with both races and treating one less
favorably than the other. A seller's behavior was considered discri-
minatory and illegal if he handled whites differently than blacks.
This definition implicitly accepted the conceptualization of a single
competitive model of market behavior. If the black purchase price
reflected "what the market will bear," it was a fact of economics, not
discrimination, that the black buyer in a changing neighborhood might
pay more than the white buyer.
"Taking Advantage": An Expanded Definition of Discrimination
Traditional acts of discrimination are less frequently observed
in the dual housing market. Discrimination more commonly manifests
itself in the institutional characteristics of the housing market which
define the choices and costs of black housing search. The effect of
aggregate acts of traditional discrimination is reflected in the dual
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market structure. The black market "will bear" a higher price
because blacks lack equal bargaining power due to restricted entry
to the larger white market.
The gate keepers of racial barriers are the market discriminators
in the traditional sense. The list of white market restrictors is long
and the activities of its actors, a pyramid of support for residential
segregation. From the actions of those who refused to provide housing
on the basis of race (real estate agents, developers, private home-
owners), to the courts which gave effect to restrictive covenates, to
lending institutions and institutional investors (insurance companies,
perhaps FNMA) who imposed stricter requirements for the acquisition
of black assets, and to governmental agencies (FHA, VA) which stimu-
lated or sanctioned such activities, the dual market developed. Al-
though these restrictive activities are theoretically within the
traditional definition of discriminatory behavior, the causal link
between discriminator and victim is usually remote, with the discrimi-
natory practice operating more in the aggregate than in individual
cases.33 The effects of institutionalized discrimination are self-rein-
forcing since they can affect buyer behavior prior to entry into the
housing market. Segregated housing patterns and other forces that
deny equal access to housing, finance or information greatly reduce
the probability that black households will search for housing in
white markets.34
The first judicial recognition of the effects of discriminatory
market structure followed shortly after the Jones v. Mayer decision.
In 1969, a number of blacks who purchased homes on installment con-
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tracts in changing neighborhoods in Chicago sued their sellers in
federal court for "overcharging" them because of race. The suit
did not allege that the sellers had individually created the condi-
tions of the dual housing market in which they operated, but that they
had "exploited" this market situation and by selling at "higher prices
and more burdensome terms than similar property sold to whites,"
had earned unjust, discriminatory profits.35 Relying heavily on the
Jones v. Mayer decision, the Northern District Court of Illinois, in a
ruling on defendants' (contract sellers) motion to dismiss, attempted
to fit the buyers' claim into the traditional definition of discrimi-
nation when it stated that the sellers' conduct would have violated
Section 1982 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act if it could be shown that
they had sold property to blacks at higher prices than similar
property was or would have been sold to whites.36
This class action lawsuit, Contract Buyers League v. F & F
Investment, was radically different from the Jones v. Mayer case. In
order for the actions of the contract sellers to fit within the tra-
ditional definition of discrimination, it was necessary to make the
inference that the sellers would have treated whites differently,
since actual sales or attempts to sell to whites by defendants did not
have to be shown. As one writer subsequently emphasized, it would be
impossible to make this inference. If a "white price" was derived
through the use of "comparable" sales, the economic analysis involves
the assumption that the seller would have treated whites differently.
But in the context of the dual housing market, that assumption was
invalid. If whites could obtain housing for less in other areas, no
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white sales would occur in the black market as long as unfulfilled
black demand created numerous black buyers willing to outbid whites
for properties in changing neighborhoods. If the seller just
accepted the highest prices in the black market, as in an auction
(absent a price-fixing conspiracy), he would have done nothing to
cause the prices to be different from those in white areas. A finding
of discrimination was unlikely to be made since a lower price in the
white market showed only that there was traditional discrimination in
the market as a whole, not that the individual seller in the black
market so discriminated. 37
Six years later in 1976, in the third longest trial in the
Federal District Seventh Circuit Court, the jury, in finding for the
defendant-sellers against the contract buyers, relied upon the tradi-
tional definition of discrimination. They did not accept the argument
that the effects of the dual housing market were discriminatory.
Jurors did not believe that there was "one [market] for Whites and one
for Blacks with both seeking the same or similar housing in the same
area." It was "one market with the classic mercantile aspects --
Supply and Demand." "They were not in competition to buy; therefore,
how could you claim Whites paid less." Economics, not civil rights,
prevailed; sellers "would have charged their own mother the going
rate." 38
The significant departure from the traditional theory of dis-
crimination had occurred two years before the CBL trial in the
Contract Buyers League companion suit against sellers of new homes on
installment contracts, Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.39 In the
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appeal decision of that case, the Federal Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit set out the standards of liability of the "exploita-
tion theory of discrimination." 40 This new theory imputes liability
to parties who do not themselves discriminate in the traditional sense
but rather exploit a "situation created by socioeconomic forces
tainted by racial discrimination." The court held that it would be
a violation of Section 1982 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act for a seller
of new housing to take advantage of a racially discriminatory housing
market situation to extract from black buyers "prices and terms
unreasonably in excess of prices and terms available to white citizens
for comparable housing." 41
In the Clark decision, the court recognized the burdensome
effects upon the entire housing market caused by the aggregation of
individual acts of discrimination. It noted that the housing shortage
was "triggered not by economic phenomena but by a pattern of discrimi-
nation," and that the purpose of Section 1982 was to "eliminate all
discrimination and the effects thereof in the ownership of property."
The "exhorbitant prices and severe long-term land contract terms"
perpetuate a system of racial residential segregation" by tieing
blacks to housing in segregated inner-city neighborhoods "from which
they can only hope to escape someday without severe financial loss."
"[E]xtracting from blacks resources much needed for other necessities
of life" reduces the probability that they will escape from a position
of social inequality. Furthermore, by providing an "unattractive yet
alternative" form of housing purchase, defendant-sellers' sales on a
29
land installment contract "deflects or forestalls" overt discrimina-
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tion by others and encourages such discrimination.
These two civil rights cases were initiated by the Contract
Buyers League, an organization founded in 1967 by a group of Jesuits
and college students for the purpose of renegotiating the installment
contracts and obtaining mortgage financing.43 The activities of the
League attracted national publicity and focused attention on the
bounds of prudent speculative profits in discriminatory housing mar-
kets.44 They also attracted the interest of the Nixon administration,
which led the U. S. Justice Department to file an amicus curiae brief,
the first of its kind to be submitted at the trial level, during
consideration of the motions to dismiss in Contract Buyers League v.
F & F Investment.4 5
CONFLICTING VIEWS ON THE COMPETITIVE NATURE OF THE HOUSING MARKET
Because the traditional conceptualization of discrimination
focuses on individual acts of differential treatment, there has been
minimal research directed toward quantifying the discriminatory costs
arising from institutional discrimination, in particular, differential
access to housing finance. This represents a significant gap in our
understanding of the role of race in urban housing markets because
differential access directly affects the competitive position of the
black household in the metropolitan market and the probability and
costs of black homeownership.
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The main body of economic research has focused on the question:
Do black households pay more, consume more or less housing than simi-
larly situated white households? It has generally been assumed that
individuals possessed equal bargaining power in a single, competitive
market. Despite the fact that there has been general agreement re-
garding the empirical facts amassed to date -- that blacks have in
the past paid higher prices than whites for the "same" bundle or
received a smaller bundle for the same price -- there is no such con-
sensus on the causes of such price differentials. This is partially
attributable to a critical methodological problem of much early
research. These studies often did not have an adequate specification
of the housing bundle being purchased. Nonetheless, disagreement on
the causes of these white-black price differentials often reflects a
different conceptual approach to defining the role of race in urban
housing markets and the results of these analytical studies may not
provide an unambiguous statement of the cause(s) of the differentials.
The division of opinion, between orthodox and dual housing market
theories, parallels the judicial conceptualization of traditional and
exploitation theories of discrimination.
Orthodox economic models provide a theory of housing price
determination and consumption with an extra term -- the discrimination
coefficient. Race affects this coefficient either through pure indi-
vidual price discrimination or individual preferences for housing in
neighborhoods with certain social compositions.46 In those models
of urban residential choice which incorporate discriminatory behavior,
price differentials result because white sellers of housing have an
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aversion to dealing with blacks and will do so only if they receive
compensation higher than what they would receive if they sold to a
white.
The primary orthodox treatment of race in economic models of
the housing market portrays housing exchanges taking place in a com-
petitive market with transfer dependent only upon the satisfaction of
individual tastes. Under the most common set of assumptions, whites
prefer segregation and blacks prefer integration. Therefore, white
households pay a premium. to live apart from blacks and blacks pay
a premimum to live close to white neighborhoods. Prices for whites
are higher in the white interior than at the white-black boundary,
and prices for blacks are higher at the white-black boundary than in
the black interior. Different preference assumptions produce different
price patterns, 47 but unlike pure race discrimination, price differen-
tials always operate on a neighborhood level rather than on an indivi-
dual basis. Segregation results from voluntary self-selection based on
preferences for homogeneity, not discrimination.48 Market imperfec-
tions -- racial discrimination and neighborhood externalities -- affect
the pattern of housing transition,49 cause temporary disequilibrium
lengthening the time necessary to achieve equilibrium, but in the long-
run, competition eliminates any discriminatory price differentials. 50
The alternative conceptualization presented by the dual housing
market hypothesis challenges the assumption of a single, competitive
market. Instead, the urban housing market is conceptualized as a
series of submarkets segmented by race and income. The observed neigh-
borhood price differentials between black and white markets are attri-
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buted to collusive behavior among white actors in the housing market,
which restricts equal access to housing units and forces the price
inside the black submarket above the price for similar housing in the
white submarket. 51 Although the market must be highly organized for
this pattern of exclusion to be effective, historical restrictions
on black access to housing opportunities in white neighborhoods have
been open and explicit.52 Given this type of noncompetitive market
structure, blacks must pay a premium to transfer units from the white
to the black market. The size of this premium. depends upon the extent
of prejudice, the organization of the market and the mechanisms
available to enforce market separation. 53 The racial difference_
between markets, not individual households, determines price. The
pattern of higher ghetto neighborhood price differentials predicted
by the dual housing market hypothesis may resemble the pattern pre-
dicted under the individual preference hypothesis. This occurs under
two situations: if blacks prefer segregation and whites prefer integra-
tion or are indifferent or if blacks have a stronger preference than
whites for segregation. Therefore, a comparison of these price diffe-
rentials would not allow the researcher to distinguish between alter-
native explanations. 54
The underlying assumption of black preferences for segregation
does not conform with survey research indicating that blacks favor
living in integrated neighborhoods. Surveys in 1963 and 1966 revealed
that 64 and 68 percent of the respective random samples of blacks
favored living in integrated neighborhoods. In comparison, in both
years 20 percent or fewer black respondents favored all-black neigh-
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borhoods.55
The assumption of a single, competitive market implies that a
black household is able to buy the same housing bundle in a black
neighborhood as a white household in a white neighborhood. Access
and purchase is therefore singularly dependent upon price and indivi-
dual ability to pay for the bundle. Under the individual preference
hypothesis, if whites prefer segregation and blacks prefer integration,
blacks would be willing to pay more than whites for housing at the
white-black boundary. But if non-pecuniary causes of limited access
preclude blacks purchasing equivalent housing bundles, then again,
the comparison of black-white price differentials would not allow the
researcher to distinguish between alternative hypotheses. The existence
of a black-white price differential in border neighborhoods is not an
unambiguous statement of preferences for integration. The price
effects in competitive economic models attributed to black tastes for
integration may reflect prior restrictions on housing choice. The
willingness of blacks to spend a disproportionate amoung of their
income on housing in transition neighborhoods may therefore be misin-
terpreted as preferences for living among whites,when in fact it may
be a measure of the demand for better physical housing and public
services that are unavailable in black neighborhoods, rather than a
social preference for white neighbors.
This "better services" argument is confirmed in at least one
study of desegregationin Chicago's suburbs. The report concluded
that "Negro families do not move to accomplish integration but rather
to obtain good housing in a good neighborhood with good schools,
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institutions and facilities."56
Orthodox models assume that institutional relationships for
the supply of credit in housing markets are fixed and therefore do
not interact with the determination of housing price or consumption
in the models. But these relationships do change in neighborhoods
undergoing transition. By abstracting from housing purchase agreements,
under the assumption of perfect capital markets, these models impli-
citly assume that the effects arising from differential access to
credit are neutral. But by one researcher's estimate, these factors
have had a significant effect on the extent of black homeownership. 58
Moreover, when differential access affects the type of sales transac-
tion as well as the price, as evidenced in the installment contract
market, empirical analyses which do not consider the purchase arrange-
ment may fail to distinguish the cause of the higher observed prices
paid by blacks for "comparable" bundles.
The assumption of market competition in orthodox economic
analyses of race and housing choice has precluded consideration of the
relationship between market organization and discrimination. The
models do not consider if and how racial discrimination and existing
patterns of segregation affect housing searches, access to credit and,
hence, the set of purchase opportunities. Since these factors do affect
black access to white neighborhoods, comparisons of "equivalent" hous-
ing bundles are conceptually flawed because they are not comparable
bundles. Thus,dual housing market researchers emphasize that the
relevant comparison is the cost of black preferences in the white
market and the cost of white preferences in the black market. Per-
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fectly constructed empirical analyses of price differentials have only
an indirect bearing on housing policy issues because discrimination
takes on many forms and price analyses do not explain the mechanisms
of differential treatment in the marketplace. Most significantly,
conventional price analyses fail to measure the full costs of restric-
tions on residential choice and market segmentation. These include
the non-price risks attached to alternative forms of housing credit.
OWNERSHIP TRANSFERS IN THE DUAL HOUSING MARKET: A CASE STUDY OF THE
INSTALLMENT CONTRACT MARKET IN CHICAGO
The causes of black-white price differentials must be examined
through a broad consideration of the housing supply adjustment process
in the segregated housing market, one which examines the competitive
nature of the marketplace and the barriers to open housing opportuni-
ties. A theory of discrimination in urban housing markets should be
able to explain what gives white households the power to exclude blacks
from their neighborhoods. The enforcement mechanism in competitive
orthodox economic models is the white buyer's segregation premium
(individual preference hypothesis) or white seller's discrimination
premium (seller's aversion hypothesis). In both cases price controls
entry and the higher cost theoretically discourages a black from
buying into a white neighborhood. This would imply a spatial pattern
of segregation first by income and then by race. Yet these models are
inconsistent with the empirical existence of a single ghetto concen-
tration and the absence of higher income black households hopping over
poorer white households. 57
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The dual market perspective recognizes in theory and empirical
research that each market is characterized by separate supply and
demand functions and possibly different suppliers and institutions.
Although it posits racial price differentials to be a function of dis-
criminatory processes segmenting the market and constraining direct
black entry into white neighborhoods, the main body of empirical
research has focused on explaining these racial price differentials
on the basis of premium s attached to particular characteristics of
the housing bundle. As an alternative explanation to the orthodox
model of a single, competitive housing market, the dual hypothesis
must explain the difference between a temporary disequilibrium which
modifies price relationships and the existence of a separatepermanent
market structure. As a guide for policy prescription, it must explain
how institutional market barriers develop, enforce segmentation by
limiting mobility, and why competition fails to eliminate these
barriers to household mobility.
This dissertation analyzes the linkage between institutional
discrimination in the housing market and the market costs of discrimi-
nation through a case study of the development and economic behavior
of the alternative homeownership market in racially changing neighbor-
hoods in Chicago. The two segments of the dual housing market interact
in neighborhoods experiencing racial change. Although economic incen-
tives fuel neighborhood transition, ownership transfers in these areas
must overcome the institutional factors that previously maintained
residential exclusion. Differential access to mortgage credit has
been an important enforcement mechanism. Alternative sources of hous-
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ing finance, such as land installment contracts, have, in the past,
filled the credit vacuum in residential areas of impending racial
change and have provided the means for black entry into white neigh-
borhoods.59 An analysis of the characteristics of housing transfers
between white and black markets, through the medium of contract sales,
provides a means of assessing the costs arising from institutional
constraints on residential choice.
Chicago was not the only urban area where installment contract
sales characterized ownership transfers between racially divided
housing markets. Published reports indicated such activity in Detroit,
Baltimore, Denver, Albany, Portland, and Madison.60 However, the fact
that installment contract sales were rarely publicly recorded has
hindered systematic study of their use. Prior studies that have
analyzed property transfers and price dynamics in racial transition
neighborhoods have been based on sample data from recorded property
transfers and stated revenue stamps. This data source generally
produced a biased sample since they rarely included the speculator-
black buyer installment sale transactions which comprised the majority
of transactions during initial neighborhood change.61 Furthermore,
federal revenue stamps on acquisitions in transitional neighborhoods
were often biased upward to conceal the speculator's real purchase
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price.
By focusing the research on Chicago, this case study is able to
overcome the above problems because the data collection process for the
Contract Buyers League litigation produced a unique, large body of
information on installment contract sales. These installment sales
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were transactions on 1-4 -family homes which took place between 1952
and 1968.
As a case study of the dynamics of racial change, this disser-
tation follows a long historical tradition of studies which have
examined the relationships between ghetto expansion and housing
prices in the city of Chicago. The conclusions of Chicago's research
history have ranked correlations of ethnicity and property values
whcih subsequently found expression in FHA Underwriting Manuals,
defined the neighborhood life-cycle hypothesis, contributed key ele-
ments to the filtering concept, stimulated the concept of the dual
housing market, and provided a laboratory for the individual preference
hypothesis which has led to the development of the arbitrage model of
neighborhood succession.63
Market Arbitrage: The Role of the Speculator
Collusion among realtors, sellers and money lenders to limit
the availability of housing to blacks in order to profit from artifi-
cially stimulated higher prices has commonly been rejected by economists
because of the inherent instability of collusive agreements among
market participants.64 Restrictive agreements collapse because there
are always some actors who are willing to break the agreement to benefit
from potential windfall profits.
The activities of blockbusters and speculators who arbitrage
racial preferences and transaction price differentials between white
and black households have always been considered proof of the instabi-
lity of alleged collusive agreements. In competitive models, specula-
tors function to clear the market by transferring units between sub-
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markets segmented by incomes, tastes, and race. This type of arbitrage
is considered to be a natural part of the filtering mechanism. It is
assumed that competition resulting from high profits in this trans-
action eventually eliminates any racial price effects.
The persistence of excess profits in speculative transactions in
racailly changing neighborhoods suggests that competition does not
completely eliminate the particular market mismatches between housing
demand and supply, or that speculators possess specialized knowledge
or resources which inhibit entry of sufficient competitors to affect
price-setting behavior, or both. As a consequence, speculators in
these situations possess a degree of monopoly power which allows them
to benefit from constrained black mobility due to discriminatory access.
There is little systematic research on the operations of
speculators with which to assess the competitive nature of the arbitrage
process and the barriers to direct transactions. The information which
does exist suggests that speculative real estate transactions result
in an expansion of the black residential area but that speculators earn
extremely large profits.65
Chapter 2 of this dissertation addresses this issue by focusing
on the structure and operations of the installment contract sales
market. How extensively were contracts utilized in racially changing
neighborhoods? Who were the contract buyers? Why did they purchase
on an installment contract? Who were the speculators? Why did they
sell instead of rent the property? How much competition existed in
this market? Were there barriers to entry?
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Involvement of Financial Institutions
Since homeownership represents the acquisition of an expensive,
durable commodity, as well as a long-term investment, most households
depend upon some form of long-term credit arrangement to finance the
purchase. Although overt discrimination against blacks in the provision
of mortgage or credit was not uncommon in the early 1950s, institu-
tionalized discrimination affecting mortgage loan criteria has been
a more pervasive form of discrimination differentially impacting black
households.
The line between overt and institutionalized discrimination is
often unclear because loan evaluation is a function of borrower credit
and property characteristics, and both sets have been affected by
discrimination and patterns of residential segregation. Lenders can
practice overt discrimination while appearing to be objective by
relying on screening devices or formal underwriting criteria that have
been heavily influenced by biased, but commonly accepted, standards of
property evaluation and by the results of past institutionalized dis-
crimination in other economic markets. Examples of this procedural
bias have been found frequently in the housing finance literature: the
FHA "economic life" criteria for neighborhooods, discounting income
from secondary jobs and working wives, rejecting credit references
from auto loan or small-loan agencies. Procedural bias causes the
objective risk of a black household with the same income as that of a
white to be higher on average. Therefore, nondiscriminatory applica-
tion of the above type of underwriting standards to mortgage applicants
often results in racially discriminatory lending patterns. 66
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Financial institutions have played a more obvious role in
maintaining non-economic barriers to mobility between white and
black housing markets. Institutional support for residential segre-
gation is manifested in the common withdrawal of mortgage credit in
racially "threatened" neighborhoods or by the refusal of lenders to
finance the purchase of black "entry" into a white neighborhood. The
effects of this form of discrimination are self-reinforcing because
they can affect buyer behavior prior to entry into the housing
market and greately reduce the probability that a black household will
search for housing in white neighborhoods.67
Financial institutions directly contributed in two ways to the
creation and growth of the installment contract market. Procedural
bias and the policy of "no integration" loans helped create the
arbitrage market in racial transition areas. Many of these lenders
then supported the speculator's activities by providing mortgage
finance for contract transactions. Chapter 3 examines how these
institutional factors shaped and supported the development of the
installment contract market. It then questions the nature of the
linkage between real estate speculation in contract sales and institu-
tional lending. By addressing these issues, the chapter examines the
barriers to direct transactions between white and black households in
changing neighborhoods.
Price, Profit and Risk
Research on black-white price differentials has primarily been
concerned with the overall level of housing prices in the ghetto and
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in all-white neighborhoods. This focus results from the concern of
economic models with long-term equilibrium effects. This type of
analysis fails to examine the short-term market structure and dynamics
of racial transition which often result in temporary price deviations
in transitional areas. The fact that the long-term price relation-
ships in the area may equal those in all-white neighborhoods does
not negate the importance of the short-term discriminatory effects.
These factors have their greatest impact in the market for owner-occu-
pied units.
The dynamics of ownership transfers are important because the
characteristics of the transfer generally depend on the form of
long-term credit, and affect both the equity recovery of the white
resident-seller and the long-term finance commitment of the black
purchaser. If institutional mortgage finance is not available prior
to and in the early stages of transition, white resident-owners, by
selling to speculators at a discount, fail to recover their full home
equity. Although the seller can personally finance the sale by taking
back a purchase money mortgage or using an installment contract, the
deferred payment and long pay-back period subsequently constrain his
housing purchase decision. Entering black households must rely on the
more expensive non-institutional forms of housing finance which
generally inflate the price and debt burden.
The impacts of credit availability on ownership transfers are
important because homeownership has been the traditional form of
forced savings and capital accumulation for the majority of low- and
middle-income households. Equities in single-family owner-occupied
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structures accounted for nearly one-half of all the wealth of the
lowest income group in 1962.68
The characteristics of ownership transfers between white and
black households in changing neighborhoods are an important part of
the dual housing market hypothesis. There has been little systematic
research of these transfers which has included consideration of the
credit supply constraint on the form as well as price of the trans-
action. Chapter 4 attempts to fill this gap in our knowledge about
urban housing markets. It analyzes two related issues: What is the
form and size of the premium required to shift units between housing
market segments? How much of this premium is associated with the
contract finance mechanism?
Information on speculative property transfers in these changing
neighborhoods represents a prime source of data for analyzing the dis-
criminatory costs of restricted access because price comparison in
the white acquisition-black sale transaction is based on the identical
bundle of housing services. Without the need to standardize the
complex, heterogeneous characteristics of housing services, the
research can focus on price differentials and "turnover" profits
which arise from differential market demand and supply relationships.
Because the installment sale transaction includes finance
arrangements, sale payment is spread out over the term of the contract.
For the buyer in Illinois, there are two major risks to this arrange-
ment: deferred title ownership, and lack of equity rights with rapid
eviction in the event of default. These nonprice terms of sale place
the contract buyer in an inferior position compared to the purchaser
44
in a deed and mortgage transaction.
The risks of contract nonpayment have been the primary justi-
fication given by contract speculators for the inflated installment
sales prices. While the terms of the contract includedadditional
payments for interest, contract speculators maintained that it was insuf-
ficient for the low-equity transaction, and that the inflated price
only capitalized the finance and holding costs of the risky investment.
Nevertheless, speculators in this arbitrage market operated under
extremely favorable legal and financial arrangements. How did these
factors alter the real risk exposure of contract speculators? What
was the payment experience of contract sales? These issues are examined
in Chapter 5.
The development and organization of the installment contract
sales market in Chicago represented a specialized response to insti-
tutional discrimination and economic arbitrage incentives. How charac-
teristic was the response? Are the lessons of this market tied to the
specific financing instrument? What changes occurred in the transition
process with the availability of FHA-insured mortgage finance? Through
an analysis of the FHA underwriting policy reforms, Chapter 6 argues
that the abuse of the installment sale was the precursor to the abuse
of FHA financing. Prior to the availability of FHA-insured mortgages
in transition neighborhoods, the land installment contract was the most
suitable, but not unique, finance instrument with which to capture
profits from the dual housing market.
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CHAPTER 2
The Market of Installment Contract Sales
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And they [the lending institutions] didn't even bother to check
our credit, or how much we had to put down. So we had to buy
on contract. It was contract or not at all.
Contract buyer, Chicago.
J. M. Fitzgerald, "The Contract Buyers League".
In September, 1960, the Carpenters purchased a 40-year-old,
two-flat masonry building for $26,000 in West Garfield Park, Chicago.
They paid $1,250 downpayment and signed an installment contract which
required them to pay the $24,750 balance over a 25-year period. After
50 percent of the principal had been paid, the contract allowed them
the option of obtaining a mortgage from the seller. The contract
specified $175 per month for payment of the principal and interest
(at 7 percent); with payments for taxes and insurance, their monthly
obligation totaled $200. Unknown to them at the time, the seller had
recently purchased the property from an Italian resident-owner for
$14,200 and had secured a mortgage from a savings and loan institution
for $15,000. After signing the mortgage agreement, the seller's
cash investment totaled $147; after the closing of the installment
sale, within three weeks of his purchase, the seller had already
secured a cash return of $1,103. Over the term of the contract he
could expect a monthly gross cash flow of $59 (the difference between
the monthly contract and mortgage obligations). The net paper profit,
after accounting for financing costs and repairs and estimated selling
costs, was 67 percent.
At the same time, in Washington Heights on Chicago's south
side, the Carters purchased a new 5 1/2 room single-family home for
$21,450. After being told by the sales agent that they had insufficient
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collateral for a GI mortgage, they paid a 7 percent downpayment and
signed an installment contract for the outstanding balance of $19,950
payable at $125 per month for principal and interest (at 6 1/2 percent)
for approximately 28 years. With payments for taxes and insurance,
their monthly payments totaled $150. On paper this represented a gross
profit of 43 percent for the construction-selling company; after a 26
percent addition for overhead and profit, the deferred net profit was
14 percent. These paper profits did not present the full picture
of investment return. At the time of buyer possession, the selling
company's direct cash investment totaled approximately $96.50 and
would be paid back after just four months of contract payments.
Land installment contracts (LICs) are officially titled
"articles for agreement for warranty deed", "trustee's deed" or
simply "contract for deed". Although legally viewed as a "wholly
executory contract of sale" with the subject of the bargain to be
transfered only upon fulfillment of all contract conditions, install-
ment contracts are functionally financing instruments with the seller
as financier freed from lending limitations and conventional mortgage
strictures common to savings and loan associations.
Land installment contracts used in Illinois commonly waive a
long list of conventional buyer ownership rights. Although the buyer
is entitled to federal income tax deductions for property taxes and
interest payments,2 the seller retains title ownership until payments
are complete. There are practically no statutory provisions constrain-
ing land contracts except for the usury rate governing mortgage loans.
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The seller's most strategic tool is his ability to utilize
any remedy the law provides in the event of the buyer's default
on the contract.3  Invariably this means that the seller prefers
the statutory forcible entry and detainer (eviction) procedure,
originally designed for trespassers and tenants in default of rent.
In Chicago, this procedure was swift and streamlined.4
Due to the advantages the installment contract offers the
seller -- control over loan collateral and rapid remedies in the
event of default -- it has long been regarded as the alternative to
mortgage finance for high-risk properties and low-equity purchasers,
a temporary financing vehicle in periods of tight money, and a means
to get around the legal restriction on loan interest rates. A contract
could be made to yield a return greater than that allowed by the
state usury ceiling by inflating the sale price to be financed at the
legal rate. The contract could then be sold at a discount to provide
the amount of dollars equivalent to a cash sale and a yield to the
purchaser equivalent to a low downpayment second mortgage.5
The installment contract is the choice instrument of the seller,
not the buyer-borrower, since it offers the latter few advantages over
a mortgage. The unsophisticated buyer-borrower in an installment
contract transaction not only fails to acquire title ownership and
equity rights, he loses the institutional protection against "bad"
investments customary to mortgage finance. There are four major
influences, generally absent from the installment sale transaction,
that protect the middle-income buyer with mortgage finance. The
first of these influences is the FHA, which protects the middle-income
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buyer by requiring that quality be commensurate with price. The
second beneficial influence is the lending institution, which
while protecting its own interests, insures that the buyer does not
excessively overpay. The third influence, an active market in housing
and credit supply, allows an unknowing buyer to "step in and take
the 'going rate' without having to do any serious bargaining" because
"knowledgeable participants" influence the market. The entire system
of common law and statutory protection, which has developed over the
years to help buyers in their dealings with mortgage lenders, is the
fourth institutional influence.6
The main argument against installment contract sales focuses
on its abuse as a financing instrument, the purchase price distortions
and the inequities of the risk-reward relationship over the term of
the contract. Discriminatory prices result not from the increment
necessary to adjust for the fact that the payment is spread over time,
but from the unequal bargaining position of black buyers. This posi-
tion results from the segregated character of the housing market, and
strong demand among blacks for additional housing units. Comparisons
between "comparable" units in white and black markets are comparisons
between two different opportunity sets: the black market with its
strong demand and artificially short supply and the white market with
its relatively lesser demand and absolutely greater supply. Simple
economics would dictate a price differential between black border
areas (and pockets of new housing) and the white market at large. 7
Regardless of internal competition in the black market, as long as
the two markets remain effectively separate through restricted access,
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and black housing demand does not match the available housing stock,
intermediaries who shift units between markets may earn "discrimina-
tory" profits.8 Such profits do not depend upon traditional acts of
discriminatory pricing by the seller. The seller only needs to
charge "what the market will bear." Installment contract sales pro-
vided a convenient instrument for earning such profits but their
source lay within the dual structure of the market.
THE MARKET OF INSTALLMENT CONTRACT SALES
Financing Neighborhood Racial Transition: Installment Sales of
Existing Homes
For two decades following World War II, contract sales were
widespread in transitional neighborhoods contiguous to Chicago's
expanding black ghetto. More than just numerous individual transac-
tions between white sellers and black buyers, contract sales were
dominated by speculative real estate activity and developed into a
specialized market for the transfer, finance and management of contract-
ownership units. Professional real estate investors with knowledge
of specialized lending sources brokered racial change, selling through
newly organized or established local real estate agents. Contract
properties were managed individually or through arrangements with
specialized management companies. A small "secondary market" for
this risky contract paper provided a speculator with a means to
liquidate his holdings.
Even the conventions of the contract market differed from those
in stable real estate markets. Property "scouts" specialized in
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"finding" properties for speculators and real estate agents often
received amortized sales commissions contingent upon continued buyer
payment performance. Multiple transfers among straw parties arti-
ficially increased the recorded turnover of property and inflated
prices for federal revenue tax stamps9 generated an appearance of
price appreciation. These actions were taken to inflate the public
record of market activity prior to black purchase and support higher
property appraisals for greater financial leverage. Coupled with
the ownership of property in blind land trusts, 10 they revealed a
pattern of concealment which tacitly acknowledged manipulation of
the market.
Was land contract financing the exclusive means of housing
finance in racially changing neighborhoods? Ideally, one would
approach this question by looking at the distribution of housing
credit by type of credit across neighborhoods representative of all
stages of racial transition and then ask: What are the characteristics
of those neighborhoods (properties and buyers) where installment
sales are preeminent which would explain the difference in the source
of housing credit? Given this type of information, it would then be
possible to begin to make inferences about the connection between
neighborhood racial transition and the supply of housing finance. It
is impossible to gather such data for the time period in which contract
sales were a dominant feature of the Chicago black housing market.
Installment contract sales were rarely recorded at the time of pur-
chase. The standard contract form contained a clause probibiting
recording of the contract in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds;11
in addition, the buyer generally lacked the legal knowledge to give
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public notice of his interest in the property. This non-recording
feature of contracts biases systematic investigation of the range
of housing finance sources across neighborhoods.
The data for this study overcomes this past constraint by
drawing upon the litigation research generated by the two class-action
civil rights suits filed by the Contract Buyers League early in 1969
in Chicago.12 The trial data has yielded a unique body of information
for a case study of installment contract finance. The main limitation
of this data source is the inability to draw a random, representative
sample from the population of contract sales. This arises from the
nature of the legal proceedings. As defined by the U. S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
(Chicago), the "universe" of 2,600 contract sales is significantly
smaller than the true population of sales within the 1952-1968 time
frame. 13  Nevertheless, this "universe" does include the largest
speculators and those with continuous sales throughout the most
active period of contract activity. The analysis of characteristics
of contract sales in the following section is based upon a sample
of 419 transactions from this universe.14
To conform to the data available, the initial question must be
rephrased: What is the distribution of contract sale neighborhoods
by stage of racial transition? Table 2-1 presents this distribution
by census tract neighborhoods following Duncan and Duncan's six-stage
classification of neighborhood racial succession.15 More than 65
percent of the sample contract transactions were in neighborhoods
of recent racial transition (invasion or penetration). Fourteen per-
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TABLE 2-1
Distribution of Installment Contract
Succession 1950-60, 1960-70
Sample by Stage of Racial
Stage of Racial Succession* Number Percent
All White 59 14.2
Penetration 28 6.7
Invasion 245 58.9
Early Consolidation 14 3.3
Consolidation 54 13.0
Late Consolidation 10 2.4
Piling Up 6 1.4
TOTAL 416 100.0+
SOURCE: Otis D. Duncan and Beverly Duncan, The Negro Population of
Chicago: A Study of Residential Succession (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1957). Definition for Penetration not specified.
+ Total may not add to 100 due to rounding.
* Properties identified by census tract classified by stage of racial
succession for two time periods, 1950-60 or 1960-70, depending upon
the transaction period. The 1950-60 classification was used for
purchases between 1950-62; the 1960-70 classification for those
purchased between 1963-68.
All White: no change in racial status of census tract.
Penetration: noticeable change from complete white occupancy pattern;
but less than 250 non-white residents in 1960 (1970); increase in
absolute number and percent non-white population between 1950-1960
(1960-1970); percent non-white greater than 0.7% in 1960 (1970).
Invasion: less than 2% of population non-white in 1950 (1960) and less
than 250 non-white residents in 1950 (1960); 250 or more non-whites in
1960 (1970).
Early Consolidation: 2% or more of population non-white in 1950 (1960);
250 or more non-white residents in 1960 (1970) but less than 250 in
1950 (1960).
Consolidation: less than 80% of population non-white in 1950 (1960);
250 or more non-white residents in 1950 (1960) and 1960 (1970).
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Late Consolidation: 80.0-97.4% of population non-white in 1950 (1960);
90% or more of population non-white in 1960 (1970); 250 or more non-
white residents in both years.
Piling Up: 97.5% or more of population non-white in both 1950 (1960)
and 1960 (1970); 250 or more non-white residents in both years.
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cent of the sample sales occurred in all-white neighborhoods which
subsequently experienced transition. In comparison, only 17 percent
of the sample transactions involved properties located in established
black neighborhoods (consolidation, late consolidation, piling up).
As shown in Table 2-2, the use of installment contract sales in
transition neighborhoods was most pronounced in the west side sector
of black expansion and during the 1950-1960 decade. During this time
period, contract sale activity appeared in approximately 87 percent
of all invasion tracts in Chicago; the only invasion area noteably
unaffected by contract activity was Hyde Park, where there was an
organized effort to keep speculators out of the area. 16 In contrast,
contract sales were evident in only 34 out of 86, or 40 percent, of the
1960-1970 invasion tracts. While the west side continued to experi-
ence heavy contract sale activity between 1960-1970, LIC activity
appeared in only selected south side 1960-1970 transition areas,
mainly those community areas that had experienced some transition
in the earlier decade.
Expansion of the black residential area between 1950-1970
represented a continuation of the 1940-1950 path of invasion on the
west side into the Near West Side and North Lawndale communities, and
on the south side,the communities of Oakland, Kenwood and Woodlawn.
If this expansion continued on the path typical for Chicago, it would
follow the routes of rapid transportation in the direction of better
housing. Both Wallace and deVise demonstrated that of all neighbor-
hoods contiguous to the prewar Black Belt, expansion proceeded in
those areas of least ethnic resistence and of relatively better
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TABLE 2-2
Distribution of Invasion Census Tracts
1950-1960, 1960-1970, by Geographic Sector, City of
Chicago Compared with the Presence of Installment
Contract Sale Activity
1950-1960 1960-1970
Number Percent Number Percent
Total Number of Invasion
Census Tracts
City of Chicago 69 100.0 86 100.0
North side 1 1.5 6 7.0
West side 29 42.0 22 25.6
South side 39 56.5 58 67.4
Invasion Census Tracts
with Evidence of
Installment Contract
Activity
All Areas 60 87.0 34 39.5
West side 28 40.6 13 15.1
South side 32 46.4 21 24.4
NOTE: Distribution of installment contract sales activity from CBL
Universe of contract properties; the assumption is that the sale
took place in decade of initial racial transition.
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housing quality. The comparison made by deVise of 1950 white con-
tiguous census tracts which were consolidated black settlements by 1960
with those remaining white revealed several interesting facts:17
. Three-fifths of the highest quintile of income tracts,
as compared to only one-fourth of the lowest income
tracts, became succession tracts.
- Two-thirds of the highest rent, contiguous tracts in 1950
were added to the Negro residential area by 1960. In
contrast, only 16 percent of the lowest rent tracts under-
went transition.
- The percent of dilapidated units in contiguous succession
census tracts averaged 3 percent in contrast to 5 percent
for contiguous nonsuccession tracts.
- The ethnic groups most resistant to change were the Polish
and Italian foreign-born.
While deVise noted that higher-income persons were able to move more
easily, Wallace and Philpott argued persuasively that white restrictive
action, noteably racial covenants and racial violence, historically
conditioned and mediated the terms under which Negro expansion took
place. Since violence often accompanied expansion of the Black
Belt, poor housirzg did not constitute a goal worth fighting for. 18
Installment contract sales occurred in areas of early postwar
ghetto expansion, Near West Side, Oakland, Woodlawn and Kenwood, but
the scale of sales activity appears to have been minor. Compared to
the community areas of subsequent heavy contract activity, North
Lawndale, East and West Garfield Park, Greater Grand Crossing, Engle-
wood, and West Englewood (east of Ashland Avenue); the housing stock
in the former areas was primarily multi-family structures which
presented fewer opportunities for nonprofessional, resident ownership
(Table 2-3).
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TABLE 2-3
Selected Characteristics of Transition Community Areas, City of Chicago, 1960
Community Area Percent Population Percent Owner- Percent Units, Percent Units, in
Nonwhite Occupied Units One-Two Flat Structures with
1950 1960 1970 1960 Structures, More than 51960 Units, 1960
I. 1950 EARLY
TRANSITION AREAS*
East Garfield Park 16.7 61.5 98.0 13.4 22.9 47.0
North Lawndale 13.1 91.1 96.3 17.9 25.9 38.9
Kenwood 9.7 83.9 78.9 8.6 15.2 74.8
Greater Grand Crossing 5.8 85.8 98.1 34.9 53.5 29.3
Englewood 10.5 68.9 96.4 26.8 52.4 25.2
Roseland 18.4 22.6 55.1 61.3 85.4 8.0
II. 1960 EARLY
TRANSITION AREAS
West Garfield Park 0.0 15.8 96.8 20.5 31.0 40.8
South Lawndale 2.0 5.9 10.3 39.8 60.3 10.4
South Shore 0.2 9.6 69.0 21.1 25.8 63.3
West Englewood** 6.0 11.7 48.3 50.9 78.0 7.8
Washington Heights 0.2 12.5 74.7 74.5 85.4 7.2
II. 1970 EARLY
TRANSITION AREAS
Humbolt Park 0.1 0.6 19.4 35.3 50.0 19.8
IV. OTHERS
1950 PAST TRANSITION
Near West Side 40.9 53.8 72.2 9.6 24.2 51.5
Fuller Park 49.7 96.0 96.9 28.4 51.2 11.4
Woodlawn 38.8 89.1 95.8 8.8 15.0 71.0
Oakland 77.4 98.2 98.9 5.9 14.5 72.9
1960 PAST TRANSITION
Chatham 0.8 63.7 97.5 5.9 45.6 40.2
1970 PAST TRANSITION
Auburn Gresham 0.0 0.2 68.7 53.1 66.8 23.5
Austin 0.1 0.0 32.5 37.7 53.3 33.2
SOURCE: Local Community Fact Book Chicago Metropolitan Area 1960, E. M. Kitagawa and K. E.
Taueber, eds. (Chicago: Chicago Community Inventory, University of Chicago, 1963).
* Early transition community areas defined as having a black population equal to or more
than 5 percent but equal to or less than 30 percent in the stated year.
** Technically West Englewood was in early transition by 1950 but there had been a clear
dividing line (Ashland Ave). between white and black West Englewood; 1960 transition is
a more realistic classification.
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The most significant sustained period of contract sales began
about 1955 on the west side in North Lawndale and on the south side
in Englewood. Figure 2-1 provides a map of contract activity by
Chicago community areas. Almost 89 percent of the universe contract
sales were concentrated in six community areas: North Lawndale, East
and West Garfield Park, Englewood, Greater Grand Crossing and West
Englewood. Contract sales in North Lawndale and the Garfield Park
areas accounted for 94 percent of the west side activity; sales in
Englewood, West Englewood and Greater Grand Crossing, 75 percent of
south side activity. During the years of peak activity contract sales
advanced into sections of Austin, South Lawndale, Fuller Park, South
Shore, Chatham and Auburn Gresham, but these areas did not experience
a significant volume of contract sale activity (Table 2-4).
Since installment sales were utilized primarily as a finance
vehicle in transitional neighborhoods, the geographic center of sales
activity shifted over time. On the west side, the center of the
market shifted from North Lawndale to East Garfield Park to West
Garfield Park. On the south side, Englewood remained an active
center for contract sales while expansion proceeded into Greater Grand
Crossing.
The installment sales market was not a short-term phenomenon.
It flourished until 1964,at which time its functional importance de-
clined in proportion to the redirected and increased activity of the
government-backed mortgage sector in inner-city neighborhoods. Over
time, contract buyers bought into better neighborhoods with less
substandard housing, fewer overcrowded units and higher income profiles.
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Figure 2-1. LOCATION OF INSTALLMENT CONTRACT SALES OF EXISTING & NEW
HOMES, CHICAGO, 1952-1.968
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TABLE 2-4
Selected Characteristics of Census Tracts with Major Contract Sale
Activity Between 1955- 1965 by Community Area
Community Area
North East Garfield West Garfield d Greater Grand West City of
Lawndalea Parkb Parkc Englewood Crossinge Englewood Chicago
Period of Initial Contract Sale 1955 1958 1959 1956 1959 1958 --
Activity
Population Characteristics (1960)
Percent Negro, 1950 5.1 0.6 0.4 3.9 0.1 1.9 14.1
Percent Negro, 1960 93.0 28.5 18.5 52.1 62.6 22.4 22.9
Median family income, 1959 ($) 5428 5432 5896 5886 6086 6264 6738
Community area index (100) 109 116 96 106 98 94 --
Chicago city index (100) 81 81 88 87 90 93 100
Percent families, income < $ 3,000 20.9 17.4 17.4 17.3 16.1 15.5 13.6
Percent families, income > $10,000 9.5 10.5 14.3 14.0 14.2 16.0 21.3
Housing Characteristics (1960)
Percent owner-occupied 21.1 15.8 21.2 30.5 30.0 43.5 32.7 c)
Percent substandard 8.6 16.9 7.9 9.4 11.9 4.7 14.0
Percent 1+ persons per room 33.5 26.2 18.6 19.6 19.4 12.0 11.7
Median gross rent ($) 100 87 91 98 96 93 88
Chicago city index (100) 114 99 103 111 109 105 100
Median value: owner units ($) 16100 13100 15200 13800 14300 11900 18000
Chicago city index (100) 89 73 84 77 79 66 100
Number of universe contract sales 262 455 719 249 64 77 --
Universe contract sales, all
census tracts, community area
1952-1968 372 508 757 331 105 87 --
SOURCE: Local Community Fact Book Chicago Metropolitan Area 1960, E. M. Kitagawa and K. E. Taeuber, eds. (Chicago:
Chicago Community Inventory, University of Chicago, 1963).
Census tracts in community areas with heavy contract activity:
a. North Lawndale tracts: 444, 445, 450A, 451, 460, 462.
b. East Garfield Park: 363Z, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 375Z.
c. West Garfield Park: 348Z, 349Z, 350, 351, 352, 353Z, 354.
d. Englewood: 871, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884.
e. Greater Grand Crossing: 890, 899, 900.
f. West Englewood: 858, 859, 867Z, 868.
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By 1965, with peak activity past, contract sales were more frequent
in older, consolidated black neighborhoods on multi-profit properties,
those properties with previous contract sales or prior rentals.
Capitalizing on a Dominant Market Position: Installment Sales of
New Homes
Installment contract sales were not confined to the existing-
home sector of the black housing market. A major expansion in the
stock of newly constructed ownership units for blacks in Chicago
occurred between 1960-1970. For the city as a whole, 9,661 black
ownership units were added during this time period.19 While it is
not possible to determine the exact proportion of these homes sold on
contract, the data on new-home installment contracts from the Contract
Buyers League files provides a lower estimate. Between 1957 and
1969, Universal Builders (UB), the defendant in Clark v. Universal
Builders, Inc., constructed and, in a joint venture with eight land
companies,20 sold 1,291 new single-family homes on the south side. All
but 18 of these homes were sold with installment contracts.
Universal was not the only developer selling new homes in the
south side market. Trial testimony, local newspaper articles and
advertisements and research reports indicated that there were at least
five other subdivision developers. While other builders may have sold
some proportion of their units on contract, there was no indication that
any other builder relied exclusively on installment sales. One small
builder known to have used installment sales did so only when the
buyer failed to qualify for either FHA or conventional mortgage
finance. 21
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The finance of new homes with installment contracts by Universal
Builders did not serve as an alternative to mortgage finance for high-
risk borrowers. Universal Builders established a non-negotiable, mini-
mum downpayment for each model which was due before the purchaser could
obtain possession of the house.22 UB further required completion of a
credit application. During the first CBL trial of the new homes case,
Universal's legal defense did argue that contract buying reached a
larger market because downpayment requirements were generally lower
than conventional mortgages, and unlike mortgage lenders, UB considered
a wife's income. But they did not argue that the higher prices of
contract sales were necessary to compensate the seller for greater
borrower risks. 23 The evidence was against this. Of the 325 contract
buyers in the initial plaintiff class, the downpayment averaged 10
percent or $2,563; the range extended from 4 percent to 46 percent
($900-$14,000). In a 1961 letter to their mortgage source requesting
reconsideration of loan terms, Universal Builders boasted of the
large downpayments made by the contract buyers, downpayments "sub-
stantially above that current in the trade." 24
Nor was Universal Builder's use of installment contract financ-
ing dictated by racial transition. Installment sales on new homes
were most frequently utilized in established black neighborhoods.
Table 2-5 displays the distribution of new home contract sales by
1960-1970 census tract classification by stage of racial transition.
Less than 10 percent of the homes constructed between 1957 and 1969
were in transitional neighborhoods.
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TABLE 2-5
Distribution of New Homes Sold on Installment
Contract by Universal Builders by Census Tract Stage of
Racial Succession 1960 -1970
Stage of Racial Succession Number Percent
Invasion 68 5.27
Early Consolidation 51 3.95
Consolidation 251 19.44
Late Consolidation 802 62.12
Piling Up 119 9.22
TOTAL 1,291 100.00
NOTE: For definitions, see Table 2-1.
After 1950, FHA-insured, and particularly VA-guaranteed mortgage
loans, had become increasingly important sources of funds for black
homebuyers.25 Universal Builders did not sell on installment contract
because these government-backed mortgage loans were unavailable in the
neighborhoods in which Universal was building. Surf Builders, a
small competitor building in the same neighborhoods as Universal
Builders, sold between 150-200 homes between 1963 and 1967, 33 percent
of which were financed with FHA-insured mortgages.26 Additional evi-
dence of FHA loan activity in these neighborhoods was available from
the discovery process for the CBL trial. 27  In every census tract in
which Universal Builders sold homes with installment contracts, cash
sales had been financed with FHA or VA mortgages.
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Assuming that the average contract buyer could have qualified
for an FHA or VA mortgage, and given the advantages of a mortgage,
how did Universal persuade buyers to purchase on an installment
contract?
One argument for UB's successful use of contract financing is
market power. Table 2-6 shows that Universal's construction accounted
for approximately 19 to 32 percent of the total Negro owner-occupied
units constructed, respectively, between 1960-1964 and 1965-1968
in the five south side communities in which Universal was most actively
building. In UB's major local market, Washington Heights, it held a
substantial market share, 45 percent, of all new homes built between
1960-1968. Furthermore, UB's share of the market may be understated
for two reasons. First, homes constructed by UB were single-family
units, while the figure for Negro owner-occupied units represents
dwelling units and may include two-family homes which were still being
built during this period. Second, the proportional distribution
between subdivision and individual custom-built homes is unknown and
the former, not the total figure,is the most appropriate to gauge
UB's market position.
From the mid-1950s onward the gap between market supply and
demand for new homes among blacks grew as demand, stimulated by
rising incomes and more stable employment, confronted continuing
restrictions on the supply of new housing for blacks in metropolitan
Chicago. These supply restrictions were attributable to four commonly
recognized, interrelated problems: (1) the difficulty of site selection
and large-scale land assembly imposed by segregation forces; (2) the
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TABLE 2-6
New Owner-Occupied Units 1960-1968, Chicago
South Side Communities: Chatham, Roseland, Greater Grand
Crossing, Auburn Gresham, Washington Heights, Morgan Park
Combined Community Areas 1960-1964 1965-1968 Total
Total Built Owner-Occupied 4069 1326 5395
Negro owner-occupied 3544 1166 4710
Percent Negro owner-occupied 87.1 87.9 87.3
Universal Builders Construction 689 372 1061
Percent of Negro owner-occupied 19.4 31.9 22.5
1960-1968 1960-1968 Units Column (b)
Community Area Total Negro Owner- Constructed by as a Per-
Occupied Units Universal Blds. cent of
(a) (b) Column (a)
Chatham 844 295 35.0
Roseland 1110 324 29.2
Greater Grand Crossing 237 18 7.6
Auburn Gresham 492 59 12.0
Washington Heights 1141 512 44.9
Morgan Park 886 60 6.8
SOURCE: Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry, Community Area Data
Book, 1970 Census 4th Count by Community Area (Chicago: CACI, 1972).
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limited availability of construction financing due to a reluctance of
investors to confront the above problem, and the belief, based on
the stereotyped image of low socio-economic status and unstable
employment patterns among black households, that this market, unlike
the white, new-home market, was too limited in size to support anti-
cipated sales; (3) the general reluctance of savings and loan associa-
tions to write mortgages for black households; and (4) the marketing
problems due to constraints on mortgage funds. 28 The bulk of new
homes constructed for black households consequently resulted from
custom construction by small-scale builders on owner-purchased lots.
This began to change in the late 1950s, early 1960s. 29
Universal's subdivision activities represented a major develop-
ment in the black market of new homes regardless of the number and
scale of other competitors. Their marketing brochures proclaimed:
In 1958 the city of Chicago issued more building permits
to Universal Builders, Inc. than to any other single builder.
Thus, because of its position as one of the really large
builders in this area, Universal is able to buy materials
in huge quantities at the most favorable price on the
market. Furthermore, this large-scale construction program
enables Universal to make the most economical use of equip-
ment. These savings and these economies are passed on to
Universal home buyers, resulting in better buys at lower
prices. 30
Nevertheless, UB's successful selling strategy was designed around the
fact that black households commonly held fewer liquid assets than
white households with equivalent incomes. They offered a no-money
down or "thrift lay-away" plan for homeownership; prospective pur-
chasers could save toward the full downpayment requirement without
delaying construction progress on their future home. Buyers would
contract for a home and make an initial payment. After half of the
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total downpayment had been paid, Universal started construction
of the home. The home would be ready for occupancy when the total
downpayment had been paid.
Installment contract sales on new homes resulted from the
dominant market position of this large-scale producer in a small
market. In this advantageous position, Universal Builders refused
to sell homes by any means other than the installment contract. The
combined output of small-scale competitors during any one period was
probably insufficient to meet demand. While these competitors
built in the same communities, each operated for only a few years.
No competitor actively built homes in the black market in Chicago
during the entire thirteen years of UB's tenure on the south side.
Furthermore, only Universal Builders offered multiple locational
choices spanning five south side community areas.
It has been easier to establish the civil rights case against
sellers of new homes. There have been fewer problems with establishing
"comparable" prices and defining excessive profits compared to the
existing home case. 31 The most significant fact establishing tradi-
tional discriminatory liability has been Universal Builders' own dual
market building operations. In the late 1950s, UB constructed 25
comparable homes in the town of Deerfield, Illinois, and, pursuant to
identical joint venture agreements, sold them to whites. The net
profit of these homes averaged 12 percentcompared to 22 percent for
comparable homes sold to blacks on installment contracts during the
same period. 32
69
This study focuses upon the existing home submarket. Activity
in these transition areas at the white-black boundary has been the
primary source of stock expansion for the black housing market.
New construction has not been a major source of stock additions.
Despite record levels of new construction in the black market in the
decade between 1960-1970, the 9,661 owner units newly constructed and
occupied by blacks in Chicago comprised only 26 percent of the net
change in the black housing stock. Over 28,000 net additions to
the owner-occupied stock resulted from the transition from white to
black occupancy.33
MARKET ACTORS
Contract Buyers
Subscribers to the American Dream, recent migrants and native
black Chicagoans desired the stability, status and neighborhood amenity
symbolized by homeownership. Stability implied a home of one's own
"while young enough to pay for it" and correspondingly, minimal
housing expenses when old, rental income from apartments in two- or
three-flat buildings, and family security.34 Most homebuyers sought
to escape the overcrowded ghetto and to benefit from better housing
and municipal services, and a better neighborhood environment for
child rearing.
The immediate reasons precipitating homeownership were often
compelling. Demand pressures from migration and natural population
increases coupled with geographic supply constraints created a condi-
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tion of pent-up demand. Between 1940-1950, the Negro population
of Chicago increased by 77 percent; between 1950-1960, the population
expanded by another 65 percent. By 1960, the total population
increase was just short of 535,000 persons, nearly double the 1940
enumeration. By 1956, the total physical renewal programs of the
city of Chicago had displaced 23,894 families and 7,101 individuals,
67 percent of which were estimated to be nonwhite.35 This relocation
figure represented more than 11 percent of the 1950 Negro population.
In the decade following World War II, locational choices
outside the ghetto satisfying the above demand factors were limited
to those city neighborhoods vacated by whites moving to the suburbs.
Homes in black suburban developments were generally not available until
the late 1950s, and then on a relatively small scale. While custom
building existed, this served an even smaller segment of the black
market. The choices for improved housing were few:
For most poor black families uprooted by urban renewal,
as well as for those seeking to get out of other over-
crowded black communities, the choice was a simple one:
accept segregated public housing, challenge segregationist
practices in white ethnic neighborhoods and depend on
police protection, or attempt to buy one of the solidly
constructed homes rapidly becoming available through a
combination of panic peddling and the exodus of white
ethnics to the suburbs. Many...chose to follow the
blockbuster.36
Many landlords in the black market refused to rent to families
with children.
I had taken one kid from my sister-in-law. We had one
kid of our own and I was pregnant with another. We had
to get another place. The owner of the apartment [ we
were renting] didn't want kids in his place. Everywhere
we went, they did not want kids. 37
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Often while apartment hunting a household unwittingly found itself
"voluntarily" committed to purchasing a home; the brokers who handled
rentals also negotiated contract purchases, and the commission benefits
of the latter were not insignificant incentives to influence the
brokers' marketing strategies.
If the traditional values attendant upon homeownership served
as idealistic sources of appeal, real financial constraints were
paramount for the majority of searching households. The determining
factor to buy on an installment contract was often the low downpayment.
FHA financing was not available in these changing neighborhoods and,
given distortions in purchasing power in the black contract market,
few households had the assets for a conventional mortgage, which
required a 20 to 30 percent downpayment.
The decision to purchase appeared as the best alternative
in an unsatisfactory situation. In retrospect, buyers of existing
homes felt victimized because of their race.
[I] knew I was overcharged from the beginning but everything
was high and I needed someplace.
[I] knew the house wasn't worth it -- I was only interested
in the downpayment.
[I was] told by my lawyer the price was too high and advised
not to buy but did so anyway since I was tired of paying
almost twice as much for rent which gave me nothing.
This was the best building we had seen. It weren't looking
too hot. But it was the best we had seen for the money we
had. He was only asking $500 or $1,000 down. 38
There is little systematic information available now with
which to construct a socio-economic profile of contract buyers at
the time of purchase.39 This is unfortunate because it limits the
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study's ability to refute the excessive borrower-risk argument made
by sellers in defense of the inflated contract prices. Nevertheless,
sample data coupled with information from CBL literature and field
interviews, and commentaries on contract buying indicate that, at
the time of purchase, the average contract buyer of an existing home
was less then 40 years of age, married with three children, a southern
migrant, and employed in a blue collar or laboring job.
Almost all buyers of existing homes had formerly been renters.
For 139 of these buyers information on previous rental expenditures
permits a comparison with contract expenditures. Monthly contract
payments for buyers on the west side were 88 percent higher than
former rentals and 51 percent higher on the south side. Most buildings
sold on contract were two-flat structures. When an adjustment is
made for rental income expectations, the calculus of the buyer's
decision becomes evident. Monthly payments for homeownership (princi-
pal and interest only) on average did not change a buyer's contractual
housing expenditures.
Utilizing 1960 census tract median income for families in
constant dollars (1957-59) as a proxy for buyer income, it is possible
to estimate the contract payment burden. For west side buyers, this
ratio of monthly payments to income averaged 33 percent (without the
rental adjustment); for south side buyers, 30 percent. For single-
family units with no rental expectations this payment burden averaged
26 percent. The real obligation was undoubtedly higher since these
figures do not include payments for taxes and insurance or utilities.
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Were contract buyers aware of the differences between mortgage
and contract financing? Did they inquire formally to a lending
institution or informally to their broker about securing a mortgage?
Did they seek legal advice for the transaction?
Although only ten percent of existing home buyers formally
inquired about mortgage finance, this number does not present the
complete story. Several buyers had previously tried to get a mortgage
for a different property and were convinced from experience that
blacks could not get mortgages. One buyer was told by his black
lawyer: "They won't let you have a mortgage in this city. You got to
have a third down, or some white man to stand up for you."40 Most
buyers who recognized the difference between a mortgage and a contract
had consulted with the broker-seller about mortgage finance. Relying
on the expertise of these specialists, they were dissuaded from di-
rectly seeking a mortgage loan from a lending institution. Those few
buyers who formally pursued mortgage finance reported refusals by
lending institutions to make loans in a particular neighborhood or
for homes with excessive purchase prices. Other buyers had insufficient
downpayments for a conventional mortgage. Regardless of buyer intent
or action, however, the overriding factor was the refusal of specula-
tors to sell a home except on contract.41
I wasn't such a fool when I bought the house that I didn't
have a mouthpiece with me. 42
Recognizing their lack of experience and lack of sophistication
in real estate transactions, the majority of buyers hired lawyers to
allay doubts, fears and uncertainties prior to signing the contract
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agreement.43 Legal advice, however, was not particularly helpful.
It rarely altered their resolve to buy or expanded their knowledge
of contract buying. Some lawyers were either fradulent, working in
cooperation with particular real estate agents, or professionally
negligent for failing to inform the buyer of code violations and other
property problems which might present obstacles to future obligations
or a clear title.44
A second group of lawyers, by counseling clients that they
were receiving fair treatment or that the price and contract terms
were a "good deal", may not have been fradulent or negligent, but
instead saw nothing inherently wrong with the contract transaction.
If they considered whether blacks were experiencing discrimination
in the housing market, it was within the traditional definition of
differential seller pricing. Contract sales represented a "reality"
of the black market which excluded consideration of institutional
forms of discrimination.
A third, smaller group of lawyers did counsel buyers against
the contract purchase because the price was too high. Buyers reported
that many of these lawyers expressed concern with what was happening,
but felt hopeless about changing the market situation. After "begging"
clients not to buy, these lawyers could offer their clients no positive
alternative. Also, frustration over housing accommodations and severe
rental problems caused some buyers to filter out problems with the
contract transation.
Prior to the CBL suits, there was one attempt by a lawyer to
alter the situation facing contract buyers.45 In behalf of two buyers,
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he sued one of the largest south side contract sellers, claiming
that the purchase price was improper because the seller had made
false representations of the actual worth of the property. The
Illinois Appellate Court refused the buyers any relief. By its
action, the court reinforced existing professional beliefs about the
"finality of signed contracts, doctrines of title, equity and posses-
sion, and the formidable requirements of showing fraud or any other
ground" which would provide relief for buyers. 46
The experience of contract buyers with legal services for
contract transactions and redress of unconscionable terms exposed the
limitations of individual suits as instruments for reform of the in-
equities of a dual housing market. Before the Contract Buyers League
suits, litigation raised issues of individual wrong-doing and redress
compatible with the traditional definition of discrimination. This
was unsuitable for the contract buying issue because the forces behind
contract buying were embedded in the nature of the marketplace, which
was most eivdent when hundreds of such cases were exposed as a broad
market phenomenon.
For many participants in the Contract Buyers League and sub-
sequent litigation work, the central issue was not really the contract
sellers' "ill-gotten" financial gains, but rather the question of
power and dignity which was wrapped up in the seller-buyer relation-
ship. The dynamics of the CBL revealed the buyers' deep-seated
sensitivities to racial exploitation -- their unequal bargaining
position.48 At the time of purchase, sellers were able to capitalize
on buyers' predisposition to the values of homeownership and security
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because of the latter's relative immobility and constrained housing
choices. Sellers were able to effectively manage the buyers' view
of facts, convincing dubious prospective buyers that buying was better
than renting. If contract buyers were aware of a transaction markup,
the extent of the markup was unknown -- comparable white market prices
were not widely available to blacks. After the purchase agreement,
buyers were bound in an unequal position by the finality of the con-
tractual relationship; even the insurance benefits were in the name of
the seller, despite payments made by the buyer. As time progressed,
the disparate relationship worsened as the buyer's "equity" increased,
the seller's risk decreased, and the seller's windfall profits, in
the event of foreclosure, increased.
Contract Sellers
The real estate market is usually composed of three types of
investors: non-professional investors (owners of single-family homes),
professional real estate investors, and real estate speculators. In
racial transitional areas, the speculator predominates. 49
A speculator is one whose motive in purchasing a property
is to resell as soon as possible at a profit. He may or
may not make repairs and may purchase on a contract for
deed or he may buy outright.50
Objectively speaking, speculators are professional real estate
investors who aim to buy low and resell at a higher price. However,
in housing literature the word speculator has rarely connoted such a
neutral image. Instead, it has most often been associated with
unethical panic-peddling and blockbusting activities designed to
rapidly initiate racial change and artificially reduce the price at
which these operators purchase homes from fleeing white sellers.
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Speculators in Chicago's contract market can be classified
into two groups: real estate brokers and non-brokers in the market
as principals. Some, but not all, speculators employed blockbusting
tactics. In the words of one seller:
I am a block-buster. Another and perhaps slightly less
odious name for my craft is real estate speculator. I
specialize in locating blocks which I consider ripe for
racial change. Then I "bust" them by buying properties
from the white owners and selling them to Negroes --
with the intent of breaking down the rest of the block
for colored occupancy...1 prefer blocks near others
where Negroes already live -- especially old, middle-
class blocks with a mixture of frame homes and walk-up
apartments. Whites already there have been conditioned
to insecurity by the inexorable march of the color line
in their direction. This makes these blocks setups for
the quick turnover, large volume and the large profits
I like.51
In the dual housing market, the speculator operates in a realty
vacuum created by institutional and economic relationships inhibiting
direct real estate transfers between white and black households. As
outside agents, speculators are not constrained to maintain an image
in the white community, a professional and economic requirement
which typcially hinders the early participation of local realtors in
the transition process. 52 Mobility and lack of attachment to a small,
defined neighborhood characterize the speculator's modus operandi.
"They work an area that Negroes have entered until there is little
left there to sell profitably and then move on to another area."53
By providing a market for the purchase of properties owned by white
households who choose to leave areas blacks may enter or are entering
and then selling to the black, the speculator does "what other real
estate agents do not want to do, or do not think they should do, or
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will not admit they are doing -- act as the go-between for the white
seller and the Negro buyer in an area still white or nearly so.'5
In the installment contract market the speculator does more
than arbitrage racial preferences in changing neighborhoods. He
provides the financing to complete the transaction, to clear the
market. For the white seller in a changing neighborhood, sale choices
are limited. Because of institutional redlining, buyers in transi-
tional neighborhoods cannot secure mortgage financing. An owner
choosing to leave must often personally finance the transaction by
taking back a purchase money mortgage or installment contract, or
sell to a speculator for cash, typcially at a lower price than if
he could have sold directly to the black buyer. From the owner's
perspective, cash is an overriding factor because without the recapture
of his equity, his next housing purchase is limited.
Contract financing of the black buyer is the other side of
the market-clearing transaction. Because payment in a contract sale
is amortized over the term of the contract, there is generally an
upward adjustment to price. A major source of profit for the
speculator arises from this disparity between the low cash acquisition
price in the white market and a higher contract selling price in the
black market.
Two conditions, therefore, immobilize conventional property
transactions in racially changing neighborhoods: first, the racial
preferences of white owners and local realtors, and second, the absence
of mortgage finance. The speculator, acting as a broker and financial
intermediary, arbitrages the profit opportunities existing from
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discriminatory supply constraints on market activity. Given the lack
of institutional mortgage money, the ability of the speculator to
eliminate the first gap is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for market clearing. Land installment contract sales insured market
clearing by providing an instrument for both purchase and finance.
By arbitraging existing realty and finance constraints, the
contract speculator considered himself an opportunist in a given market
situation. By interposing his own credit rating between the black
buyer and mortgage lender, he considered his activity a "beneficial"
service which facilitated ownership transfer.
They don't mention that...when it was almost impossible
for a Negro to buy a house with F.H.A. or normal conven-
tional mortgages, dealers sold houses to Negroes. These
dealers invested their own money and pledged their own
credit in order to make houses available to Negroes.
They don't tell you that all new housing developments
which were built in the past twenty years, were only
built for white people...They don't tell you that the
F.H.A. and the government itself turned its back on the
problems of housing Negroes, and without the dealers, there
would be no opportunity for decent families to own
homes.55
The data from the Contract Buyers League litigation pertains
exclusively to white speculators. Nevertheless, black real estate
brokers were not absent from this market. Additional CBL evidence
did reveal the existence of a number of black speculators and trial
testimony brought to light the financial details of one contract sale
by a black professional appraiser which were strikingly similar to
those of white contract sellers. 56
Selling homes on contract did not release the speculator from
conventional management concerns or tenant-landlord relationships.
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It did eliminate rental maintenance responsibilities and shift the
liability for real estate taxes, insurance and code compliance.
Nevertheless, monthly payments had to be collected, delinquencies
monitored, taxes and insurance paid and, as these contract neighbor-
hoods aged, the potential for vandalism in vacant buildings checked.
Why then did these speculators "sell" as opposed to "rent"? What
additional benefits flowed from this form of property management?
The dual housing market created a situation of pent-up demand
for housing. Coupled with a block-by-block, or "cave-in" expansion
policy, the initial period of transition presented the only opportunity
to earn "turnover" profits for the recently available housing as blacks
sought to satisfy preferences for relatively better housing services
available in the transition areas. The installment contract sale
yielded greater long-term profits than a rental because it offered a
means of locking in the initial price surges associated with limited,
block-by-block ghetto expansion. In an internally competitive black
market, over time as the geographic boundaries of the area expanded
and new neighborhoods became available to black occupancy, rental
payments in the earlier transitional neighborhoods would decline to
reflect increased supply and an easing of the housing shortage. In
contrast, the contract price and monthly payments, fixed at the time
of purchase, would lock in for the term of the contract the high prices
associated with ghetto expansion. With an installment sale, the seller
also stood to benefit from "owner psychology" toward property mainte-
nance.
81
Sources of Profit
Table 2-7 presents a breakdown of the components of a typical
contract transaction for an existing two-flat building on Chicago's
west side during the height of installment sales activity. The property
was acquired for $14,200 and sold for $26,000 within three weeks of the
purchase. To maximize his return, the speculator financed the pro-
perty with a mortgage loan of $15,000 for 20 years at seven percent.
After adjustments for acquisition, financing, repairs and renovation,
estimated holding and selling costs, the deferred profit was $9,546,
a 67 percent net markup. This would represent a very large return on
the $204 investment. This is the dramatic contract sale paper profit
commonly cited in housing literature.
To realize these profits the speculator has two main options:
hold the contract until term or cash out his property interest. In
the first case, the cash profit accrues from the annual gross cash
flow received by the seller; this is the difference between the annual
contract payments and the annual mortgage payments, in this example,
$708 (a 347 percent per annum rate of return). The present value of
this difference between loan payments made by the buyer to the seller
and those made by the seller to the lending institution, less an
allowance for administering the loan and any initial equity, represents
the seller's long-term net profit assuming that the contract is not
forfeited. In this example, using the seven percent mortgage interest
rate as the discount rate, the present value net profit equals $8,502.
Given the higher risks in this sector of the market, this rate is
unrealistically low; the cost of funds for some speculators in this
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TABLE 2-7
Installment Contract Transaction for an Existing West Side
Two-Flat Building, 1960
Sold to black buyer $26,000
Cost to speculator 14,200
Gross Markup 11,800 83.1%
Costs to Speculator
Acquisition price $14,200
Title and associated costs 185
Repairs/renovation 12
Estimated:
Sales commission 1,300
Carrying costs during selling period 0
Overhead during selling period 7
Financing costs 750
Total Costs $16,454
Deferred Profit 9,546 67.2%
Cash Flow at Contract Sale Closing
Total Cash In
Contract downpayment $ 1,250
Mortgage proceeds 15,000
$16,250 (a)
Total Cash Out
Direct costs 16,447
Indirect costs (overhead) 7
$16,454 (b)
Equity (b -a) 204 (c)
Annual Cash Flow Analysis
Annual loan payments by the buyer to the
speculator ($24,750 loan for 25 years at 7%) $ 2,100 (d)
Annual loan payments by the speculator to the mort-
gage lender ($15,000 loan for 20 years at 7%) 1,392 (e)
Estimated cost of administering the contract
(5% of contract payment) 105 (f)
Net cash proceeds per year, year 1 through 20
(d - e - f) 603 (g)
Net cash proceeds per year, year 20 through 25
(d- f) 1,995 (h)
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TABLE 2-7, continued
Net cash proceeds over the term of the contract
[(g x 20) + (h x 5)]
Present value of $603 annual income stream
received over 20 year period assuming a 7%
discount rate
Present value of $1995 annual income stream
received over 5 year period after 20 years
assuming a 7% discount rate
Total present value of contract sale payment
stream received over 25 year period assuming
7% discount rate (i + j)
Total present value of contract sale payment
stream received over 25 year period assuming
15% discount rate
Present value net profit at 7% discount rate
(k - c)
Present value net profit at 15% discount rate
(1 - c)
Timelag between acquisition and resale (days)
$22,035
6,388 (i)
2,114 (j)
8,502 (k)
4,183 (1)
8,298
3,979
20
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market greatly exceeded prevailing conventional mortgage rates.
Using a 15 percent discount rate, the present value net profit
equals $3,979.57
If full cash payment were received at the time of sale,
a speculator might be willing to accept a price of $19,683 or
thereabouts ($15,704 + $3,979), representing a 25 percent profit
on the transaction.58 This is a hypothetical "cash" price because it
would undoubtedly exceed the mortgage appraisal figure. The argument
against installment contract sales rests on this type of selling-
finance distortion: speculators used installment sales as a means to
capture excessive profits based on inflated sales prices which could
not have been supported by institutional mortgage finance. The
difference between this "cash" price and the contract price measures
the extra component of the black market price required to transfer
units to the black market through the contract sale mechanism.
The second way a speculator realizes the deferred profit is
to cash out his interest prior to contract maturity by selling the
contract paper at a deep discount, usually 40- 50 percent, to an
investment group which specializes in purchasing and managing contract
paper (Table 2-8). These investment groups represent the small secon-
dary market of contract financing. Alternatively, the seller could
cash out by obtaining a conventional or FHA mortgage for the contract
buyer (Table 2-9). Cashing out of the investment was used by only
a handful of sellers in the west side submarket and was based on
individual business requirements. 59 The evidence suggests that
sellers utilized cashing out as a means of securing revenues to
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TABLE 2-8
Profit Analysis of Investment Cash Out Through Sale of
Contract Paper, 1963
Contract balance at time of paper sale
Mortgage balance at time of paper sale
Book value equity
Purchase price of book value equity at 60% discount
Cash Flow Proceeds of Contract Sale Prior to Paper Sale
Annual payments by buyer to seller
Annual payments by seller to mortgage lender
Estimated cost of administering the contract
(5% of contract payment)
Annual net cash proceeds
Net cash proceeds over 2.75 years of contract payment
prior to paper sale
Present value of net cash proceeds from holding contract
over 2.75 years assuming a 15% discount rate
Present value of net cash proceeds from sale of contract
paper after 2.75 years assuming a 15% discount rate
Present value of total net cash proceeds of contract
transacton (a + b)
Seller's Cash Flow at Contract Sale Closing
Total Cash In
Contract downpayment
Mortgage proceeds
Total Cash Out
Direct costs
Indirect costs
Equity (e -d)
Present value net profit (c- f)
$20,116
7,090
13,026
$ 5,210
$ 1,980
1 ,260
99
621
1,708
1,321 (a)
3,547 (b)
4,869 (c)
$ 1,000
9,000
10,000
12,803
19
12,822
(d)
(e)
2,822 (f)
2,047
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- TABLE 2-9
Profit Analysis of Investment Cash-Out Through FHA
for Contract Buyer, 1969
Refinancing
Amount of FHA mortgage
Outstanding contract balance at time of FHA refinancing
Contract price reduction
Seller's Obligations in FHA Refinancing
Discount points
Discharge of conventional mortgage
Other
Total
Net proceeds to seller from FHA refinancing
Cash Flow Proceeds from Contract Prior to FHA refinancing
Annual payments by buyer to seller
Annual payments by seller to mortgage lender
Estimated cost of administering contract
(5% of contract payments)
Annual net cash proceeds
Net cash proceeds over 6 years
Present value of net cash proceeds from holding contract
6 years prior to FHA refinancing assuming a 15% discount
rate
Present value of net cash proceeds from FHA refinancing
after 6 years of contract payment assuming a 15% dis-
count rate
Present value of total cash proceeds of contract
transaction (a + b)
$16,800
16,883
83
$ 1,512 (9%)
9,119
1 ,673
$12,304
$ 4,496
$ 1,944
1 ,404
97
443
2,658
1,677 (a)
1,944 (b)
3,621 (c)
Seller's Cash Flow at Contract Sale Closing
Total Cash In
Contract downpayment
Mortgage proceeds
Total Cash Out
Direct costs
Indirect costs (overhead)
Equity (e- d)
Present value net profits (c - f)
$ 350
13,000
13,350
14,393
2
14,395
1,045
$ 2,576
(d)
(e)
(f)
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purchase additional properties, to liquidate the business, or to
eliminate strained relations with contract buyers. 60
What are the comparative profits of these alternative strategies?
Table 2-10 presents the average present value net profit figures for
each option.
TABLE 2-10
Present Value Net Profits for Alternative Management Options
Option Average Present Equity NValue Net Profit
Holding contract until term, $2,667 $1,350 290
no forfeiture
Cashing out to investment 2,045 1,751 7**
syndicate mortgage co.
Cashing out with FHA refi- 2,865 945 7
nancing for contract buyer
* Assuming a 15 percent discount rate.
** Small sample due to limited data availability.
If the seller held the contract until term he could expect a present
value average net profit of $2,667 compared to $2,045 for cashing out
through sale of the contract paper and $2,865 for FHA refinancing.
While FHA refinancing provided the highest present value profit,
this alternative was not available before 1966.61
The federal tax treatment of installment sales provided the
seller with additional transaction benefits. Through either the cost
recovery method or the installment sales method, a seller could defer
all or part of the capital gains tax liability from the transaction.
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In the former instance, the capital gain was not subject to taxation
until such time as all costs incurred in the transaction had been
recovered. For two large speculators who exclusively used this method,
the period of complete tax-free cash flow averaged seven years. For
those speculators utilizing the installment sales method, the federal
tax liability was spread over the term of the contract and paid in
proportion to the receipt of payments for contract principal. If
there had been a $5,000 capital gain on a property with a $15,000
contract price, the capital gain tax liability in each year would have
equaled one-third of each dollar of principal payment.62
A strategy of strict enforcement of contract delinquency and
resale provided another source of profit for the speculator. When the
contract buyer forfeited his contract, the seller was legally entitled
to evict the buyer, repossess the property and retain prior payments
as liquidated damages.
Some indication of the extent of this practice can be
gained from two independent and related sources.
Inspection of the advertising columns of the leading
weekly Negro newspaper show two and three columns of
homes and apartment buildings offered at five hundred
to nine hundred dollars down, with never a mention of
total price or monthly payment, all advertised by one
owner. An examination of the titles of forcible entry
and detainer suits filed in the Municipal Court of
Chicago, seeking possession of the "entire premises,"
and filed in the name of the same advertiser, runs for
the period from January 1956 to October 1957, to two
hundred eighteen cases. 63
Although less widespread, other sources of profit included
mortgage refinancing and returns from other components of the transac-
tion. Many sellers were lawyers or real estate brokers who functioned,
either individually or corporately, in more than one capacity and
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earned fees for legal services, brokerage and management.
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE INSTALLMENT CONTRACT MARKET
Participants and Market Shares
The market of contract sales existed primarily in areas of ghetto
expansion, in those neighborhoods of existing housing where block-
busting and panic peddling activities most often accompanied racial
transition. Often completed within three to five years, racial change
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in these neighborhoods conformed to a pattern of rapid mass invasion,
an effect significantly reminiscent of the block-by-block expansion
policy first endorsed by the Chicago Real Estate Board in 1917.
This similarity is paradoxical because speculators and realtors
hold opposite racial ideologies and speculators operate outside the
professional code of realty ethics. While the realtor has an economic
incentive to prevent nonwhite entry into white neighborhoods, the
speculator's incentive is to control the number of neighborhoods
undergoing racial transition.
High profits for speculators in the dual market are a function
of the rate of expansion and whether infiltration and consolidation
occur before more expansion. Nevertheless, the ability to control the
geographic scale and the rate of ghetto expansion implies market power
on the part of individual speculators or collusion, both generally
considered improbable in real estate markets. Did such market power
exist in the installment contract market?
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Requiring more knowledge than capital, presenting few formal
barriers to entry and yielding large profits, contract selling
attracted numerous participants. The original 1969 complaint for
Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment presents a lower bound
estimate of the number of sellers; it listed 91 defendants operating
in the Chicago installment contract market between 1952 and 1968.
By 1975, the number of defendants totaled 102. After adjusting for
multiple business identities of several sellers, there were 41 known
operators. Trial motions reduced the analysis sample to 32 contract
operators. 65
Classifying these contract operators by their sale volume
presents a better picture of their position in the market. Nine
defendants, holding .6 percent of the universe properties, did
not originate contract sales (contract assignees) but acquired title
ownership of the property either by legal assignment through purchase
of the paper (7 defendants) or through mortgage foreclosure proceedings
(2 defendants). In contrast, 94 percent of the properties were held
by the remaining 23 defendants who originated contract sales. 66Ten
speculators, each with more than 100 contracts, accounted for slightly
over 75 percent of the universe properties (Table 2-11).
Despite numerous sellers, the structure of this portion of the
market displayed considerable concentration of sales by large-scale
sellers. The largest five speculators on the west side and the largest
three on the south side, respectively, controlled 64 percent and 76
percent of the prime contract sales -- those properties in the neigh-
borhoods of early transition;67 fifteen speculators accounted for the
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residual sales. As shown in Table 2-12, individual shares varied
considerably. The largest share of the universe sales, held by
Boston,68 exceeded 32 percent between 1950-1960; the second-largest
speculator accounted for 19 percent of these sales. The smallest
share among the large-scale speculators equaled 5 percent of the sample
subset.
TABLE 2-11
Distribution of "Universe" Installment Contract Properties by
Type of Market Investor and Scale of Sales Volume, 1952-1968
Type of Investor Number of Properties Percentin Universe
Contract Originators
Large-scale (> 100 properties) 1,944 75.2
Small-scale (< 100 properties) 477 18.5
Subtotal 2,421 93.7
Contract Assignees 165 6.3
TOTAL 2,586 100.0
In the west side market such extreme market concentration did
not persist over time as new speculators entered the field. The death
of Boston in 1963 and competition from numerous small speculators
succeeded in leveling individual sales shares and reducing the total
share of the largest five to 50 percent for the 1960-1970 period,
compared to 70 percent for 1950-1960.
The pattern of south side activity differed. With few new
speculators entering and the shares of small-scale speculators re-
maining constant, a reduction in individual sales shares resulted from
92
TABLE 2-12
Contract Sales Shares Among Large-Scale Originators for Universe
Properties in Early Transition Neighborhoods, 1950 -1970
Distribution of Universe Properties in
Early Transition Neighborhoods*
Contract 1950-1960 1960-1970+ Total
Originator Number Percent Number Percent Number Precent
I. West Side
Boston 369 32.5 32 6.8 401 24.9
Hicks 213 18.7 44 9.3 257 16.0
Cone 83 7.3 75 15.9 158 9.8
Mills 56 4.9 62 13.2 118 7.4
Stern 70 6.2 24 5.1 94 5.9
Subtotal 791 69.6 237 50.3 1028 64.0
Others 346 30.4 234 49.7 580 36.0
TOTAL A 1137 100.0 471 100.0 1608 100.0
II. South Side
Peck 175 43.2 26 21.1 201 38.1
Master 95 23.5 23 18.7 118 22.3
Church 41 10.1 43 35.0 84 15.9
Subtotal 311 76.8 92 74.8 403 76.3
Others 94 23.2 31 25.2 125 23.7
TOTAL B 405 100.0 123 100.0 528 100.0
TOTAL A+B 1542 72.2 594 27.8 2136 100.0
* Early transition neighborhoods = Penetration, Invasion and Early Conso-
lidation stages; for definitions, see Table 2-1.
+ Most sales between 1960 - 1965.
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the entrance of one speculator and the growth of his business.
Between 1960-1970, the largest two originators controlled approxi-
mately 40 percent of the contract universe sales, compared to 67
percent between 1950-1960. Nevertheless, the combined sales volume
of the three largest originators dominated the south side market.
Although spatial expansion of the ghetto between 1960-1970
provided continuous sales opportunities, after 1965 the incidence of
contract sales declined due to external influences on the contract
market. Consequently, the 1960-1970 period reveals more speculators
competing for smaller number of sales in both sectors.
Geographic Concentrations
It is important to know if the aggregate figures conceal varia-
tions within the west and south side submarkets. Did speculators
concentrate activity in any community? There was no apparent division
of territory on the large spatial scale of community areas because the
block-by-block character of racial transition inhibited such patterning.
Furthermore, the distribution of property in a speculator's portfolio
reflected his tenure in the contract market. Those west side origina-
tors entering the market earliest had higher proportions of properties
in North Lawndale and East Garfield Park than those entering the market
after transition activity had shifted to West Garfield Park. More than
half of the speculators concentrated their activities in West Garfield
Park simply because it was the focal point of racial transition on the
west side during the peak of the market.
Table 2-13 clearly reveals the consistent dominant sales position
of the four largest speculators across community areas. (Boston's
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TABLE 2-13
Percent Distribution of Existing Home Contract Sales by
Speculator by Community Area, 1952 - 1968
West Side Large Scale Contract Originator
Community
Area Boston Hicks Cone Stern Mills Others Total
North Lawndale 31.2 10.2 7.5 14.8 6.2 30.1 100.0
n = 372
East Garfield Park 35.6 22.0 4.3 2.2 3.2 32.7 100.0
n = 508
West Garfield Park 16.6 14.5 13.6 6.3 10.4 38.4 100.0
n 637 25.8 15.9 9.3 7.0 7.2 34.8 100.0
South Side
Community Peck Master Church Others Total
Area
Englewood 38.4 26.9 14.5 20.2 100.0
n = 331
Greater Grand Crossing 44.8 32.4 4.8 18.0 100.0
n = 105
West Englewood 31.0 16.1 41.4 11.5 100.0
n = 87
n=523 38.4 26.2 17.0 18.4 100.0
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relatively small share in West Garfield Park can be partially attri-
buted to his death and sudden curtailment of business.) With only
two exceptions, Boston and Hicks and Peck and Master held dominant
positions in each community area within their respective markets. 69
The community designations used so far are large spatial and
population groupings with historical and modern significance for
urban sociological identity, but their size exceeds a personal notion
of a neighborhood. Did the largest speculators account for major
sales activity in neighborhood census tracts? Yes. The distribution
of indivdiual sales shares at the census tract level does not reveal
territorial divisions but reinforces the joint dominance of the largest
sellers.
Orthodox economic models of urban housing markets present
blockbusting and speculative real estate transfers as a competitive,
privately initiated response to market imperfections which inhibit
direct transfers between white and black households, one which will
eliminate any excess profits. Yet the evidence from contract sales
shows that while numerous speculators participated in the market,
the observed structure more closely resembled an oligopolistic market.
The evidence also shows that contract originators concentrated
their activities in large geographic sectors -- in either the west or
south sides of Chicago. Only four contract originators operated in
both submarkets. In contrast, the common practice among contract
assignees was to participate in both geographic submarkets. This
pattern is understandable. Real estate sales origination commonly
represents an investment in knowledge, expertise, about the local
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market conditions. In contrast, secondary real estate transactions
reflect the contract assignee's expertise in evaluating the financial
characteristics of the contract paper sale. Similar to the operations
of the conventional secondary mortgage market, the common characteris-
tic of those contracts held by assignees would be the nature of the
risk of the underlying collateral and the borrower, rather than just
the specific property location.
Cooperative Relationships Among Contract Sellers
Up to now the discussion has focused upon formal sales shares
over time, and as a proxy for activity at a single point in time, upon
geographic submarkets. Yet the line between formal sales power and
patterns of informal cooperation significantly colored the choices,
prices, and terms facing contract buyers. The CBL complaint defined
"unlawful combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce"
in the purchase and sale of real estate properties and in the discount-
ing of installment contract paper as consisting of "a continuing
agreement, understanding and concert of action among defendants and
other co-conspirator purchasers, sellers and financiers of real estate
properties to fix, maintain and stabilize prices on the sale of
properties to plaintiffs at approximately $5,000 to $15,000 per unit
above the fair market value,"70 and having the effect of eliminating
price competition among speculators and associates.
While it cannot be shown that all speculators met together
conspiratorially in some board room or lavatory for the purpose of
price-fixing or dividing up territories, evidence does indicate that
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most speculators entered into various types of relationships with
each other. 71 In their complex maze of relationships (Figure 2-2)
some speculators:
(1) established general partnerships for periods of time;
(2) established partnerships for individual properties by
holding beneficial interest in certain land trusts with
other speculators;
(3) acted as brokers for white owners in the sale of property
to other speculators;
(4) assigned beneficial interest in certain land trusts to
other speculators;
(5) employed or otherwise did business with the same companies,
agencies or individuals as other speculators for services
such as mortgage finance, brokerage, insurance, legal
advice, and labor or materials for improvement.
In addition, the names of certain corporations and individuals
appeared in connection with more than one speculator, implying that
some speculators had mutual associates.
The degree of cooperation and personal familiarity involved in
these multiple arrangements clearly varied. In the first two instances,
interests of mutual benefit prevailed over competitive roles. The
fourth and fifth associations, while profitable for both parties,
represented exchange relationships which took place after the contract
transaction and which would not have inhibited a prior competitive
relationship.
General partnerships provided less maneuverability than joint
venture agreements for individual properties, In fact, such partner-
ships were operative only before peak market activity. Despite
Hicks' partnership with Hillman, between 1959 and 1964, he continued
FIGURE 2-2
Relationships Among Contract Operators
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to operate independently on many properties. His subsequent partner-
ship with Mills only lasted six months. The eleven-year general
partnership between Peck and Master ended in 1957, the year south side
market accelerated. Even so, Peck and Master retained the same office
space for more than one year after the formal split.72
This pattern of partnerships and joint ventures among competi-
tors significantly alters the conventional image of competitive
speculative relations. As shown in Figure 2-2, all speculators were
involved in some form of interrelationship. The four major alliances
-- Hicks with Hillman, later with Mills; Peck with Master; Birch with
numerous others; and the Hoover et al. complex web of associations --
are notable for the interrelationships among major market powers and
the multiple types of business relations between the same pair of
speculators. It was not uncommon for speculators to be co-beneficiaries
in one transaction, yet buyer and seller in the exchange of contract
paper in another. Familial relationships between a few business entities
further clouded competitive relationships.
More informal than co-beneficiary relations, but more extensive,
relations for the purchase and sale of contract paper drew the parti-
cipation of all speculators. Properties were transfered with anonymity
and without the expense and time of title transfers, and hence record-
ing, by assigning over 100 percent interest in the trust which held
title to the property. The source of profit from these paper sales
provided a cooperative incentive to maintain inflated contract prices.
It was the large gap between purchase and sale prices which made it
possible for speculators to generate cash profits despite a 50 or 60
100
percent discount of paper equity. If a speculator expected to sell
paper at a discount yet still net out a certain return, the markup
could easily be adjusted to yield the desired gross profit after
. 73discounting.
The existence of numerous speculators engaged in a pattern of
complex, interlocking associations raises several issues. What were
the costs of gaining additional market shares versus the benefits from
cooperation? Did speculators seek to increase their market shares
through price competition if excess demand guaranteed them above
normal profits anyway? If profits were so high, why weren't there more
participants?
Given the relatively small geographic area of each submarket,
the cost of gaining additional market control may have exceeded the
benefits from cooperation. The extensive relationships among specula-
tors suggest that this was a realistic trade-off. Aside from the
obvious benefits of split profits derived from partnerships, coopera-
tive relations would maintain the inflated price structure and stimulate
the sale of related services offered by speculators in other capacities
such as brokerage, insurance, legal advice, mortgage finance, property
management. A speculator's ability to increase his share of the market
depended upon other components of the supply equation, an additional
supply of property and capital, as much as upon securing additional
contract buyers through price competition.
If mutual understanding of market incentives and beneficial
arrangements inhibited contract sales price competition, it did not
preclude other forms of competitive behavior.74 After successfully
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negotiating the purchase and sale of a west side property, Boston
wrote his frequent associate:
[Hicks]must be burning on this one. The seller showed
me [Hicks'] unsigned contract for the purchase dated
Janu gy 11, 1957 for $7,700. He could not close the
man.
Boston paid the white-resident seller $7,500 a month and a half
later. This same speculator offered "rewards" of $100 or an equivalent
downpayment credit to contract buyers for leads that resulted in a
purchase of a property.76
Collusive agreements have always been difficult to arrange and
enforce in a market of many participants. But such agreements need
not be formal, nor restricted to price setting or territorial shares.
The market may engender informal mechanisms of cooperation that preserve
a competitive incentive but funnel it into other forms of competition
while preserving the inflated price structure of the installment sale.
This does not imply that sellers do not compete against one another
for acquisitions.77  Nor does it mean that profits do not vary among
speculators due to differential costs of other inputs such as finance
and management services.
Specialized Knowledge and Barriers to Entry
The economic laws of supply and demand state that over time
competitive forces direct a market toward self-correction. High
profits attracting additional participants beat down high prices and
erode excess profits as speculators compete against one another for a
larger share of the market. There are several factors which affect
the ability of the contract market to self-correct.
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Both white prejudice and excess demand among blacks for "decent"
housing shape the market incentives for arbitrage. The self-correcting
argument assumes that the net effect of speculative activities offsets
demand. However, to the extent that sellers are able to capitalize on
white fears of racial change (declining property values, crime, over-
crowding in schools), secure particular types of housing in short
supply (homeownership units), or control the pace of transition, they
may still be able to purchase at a depressed price or exact a sale
premimum.
The competitive market argument further assumes public knowledge
of the level of profits and no significant barriers to entry into
the market. In the contract market information on the high profit
levels remained private; these were non-public businesses in small,
local markets. Technically speaking, entry into the contract market
was free, no licensing requirements governed entrance as a seller.
There were no real economies of scale to inhibit entry either. But
there was a substantial capital requirement for full-time operators --
speculative installment sales required a continuous supply of capital,
otherwise business was limited by the personal distribution of wealth
and the possibilities of using partnerships. As will be shown in the
next chapter, the availability of capital in the contract market af-
fected business volume. Furthermore, speculative activities required
specialized knowledge regarding the neighborhoods most susceptible to
change, the business and legal procedures of contract selling, and the
institutions, individuals and mortgage companies willing to write
mortgages to finance contract selling. In this type of environment
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information became a commodity and its owners possessed a degree of
monopoly power.
Barriers to entry and information are critical factors explain-
ing the development and persistence of the dual housing market and in
the particular instance, the installment sales market. For the buyer
it is the barrier to entry into the metropolitan white housing market,
or inversely, the limited exit from the ghetto into selected transition
neighborhoods. The buyer rarely has information on the price and
bundle characteristics of housing in white neighborhoods; when he
shops, he shops the black market. For the seller, entry and business
expansion depend upon capital leverage. The next chapter focuses on
these institutional parameters of the contract market.
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CHAPTER 3
The Role of Financial Institutions in the
Installment Contract Market
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The Chicago gentlemen's agreement is well known, freely admitted,
but so far as we know, it is not an official document available to
us to present to you. In essence it is an understanding that no
real estate dealer will sell or rent to a nonwhite in any block,
until the block has been "cracked" by the presence of a Negro family
there by some other means. The real estate dealer who violates this
agreement is punished severely by the industry. He finds his
financial services leave him, and he may be driven out of business
in short by what follows.
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Hearings, Chicago, 1959.
The market of installment sales -- that "other" means --
developed in response to a supply vacuum created by a set of private
and public institutional practices commonly referred to as The Gentle-
men's Agreement. Codified into the realtor's professional norms and
technically legitimized in underwriting theories linking neighborhood
homogeneity with the stability of property values, institutional
support for residential racial segregation fostered a self-perpetuating
mode of discrimination. These institutional norms inhibited direct
mobility between white and black housing markets. "No Negro" or "no
integrated area" institutional practices maintained the color line by
restricting lending or brokerage activities to established segregated
neighborhoods, thereby creating the market context for contract sales by
channeling unfulfilled black demand to the ghetto real estate profes-
sionals managing racial transition.
While formal sanctions at one time influenced compliance with
segregationist norms, economic incentives related to long-term profit
opportunities in both the real estate and financial communities continued
to foster institutional discriminatory behavior.I The cumulative effect
upon the structure of urban housing markets of incremental de-
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cisions made by numerous participantswho shared a racial ideology
and common professional indoctrination in real estate appraisal,
was much the same as if there had been explicit collusion: blacks
lacked direct access to the larger white housing market.
Numerous financial institutions in Chicago engaged in two types
of behavior that directly affected the market environment and profit-
ability of contract selling: (1) they employed underwriting policies
derived from racially biased economic theories which had the effect of
denying blacks direct access to the white housing supply, and (2) they
directly aided and abetted the contract finance system by bankrolling
speculative transactions with mortgage loans secured by contract pro-
perties. 2
This chapter begins with a review of the institutional policies
that created the financing vacuum in racially transitional neighborhoods
and goes on to address the major issue of institutional involvement --
the seemingly contradictory decision of many institutions to underwrite
speculative mortgage loans in transitional neighborhoods, the antithesis
of "good" lending behavior. If institutional lenders declined to grant
mortgage loans in transitional neighborhoods because of the uncertain
effects of racial change on property values, how then did speculators in
the existing home contract market finance their operations in these
neighborhoods, and at that minimize their cash investment? Which insti-
tutions and individuals extended credit in this risky market? What were
the costs and benefits for the institution from this involvement?
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INSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION: "NO INTEGRATION" POLICY
Chicago area real estate brokers and mortgage lenders
who deal with nonwhites have told the Commission that
mortgage funds are available to qualified Negro home
buyers in all-Negro communities, such as Park Manor
and Chatham, and in once-all-white areas where Negroes
are now purchasing and occupying homes. These brokers
complain, however, that it is difficult to obtain a
mortgage in certain older neighborhoods. These very
complaints, though, illustrate the striking change that
has occurred during the past several years in mortgage
availability for nonwhites. In 1950, brokers' complaints
would center around the problem of simply obtaining a
mortgage for nonwhites anywhere, any place. Today's
complaints center around getting a mortgage for a parti-
cular house in a particular neighborhood... Few finan-
cial institutions will process loans for nonwhite bor-
rowers wishing to purchase in all-white neighborhoods
in the city or suburbs. 3
Despite the sanguine tone of the report of the Chicago Commission
on Human Relations describing the progress of a decade toward easing
the shortage of mortgage funds for blacks, there was still widespread
refusal to lend for black entry into a white neighborhood or one in the
early stages of transition. It was no secret that mortgage money was
not available to black or white purchasers in "threatened" neighborhoods.
The lending industry,5 acting on the premise that only homogeneous neigh-
borhoods could offer an economically sound investment, in effect tacitly
agreed to restrict black mortgage financing at the point of racial
change and lend, if at all, only in established Negro communities. 6
This geographic status quo lending policy was a constraint on
the supply adjustment process of the black housing market. Transition
neighborhoods have historically played a significant role in the
incremental expansion of the black housing stock. The existing ghetto
housing stock, often unsuitable for the conversions, mergers or up-
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grading required by changes in housing demand, nevertheless most often
lacked neighborhood amenities and public services available in housing
bundles in other locations. Regardless of a desire to live in an
integrated neighborhood, increases in black housing demand exerted
pressure on existing white neighborhoods, since newly constructed pri-
vate units provided a relatively insignificant share of stock addi-
tions, particularly in the black sector.7
The "no integration" policy ostensibly derived from lenders'
major concern with equity recovery and the investment risks attendant
upon the neighborhood change which inevitably followed the introduction
of a black into a white neighborhood. Historically, in periods of
little new housing expansion in the white market, violence and property
damage often accompanied the initial sales threatening racial change.8
Lenders also habitually cited the instability of prices in rapidly
changing neighborhoods where "price" and "value" were not the same.
The economic incentives for lending institutions to restrict
the geographic locations of mortgages granted to blacks is further
explained in terms of the institution's market position and public
profile. By lending to a black family in an all-white neighborhood in
which the institution had already made mortgage loans, it would be
"spoiling" its own market by introducing instability -- when stability
is one of its primary concerns in loan origination. Lending institu-
tions, therefore, view such lending as undermining their outstanding
portfolio of loans, despite the fact that there is considerable evidence
that the movement of blacks into white areas does not, in the long 'run
depress property values.9 As holders of mortgages of whites who may
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all seek to leave at once, there may be short-term price changes that
could leave the institution in a vulnerable position, depending upon
the the relationship between the outstanding mortgage balances and the
transitional market prices.
Lending institutions' reluctance to lend in all-white neigh-
borhoods equally derives from a concern with the potential resentment
of white depositors.
We take the position that the first two or three sales to
Negroes in any block should be financed between the arties
...There are five savers in every block in Chicago.1
We do not finance the first Negro purchaser in white area
for public relations reasons. White resentment in the
area would be great, probably resulting in account cancel-
lations and discontinuance of other business.11
The public relations motive, however, does not exert a uniform force in
all areas or upon all lenders; there is room for differing judgements
about the effects of lending policy,which produces a vague and variable
stance regarding the acceptable timing of such lending.
The long standing unwritten policy of mortgage men not to
finance the Negro unless his is the fifth house to go
black in a white block, is currently being adjusted to the
third or even the second house. 12
[We] do not insist that neighborhoods be 50 percent
colored, or insist on any arbitrary statistical line before
lending to Negro applicants. Depends on circumstances. 13
"Non-deteriorating areas" has often been the qualifier -- the missing
economic element put forth by lenders to explain the lack of observed
equal lending treatment. Industry spokesmen persist in viewing the
finance problem as a problem of inferior ghetto property, citing public
interest as the reason not to finance properties where "building codes,
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zoning and other city ordinances are violated."4 Chicago's leading
black mortgage lender notes:
Economic factors, hell. Look at all those Polish neighborhoods
along the Dan Ryan. They're ready for urban renewal. But the
money pours in. Or look at the Back of the Yards. That's an
old area. But then look at Douglas Park, or Garfield Park.
If they had the flow of mortgage money they wouldn't be gutted
as they are today. When these neighborhoods changed there was
money available all right, but to speculators who milked the
persons who wanted homes there...The house represents a method
of capital appreciation in the ghetto community. And a strong
capital base is a threat to the white community.15
The absence of institutional financing in the black housing
market during the period of contract sales cannot be solely ascribed to
racial discrimination. Poorly maintained housing and less qualified
buyers do increase the risk of mortgage lending, and both occurred more
frequently in the black market. The major issue in any analysis of
geographic allocation of residential finance has always been to separate
race from economics. Yet early underwriting theories, clearly derived
from racially affected economic theories, and subsequent credit denial,
contain the seeds of a self-fulfilling prophesy regarding neighborhood
conditions. The unacceptability of much nonwhite property for FHA-
insured or conventional loans is symptomatic of the larger problem of
restricted access of nonwhites to real estate in areas which would meet
lending standards.
Liability of the Federal Housing Administration
The overriding concern of the lending industry with the neigh-
borhood homogeneity criterion can be traced to the Federal Housing
Administration's systematic development and active promotion of the
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neighborhood unit and the race restrictive covenant as reference stan-
dards for loan evaluation. The FHA standards and locally defined lend-
ing areas often established the norm for conventional lenders, FHA
began its career by accepting the prevailing real estate ideology that
blacks should be denied access to white neighborhoods in order to
protect property values in those neighborhoods. While FHA did not
invent the restrictive covenant nor the ideology behind it, its adoption
conferred official sanction upon it and stimulated its widespread
usage. 16
The CBL complaint against the FHA, incorporated in Baker v.
F & F Investment, stated that FHA's promotion of racially restrictive
covenants and racially determined underwriting theories contributed
greatly to residential segregation in Chicago with the consequent nar-
rowing of choice and limiting of mortgage financing available to blacks.
17The detailed evidence against the federal agency, paralleling that
found in numerous accounts,18 supported two related claims: (1) the
FHA developed and supported discriminatory underwriting policies based
on a perception of how race affects property values and (2) the FHA
maintained a system of redlining maps based on neighborhood "economic
soundness", whereby loans in the redlined areas were automatically
rejected. 19
Specifically, FHA appraisers operated under the theory that the
economic life of an area decreased markedly when residents of the neigh-
borhood were not of the same social, economic and racial group. The
neighborhood rating was critically important in assessing the "economic
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soundness" of a mortgage loan; if the economic life of a neighborhood
was not sufficient, FHA mortgage insurance was withdrawn from such
areas regardless of the merits of individual mortgage insurance
applications. The characteristics of "economic soundness" were clearly
reflected in FHA policies requiring racially restrictive covenants, in
official underwriting manuals, and in appraisal training materials
setting forth the relationship between neighborhood stability and loca-
tional analysis. In 1956, FHA applications received by the Chicago
field office contained a racial designation. 20
If homes in a neighborhood did not meet the FHA-minimum property
standards or the surrounding areas were deteriorated, the appraisers
could write off entire blocks as being uninsurable. Under the minimum
property requirements for one- and two-unit homes in 1958, an FHA
appraiser could reject a home if the lot size was too small, if there
was not at least one tree in the yard, if there was either a bedroom or
a bathroom adjoining the kitchen, if there were not splash blocks, and
for many other even more detailed requirements. 21
Implementation of the economic soundness policy led to a practice
of redlining entire geographic areas of Chicago which the appraisal
department considered ineligible for mortgage insurance. Although
physical evidence of these maps proved somewhat elusive , it could
be shown generally, through their own documents, admissions of past
employees, and various committee reports, that the FHA in Chicago red-
lined areas which coincided with existing inner-city
ghetto and transitional neighborhoods.22 Research for the CBL liti-
gation revealed that the FHA neighborhood files and documents, which
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would have been useful in indicating exactly which areas were redlined
and the reasons therefore, were destroyed. Persons contacted for
such information either would not talk for fear of reprisal or
merely spoke in generalities.23
We do know that the Chicago field insuring office utilized an
automatic rejection procedure based on the geographic classification
of loan applications. From 1955 to at least1961 ,24 receiving desk
personnel reviewed all applications, rejected and
discontinued processing, without a credit determination or property
valuation being conducted, all those properties with neighborhood
locations designated as "economically unsound" from either of two
sources: the red-outline notation in Olcott's Blue Book of Values,
a copy of which was kept at the receiving desk, or from the FHA
neighborhood ID files on established ratings of locations.25 A court-
ordered pre-trial memorandum of the plaintiffs stated that the Olcott's
for 1962 showed that the Chicago FHA office redlined the west side of
Chicago to about Kostner Avenue (4400W) from about Roosevelt Road
(1200S) to about Madison Street, the primarily residential area into
which blacks were moving or had moved (East Garfield Park). According
to the same memorandum, North Lawndale, Fuller Park and Englewood
community areas were similarly marked off-limits from the time they
experienced racial transition until the late 1960s .26
Nonetheless, no redlining maps existed after 1969. They had
been destroyed after being noticed by a Washington official in use in
the regional office in Detroit. 27
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FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans represented the only
alternative to contract buying for most black households seeking to
purchase a home outside the ghetto. Financial institutions would
not accept the risk of lending in threatened white or transitional
neighborhoods, and the majority of contract buyers nontheless lacked
sufficient cash reserves for a conventional mortgage downpayment which
averaged 20 to 30 percent. On the basis of the statutory FHA minimum
downpayment, the average contract buyer would have qualified for an
FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed loan even on the basis of the inflated
contract purchase price.28
In the FHA Manual, the negative effect on a neighborhood's
economic life from changes in "user groups" referred to racially chang-
ing neighborhoods. 29  Is there any evidence that the local FHA office
extended mortgage insurance in transitional areas in Chicago? Was it
aware of the alternative market developing in its absence? Evidence of
the geographic pattern of FHA lending in the Chicago housing market
available as a consequence of research for the CBL litigation is pre-
sented in Tables 3-1 and 3-2.30 Table 3-1 compares the volume of lend-
ing in 1960-1961 between the city of Chicago and outlying areas
according to the racial composition of the insured property locations.
Racial composition is first classified by census tract within Chicago
and by town elsewhere (Columns A and C). For a better indication of
neighborhood composition, the black population proportion is further
classified according to census block for Chicago city loans which fell
in census tracts over five percent black (Column B) and by tract in towns
of five percent or more black population (Column D).
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TABLE 3-1
Distribution of FHA-Insured Mortgage Loans in Chicago
and Northern Illinois, 1960-1961
City of Chicago Rest of Northern Illinois
1960 Racial Corn- BCess BCnusyTon By Town
position - By ensus By Census B Town & Block
perty Locationa Tract Tract (C) (D)(A) (B)
Percent black
Less than 5 64.0 71.7 81.0 87.4
5-29.9 19.8 9.4 19.0 7.6
30-59.9 3.5 2.7 0.0 4.9
60-89.9 5.5 6.3 0.0 0.1
90-100 7.2 10.4 0.0 0.0
TOTALb 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Number of loans 859 858c 4353 4351d
SOURCE: Jenner & Block Law Offices, "Study on FHA-Insured Loans",
Chicago, June 26, 1975. Includes active and inactive loan files as
of 1970. See note 27, Chapter 2, note 30, Chapter 3, infra.
a. U. S. Census of Population, 1960.
b. Columns may not total one hundred percent due to rounding.
c. One loan unaccounted for.
d. Two loans unaccounted for.
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Loans in the city of Chicago accounted for a small proportion,
16.5 percent, of the total outstanding loans. The FHA did not insure
in the central-city areas of Chicago; in 1960 and 1961, the agency
insured only four loans in the central city limits of Chicago between
Chicago Avenue and 47th Street. Almost 95 percent of the loans insured
in the city were south of 47th Street. The distributions of both city
and surburban loans show an inverse relationship between the number of
loans and the proportion of minority population. Areas of the city
which were more than 30 percent nonwhite held 19 percent of the city's
FHA-insured loans.
The pattern of loans in the nonwhite areas reveals that the FHA
did make a small proportion of loans in areas that were experiencing
racial change during these years, but that such loans were accepted on
a very selective basis. No insurance was extended in the older, transi-
tional neighborhoods on the west side. While 162 loans were insured on
properties located in census tracts that were still experiencing transi-
tion in 1960 (i.e., those tracts classified as penetration, invasion,
early consolidation for 1950-1960 with a 1960 black population between
five and thirty percent, Table 3-2), the majority of these loans were
in one community area, Chatham, an area of much new construction for
nonwhites where 11 percent of the housing stock had been constructed
within the past ten years.31
FHA would insure loans in "orderly" racially changing areas --
where the prices of homes remained stable -- such as Chatham, but it
removed itself from racially changing areas in which there was panic
selling -- those blocks on which every house had a "for sale" sign in
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TABLE 3-2
Distribution of FHA-Insured Mortgage Loans in
Chicago Census Tract 1960-1961, by 1950-1960 Census Tract
Stage of Racial Succession
1950-1960 Racial Number of FHA Insured Number of FHA-Insured
Classification* Loans, 1960-1961 with 1960 Black Population
Between 5 and 30 Percent
Penetration 11 4
Invasion 235 158
Early Consolidation 17 --
Consolidation 21 --
Late Consolidation 7 --
Piling Up 25 --
Subtotal 316 162
White 543 --
TOTAL 859 162
SOURCE: Jenner & Block Law Offices,
1960-1961", undated research material
* See Table 2-1 for definitions.
Memorandum, "FHA Insured Loan Study,
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front of it -- because of the uncertainty regarding values. Lenders
cognizant of FHA's insurance policy would rarely submit applications
in racially changing areas; contract sales were the only way to get a
sale in those areas. 32 Comparison of FHA lending activity with contract
sale activity reveals an inverse relationship between the existence of
FHA-insured loans and contract sales. Between 1960 and 1961, there
were only ten census tracts in Chicago with evidence-of both types of
financing. In effect, there was no real choice. FHA-insured lending
in all but two of these census tracts represented token activity of
four or fewer properties. In at least two other tracts, earlier con-
tract activity had signaled transition. Except in Chatham and Washington
Heights, one generally found evidence of contract activity predominating
in early transition tracts.
"To a greater extent than ever before the use of land-contract
sales among Negro buyers in Chicago is a growing evil." This response,
given by the director of the Chicago FHA insuring office to a 1959
Congressional inquiry concerning practices in the low equity sector of
the "conventional" mortgage market,33 reveals the fact that the FHA
knew how and under what conditions the gap in the supply of housing
finance was serviced although they did not believe themselves to be at
fault. Furthermore, in the early 1960s as part of the feasibility
analyses of urban renewal areas, the FHA conducted studies on contract
sales in several cities. The aim was to develop a program of home reno-
vation and rehabilitation through financing rather than to destroy the
homes through urban renewal. Research uncovered the fact that buyers
had high contract balances which made it nearly impossible to obtain
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conventional mortgages or construction loans. According to the
FHA administrator in charge, many sellers admitted that the sale
prices of the contracts were "greatly" inflated. In cities other than
Chicago, he negotiated substantial reductions on the outstanding con-
tract balances. Unable to obtain any help from the city of Chicago
through its urban renewal program and unable to devise any other
means of pressuring contract sellers to reduce the amounts outstanding
on their contracts, he was "completely unable to obtain negotiations
of contracts in Chicago." 34
If one cannot definitively prove that the Chicago FHA office
redlined neighborhoods on a discriminatory basis, their failure to insure
loans on an open occupancy basis 35 and in almost all racially changing
areas, was certainly a contributory cause of the speculative opportu-
nities and the gross price fluctuations which ensued and thereby fore-
closed the possibility of FHA activity.
In retrospect it is easy to attribute social liability to the FHA
for not insuring in older inner-city neighborhoods. While FHA-insured
loans had long provided mortgage credit for low equity purchases,
it did so only for those properties that permitted the insuring agency
to operate on a self-sustaining basis; given FHA underwriting and con-
struction standards, loans were concentrated in the middle-income, new
suburban market. The availability of FHA and VA mortgage loans in
Chicago further suffered from general programmatic constraints common
to such loans in most urban areas: high discounts to offset the low
statutory contractual interest rate, high construction costs, bureau-
cratic red tape and, in Illinois, a lack of mutual savings banks,
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commonly large holders of such mortgages.36 Conventional lenders did
not see the benefits of the government-backed mortgage loans since,
with the addition of the insurance premimum, the total interest rate
often exceed the conventional interest rate.37 Indeed, the effects of
these factors are revealed by the fact that by the end of 1959, a
smaller proportion of veterans in Illinois had made use of the VA-
38
guaranteed mortgage program than in any other major state in the country.
Not until 1965 did the FHA officially recognize the effects of
its "automatic exclusion and rejection" policy.
In some instances there has been hesitancy on the
part of insuring offices to make FHA programs available in
older neighborhoods. An automatic exclusion of neighborhoods
merely because they are older can result in the shutting off
of capital investments in these neighborhoods. Unavailability
of capital, in turn, accelerates decline.
Directors should at all times be aware of the charac-
teristics and changing patterns of residential areas within
their jurisdiction. They should be alert to situations in
which values can be stabilized and property upgraded by an
infusion of capital in older residential sections and should
help bring this about by seeing that such areas are not denied
the benefits of mortgage insurance. 39
The irony of FHA's new market position was that it was given a directive
to intervene as a lender of last resort, to supply a service and to
reverse a legacy of neighborhood consequences and institutional attitudes
which it had fostered.40
INSTITUTIONAL FINANCE OF SPECULATIVE TRANSACTIONS
Mortgage lending practices commonly adhere to conservative
principles of investment consistent with the fiduciary responsibilities
of financial intermediaries. The industry's model of "good" lending
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behavior was predicated upon no lending to black households in
white neighborhoods, no lending in racial transitional areas until
price stability returned, and risk minimization through conservative
lending limits. While it was the role of the FHA-insured sector to
service low equity purchasers, the FHA itself set the standard with
respect to neighborhood homogeneity.
The structure of financial markets in Chicago reinforced the
conservative disposition of financial intermediaries. Unit banking
areas such as Chicago tended to collect the lowest volume of long-
term savings in local financial institutions, and commercial banks in
Chicago in the late 1950s and early 1960s placed less funds in mortgage
loans relative to savings deposits than banks in most other areas.41
Without mutual savings banks, the savings and loan associations
provided the bulk of mortgage lending funds and only a handful wrote
FHA-insured mortgages.42 A 1959 Chicago survey showed that of the 243
savings and loan associations in Cook County, only 21, including the
two black associations in the city, had made loans in the heavily
black-populated south side area during the preceding twelve months.
Only one white association had made an initial mortgage loan to a black
family in a white neighborhood.43
The direct involvement of savings and loan associations in the
contract market clearly deviates from the conventional practices of the
time. Were these associations aware of the type of security colla-
teralizing the mortgage, the absentee ownership of the mortgagor, the
installment contract sale? What were the costs and benefits of financing
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speculative mortgage loans? Did the involved associations represent
a deviant class of mortgages?
Investors in Speculative Real Estate Transfers
Just as the dual housing market fostered a realty vacuum for
speculative transactions, it also fostered a financing vacuum. Impend-
ing and ongoing neighborhood racial change led to a reduction of local
mortgage money in transitional areas and provided a ready market of
profitable lending opportunities for those lenders who understood how
to assess and price risk in these neighborhoods.
The contract market was composed of an outside set of money
lenders financing speculative activity just as it was composed of an
outside set of real estate investors. In 1960, there were 289 savings
and loan associations in the Chicago metropolitan area. At least 55,
or 19 percent, of these institutions had loans outstanding to speculators
in the installment contract market after 1955; yet only 34 of these
associations were located in the city of Chicago and a mere 7 were
located in those community areas with contract sales activity.
Savings and loan associations were not the sole financiers of
the contract market; while their mortgage underwriting activities
accounted for 73 percent of the contract properties in the data set, the
residual 27 percent was financed by other institutional lenders, local
black life insurance companies, local ethnic fraternal organizations,
and individuals, mortgage companies, and investment syndicates.44
Individuals and investment syndicates have traditionally provided
financial leverage for risky investments. The subordinate role of these
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"other" investors in the contract market can be attributed to the
unusually large-scale involvement of several savings and loan associ-
ations with those speculators accumulating the largest portfolio of
contract properties. Sample data reveal a temporary decline in the
relative usage of other mortgage money sources during the period of
heavy SLA involvement between 1959 and 1963. Except on the south side
where there were fewer SLAs willing to invest heavily in speculative
mortgage finance, small-scale speculators relied on these non-SLA
sources almost twice as frequently as large-scale speculators. A com-
parison of the costs of mortgage finance by type of mortgage lender,
presented in Table 3-3, shows the costs of SLA mortgage finance to be
lower than the costs of other sources of mortgage finance. Speculators
undoubtedly preferred SLA mortgages. These mortgages were written for
longer terms with lower interest rates and fewer discount points than
mortgages written by other financiers. The difference between the
mortgage payments and the contract receipts, the monthly gross cash flow
to the speculator, was greater for SLA mortgages than for other mort-
gages.
Aside from the profit-making goal of a high investment return,
why would ethnic fraternal organizations such as the Polish Roman Catho-
lic Union of America and the Polish National Alliance of the U. S.
finance the disruptive, speculative activities of dealers operating
in their clients' neighborhoods? Why would black-owned or managed
financial institutions underwrite speculative contract purchases rather
then direct mortgage loans?
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TABLE 3-3
Selected Financial Characteristics of Contract Transactions
by Type of Mortgage Lender 1955-58, 1959-64, 1965-68
1955-1958 1959-1964 1965-1968
Mean Value
Savings and Loan Association
First Mortgage Characteristics
Interest rate (percent) 6.05 6.64 6.39
Discount fee (percent) 3.60 4.17 2.18
Term (years) 11.2 13.4 15.5
Loan amount ($) 9443 11699 13125
Loan-to-price ratio (percent) 77.02 95.73 122.2
Appraisal-to-price ratio 129.0 138.4 132.0
(percent)
Contract Transaction Charac-
teristics
Monthly gross cash flow ($) 57 47 53
Gross cash investment ($) 61 -242 -2628
number of observations 51 270 9
Other Mortgage Lender
First Mortgage Characteristics
Interest rate (percent) 6.10 6.56 6.75
Discount fee (percent) 9.00 9.32 9.52
Term (years) 9.5 10.5 6.7
Loan amount ($) 8417 2979 7627
Loan-to-price ratio (percent) 88.82 100.48 93.33
Appraisal-to-price ratio na 131.0 na
(percent)
Contract Transaction Charac-
teristics
Monthly gross cash flow ($) 49 34 36
Gross cash investment ($) -141 -66 18
number of observations 53 75 8
na= information not available.
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With the exodus of conventional sources of mortgage funds in
racially changing neighborhoods, the immobility of real estate trans-
fers inhibited the locational choices for resident ethnic whites as
well as potential black entrants. It is the recognition of this
constraint which most likely provided the impetus for the financial in-
volvement of the ethnic fraternal organizations.45 Financing the
contract transactions of speculators represented the counterpart to
financing suburban residential choice since it provided the cash re-
sources necessary to purchase homes from whites desirous of leaving the
old neighborhoods in the wake of racial change.
In contrast, the involvement of black-owned or managed institu-
tions was both more complex and widespread. As part of a broader
institutional family of either life insurance companies or savings and
loan associations, the behavior of these black institutions was condi-
tioned by the attitudinal and procedural norms, and regulatory guidelines
of each industry. In both of these industries conventionally accepted
principles of mortgage underwriting procedurally prohibited lending in
racially changing neighborhoods. While these black institutions were
cited as pioneers in lending in emerging black neighborhoods,46 the
exact location of these loans and the timing of this lending vis a vis
initial transition was unclear. The CBL information on contract
buying targeted one aspect of this institutional involvement. Black
life insurance companies financed contract speculators. It is unclear-
exactly why these companies chose to finance speculators rather than
buyers directly. Apart from the high returns attainable, one can
only suggest that since life insurance companies are not mortgage
originators but purchasers of mortgages from local correspondents, the
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probability of direct mortgage placement with black buyers was small,
If the speed of Negro residential expansion was limited by the
resources of Negro-owned life insurance companies and savings and loan
associations, as noted at the housing hearings held by the U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights in Chicago in 1959, it is unlikely that the
contract market would have attained such an impressive scale. Table
3-4 presents a comparison of the size of these black companies with
the size of the major white institutional investors in the contract
market. The testimony at the Civil Rights Commission hearings most
likely reflected the major role black institutions played in financing
homeownership through direct purchase and mortgage transactions in
established black neighborhoods rather than in the broader Negro home-
ownership market, because the development of a large-scale contract
market was clearly dependent upon the participation of larger white
institutions.
Mutual Benefits from the Lender-Speculator Relationship
Mortgage finance provided the lubricant for the contract market.
While entry into the market was technically wide open, it was dependent
upon securing an adequate and often continuously reliable source of
mortgage finance. A speculator's volume was necessarily limited by
the number of his financial contacts, or the size of his prime source
institution and its commitment to financing contract transactions.
Without financial leverage, sales volume was a function of a speculator's
personal resources.
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TABLE 3-4
Asset Size of Major Savings and Loan Associations Involved
in Financing the Contract Speculators Compared with Black-Con-
trolled Institutions: 1960, 1966
Institution* 1960 1966
Gotham SLA 17,297,261 35,881,704
Dividend SLA 19,931,600 27,967,946
Dusty SLA 3,780,051 5,433,436
Provident SLA 25,184,357 Liquidated
Major SLA 2,974,938 3,831,549
Ring SLA 3,679,783 7,945,280
Lake FSLA 26,939,221 41,633,672
Avon SLA 4,706,133 10,434,868
World FSLA 7,296,516 11,385,760
Colonel FSLA 33,666,260 54,702,687
Black-Controlled Institutions
County FSLA 11,427,698 17,332,301
Trust FSLA 5,099,980 7,813,786
South Insurance Co.+ 23,468,565 33,339,732
City Insurance Co. 13,353,306 19,314,360
Assured Life Insurance Co. 6,683,393 7,835,096
SOURCE: Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago, Directory of Members, 1960,
1966. Best Insurance Directory, Life Insurance Companies, 1960, 1966.
* Names represent pseudonyms. Listed in decreasing order of participa-
tion in finance of speculative transactions in the installment contract
market.
+ Only black institution known to have had a large involvement financing
speculative transactions in the installment contract market.
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The sources of finance differed between geographic market
sectors, but the characteristics of mortgage finance enabled all
large-scale contract sellers to speculate in contract properties with
little or no cash investment. While average gross cash investment for
all sellers was low, it was lower for large-scale sellers, $23 compared
to $388 for the small-scale seller. On the west side, all large-
scale sellers secured more than half of their mortgages from a single
SLA; the two largest sellers used the same institution, Gotham Mutual
Saving Association.48 On the south side, while several other SLAs made
multiple loans to individual speculators, a pattern of concentrated
mortgage lending by a few lenders did not develop. Non-SLA mortgages
were twice as prevalent, and speculators spread their mortgage loans
among several associations.
In addition to the leverage function, mortgage finance of
contract property allowed the speculator to shift the risks of contract
selling to a third party without sacrificing his high investment return.
By interposing his credit between the lending institution and the
contract buyer, the speculator successfully arbitraged conventional
credit constraints facing the low equity contract buyer in transitional
neighborhoods. In the process, however, the lender bore most of the
risks, since both the borrower and contract buyer had little or no
equity invested. The fact that the speculator in most cases was not
personally liable since the land trust account was the legal mortgagor
further decreased the risk to the seller. In case of contract buyer
default, property deterioration or a decision to disinvest, the specu-
lator could, and often would, default on the mortgage note, leaving the
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association with few options but to foreclose on the loan.
Mortgage loans made to speculators for the purpose of financing
property acquisition to be sold subsequently on an installment contract
were characterized by high interest rates, high loan origination fees,
and short maturities. These higher rates and shorter terms could be
attributed to high risk or to market imperfections which limited the
availability of funds in this particular market and caused some borrow-
ers to pay higher-than-average rates and fees to obtain financing.
Within the lending industry, it is generally conceded that,
all other things equal, loans to nonresident owners, on older buildings,
and in racially changing neighborhoods represent greater risks to the
lender because of the greater uncertainties of expected loan returns.
When the borrower-contract seller is interposed between the lender and
the buyer whose income provides the funds for payments, the lender loses
his customary control over a critical underwriting standard -- the
ratio of borrower income to loan payments. The inflated price of a
contract sale compounds the risks. In such a situation the risk
burden of the loan disproportionately falls on a single component --
the value of the real estate security. Both seller and buyer often
have little invested capital.
However, while the mortgage terms to contract sellers reflected
a perception of higher than average risk -- higher interest rates,
shorter maturities and higher loan premiums -- the very high loan-to-
purchase price ratio reveals the true liberality of the mortgage loan.
This ratio increased over time from 77.4 percent for the period 1955-58
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to 95.7 percent for mortgages granted between 1959 and 1964 (Table
3-3).
The fact that contract sales have most frequently been utilized
as a means of initiating neighborhood transition subjects lenders to
the additional risks of price instability which purportedly keeps them
from making "integration" loans. (Price stability in the market fol-
lowing initial transition often fails to sustain the high level of
housing prices and rents generated earlier and captured by speculators
in long-term contract payments.) When lenders are aware of the tech-
niques of real estate investors engaged in contract sales of properties
in racially changing neighborhoods, the risks they accept when making
mortgages on these properties are greater than the risks of lending
directly to prospective homebuyers at similar mortgage terms.
To justify the investment on an individual loan basis, the
higher risk of lending to a nonresident owner theoretically need only
to be compensated by a sufficient return. Yet the most salient
characteristic of SLA involvement in the finance of contract properties
is not that it deviated from the low-risk loan, but that several asso-
ciations made multiple high-risk loans to several speculators. Four
SLAs accounted for 48 percent of the SLA-financed mortgages;49 loans
from Gotham Mutual Savings Association accounted for over 45 percent
of these loans. In practice, it was the portfolio concentration of
risky loans which compounded the risk attributable to a particular loan.
Consider a hypothetical example of an association entering
into a lending program where it expected that one-fifth
of its loans would default, and the recovery rate on these
loans would be 50 percent of the loan balance. In order to
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produce a 6 percent average return on its entire port-
folio, the association would have to earn a rate of 50
20 percent on the remaining four-fifths of its loans.
Why would an association make these loans at high loan-to-
purchase price ratios? One answer, of course, is that the expected
profit from the high interest rate and high loan premium was a suf-
ficient inducement for the lender. As shown in Table 3-5, the
average interest rates and origination fees of mortgage loans on
speculative contract transactions substantially exceeded prevailing
mortgage rates on existing homes in Chicago.
The exceedingly high loan-to-purchase price ratios can partially
be attributed to the fact that speculators generally purchased property
from white homeowners at distressed prices. But laxity in administra-
tive procedures, excessive overappraisals and a willingness by favorably
disposed lending officials to make loans at greater than 80 percent of
appraised value are equally responsible.5 1 Mortgage applications often
had no bearing on the subsequent loan. They were completed after an
oral commitment, or forms signed in blank by most large-scale specula-
tors, were completed at the convenience of the association.52 The
effect of these lending procedures was a high loan-to-price ratio while
53
the loan-to-appraisal value ratio conformed to the lending regulations.
In these speculative mortgage finance arrangements the lender clearly
held a superior bargaining position. While the costs of such mortgages
were high relative to conventional mortgage rates, the astute lender
understood that this was scarcely a constraint on the speculator's
ability to generate a high return. Such a return was almost always
forthcoming. First, the prevailing contract market prices, when con-
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TABLE 3-5
Characteristics of Conventional First Mortgage Home Loans
for Existing Homes Originated by Major Lenders Nationally, in Chicago
SMSA, Compared with Characteristics of Mortgage Loans Made to
Speculators in Chicago, Selected Years
Type of Loan and Loan Annual Averages
Characteristics 1963 1964 1965
Loans for purchase of existing
homes, U. S. average *
Contract interest rate (%) 5.98 5.92 5.91
Nonrecurring fees & charges (%) 0.65 0.56 0.51
Loan term to maturity (years) 19.7 20.1 20.6
Loan-to-purchase-price ratio (%) 71.6 71.6 72.4
Purchase price ($) 18,700 19,200 20,200
Loans for purchase of existing
homes, Chicago SMSA *
Contract interest rate (%) 5.60 5.58 5.57
Nonrecurring fees & charges (%) 1.25 1.03 0.90
Loan term to maturity (years) 20.8 21.2 21.1
Loan-to-purchase-price ratio (%) 70.7 72.8 70.7
Purchase price ($) 23,300 23,000 25,200
Loans for purchase of existing
homes by nonresident owner for
speculation, Chicago +
Contract interest rate (%) 6.69 6.48 6.29
Nonrecurring fees (%) 4.06 3.08 2.50
Loan term to maturity (years) 14.6 13.2 15.0
Loan-to-purchase-price ratio (%) 100.3 103.7 123.3
Purchase price ($) 11,336 11,781 7,550
number of observations 33 24 7
SOURCE: Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Office of
Release 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966.
Public Affairs, News
* Average terms based on a sample of lenders.
+ Average terms based on a sample of newly originated loans made by
lenders to speculators for property acquisition subsequently sold in
an installment contract.
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verted to a chash flow relationship between mortgage expense and
contract payment, yielded a large cash flow which minimized the time
period necessary for the speculator to recapture his initial investment.
Second, the initial cash investment was generally so minimal (or nega-
tive) that returns were high regardless of the absolute dollar cash
flow. This superior bargaining position was buttressed by the logistics
of real estate transactions; the ability to purchase a building was
often contingent upon obtaining a loan commitment prior to closing on
an acquisition.
A second reason for liberally granting speculative mortgage
loans was that loan losses were not anticipated -- the lender believed
he had a "secure loan due to the fictitiously high price on the property.
Or, if more sensitive to the risk involved, he may still [have believed]
that the high yield on such loans amply compensated for the risk
involved."54
We feel that the security to the amount of the loan is far
in excess of any security obtainable in any other area of
the city of Chicago.. .We feel that with the small amount
of mortgage loan, short term of mortgage, and repayments of
principle averaging $1,000 per year per mortgage, our loans
are fully protected. 55
Alternatively, since a majority of the contract properties were
two- or three-flat buildings, the lender may have been persuaded that
the property was worth more than the acquisition price by using an
income approach to value. With the market more circumscribed for the
black renter and the low income rental supply diminished during the
previous decade due to urban renewal demolitions, higher "rents" could
be charged to the black compared to the white renter for the same
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space. Higher rental income would support a higher valuation for
the property and thus a larger loan,56
In 1961, the directors of Gotham MSA, the largest investor in
the contract market, saw no particular danger in a concentration of
loans to a limited number of real estate investors. To justify their
position, they reversed the commonly accepted principle that loans
for nonowner-occupied dwellings carried greater risk. The ambiguous
perception of contract buying permitted this type of flexible thinking;
both parties -- contract buyers and sellers -- thought of themselves
as owners.
Our records show these contract purchasers value their
newly acquired real estate more than the former owner,
and collection experience has been excellent.57
Yet when borrower-seller delinquencies became epidemic, this association
reversed its stand regarding the risks attendant upon these contract
sales transactions:
[There are] many responsible contract purchasers living in
these properties. These people, for the most part, have
been sold the property at a ridiculously high contract
price, which made the monthly payments almost impossible.58
A likely motivation for the lending practices being pursued by
several associations was the opportunity for personal enrichment. It
was common knowledge among those familiar with the dual financing
arrangements in the contract market that many of the officers of
participating savings and loan associations benefited from under-the -
table payments. Indeed,several gained a reputation for financing
speculative transactions; sellers were aware of the associations "that
would loan on these properties -- that would loan in these areas." 59
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Frequently these brokers go out into other neighborhoods
and for cash bonuses persuade the savings and loan officers
out of the neighborhood to make 70 or 80 percent loans.
They'll charge 1 percent or 2 percent legally and 2 percent
or 5 percent extra bonus in cash paid off to the officers
of the savings and loan for making these high loans. 60
The method of closing mortgage loans through escrow accounts and dis-
bursing the net proceeds (after deducting loan fees and charges) to
the escrow account with the instructions "Pay the proceeds of the loan
to borrower" facilitated the payment o f higher than stated premiums,
referral fees, kickbacks.
At Gotham, a mutual asscoiation, the president benefitted from
a bonus arrangement whereby he received 25 percent of net earnings after
dividends and before allocations to reserves.
Association earnings were, of course, magnified by the high
interest rates and large loan premiums charged to borrowers
on risky loans. Even though a portion of loan premilums was
deferred and taken into income in subsequent years, $161,000
or about 25 percent of gross income during 1959 consisted of
premium income. Deferred premiums shown on the association's
balance sheets were about $180,000 at the end of 1959 as com-
pared to less than $12,000 a year earlier. Therefore, the
president stood to receive an additional $40,000 bonus in
subsequent years from loan premiums collected in 1959. Fur-
thermore, the president and other top officers and directors
of the association split loan fees and appraisal fees charged
borrowers on new loans, without taking these fees into asso-
ciation income. 61
Many associations involved in the contract market sought high-
rate, high-fee, and frequently high-risk loans as an accommodation to
changes in the financial marketplace. The associations with the largest
involvement all experienced rapid savings growth in the late fifties and
early sixties (Table 3-4) as a consequence of extensive advertising, ex-
pensive promotion gifts, high dividend rates and commissions paid to savings
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brokers. During the same period, 1959-65, changes in mortgage and
savings rates produced an "earnings squeeze" in the savings and loan
industry. In 1960, conventional mortgage rates began to decline.
By mid-1963 rates had stabilized at about 5.8 percent, down from 6.3
percent in 1960; they did not increase again until the end of 1965.
The average rate paid on savings accounts concomitantly continued to
rise from 3.9 percent in 1960 to 4.2 percent in 1965.62 Some associa-
tions considered high-yield loans a necessary means to increase their
loan portfolio return. The high return was necessary if the association
was to maintain the 1960 point spread and continue to attract and to
pay for savings.
Concentrations of High-Risk Loans to Real Estate Speculators
There is ample evidence to demonstrate that most of the involved
associations were well aware of the characteristics of the mortgaged
property, the borrower-beneficiary relationships behind loans made to
trust accounts, and the intended usage of mortgage proceeds to finance
sales on installment contracts. The appraisal documents used by several
associations in the late fifties and early sixties explicitly requested
information on the racial composition of a neighborhood through the
following types of questions: "colored or white purchaser?", "racial
composition of the neighborhood?", "distance from colored?" 63 Appraisal
forms similarly requested information on the intended usage of the
property with a printed designation for contract sales: "Premises are
occupied by: owner , tenants , contract purchaser , " or "Land Contract.:
Purchaser ."64
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A majority of the mortgage loans made to a trustee of a land
trust account represented multiple loans to one real estate speculator.
Administrative procedures facilitated concealment of these multiple
loans to a single borrower. Supervisory examiners often found that the
mortgage notes were rarely signed by the beneficiary(ies) of the trust;
in several cases, they were unable to find trust agreements and there-
fore concluded that the association never concerned itself with the
real beneficiaries.65 At least one association did not require the
applicant-beneficiary to certify his total indebtedness to the
association when applying for a new loan. 66
Knowledge of the risks involved in financing speculative real
estate transactions gained through the slow, but steady accumulation
of loan delinquincies beginning in late 1961 and early 1962 did not
persuade some lenders, signficantly the four associations with the
largest portfolio of loans secured by contract sale properties (Table
3-6), to discontinue high-risk lending, which in one case was charac-
terized by supervisory examiners as "hazardous mortgage lending
practices." 67 The examination report for this association for the
following year (1963) revealed that loans in the Lawndale-Garfield
Park area, noted by examiners as a "blighted neighborhood", increased
by 91 percent to $10.3 million during the fourteen-month period
between examinations. This lending concentration represented more
than one-third of Gotham Mutual Savings Association's outstanding
loans. During this period the two largest borrowers, who were also
the two largest west side contract market speculators, Boston and Hicks,
were granted 230 and 90 loans, respectively, for a total of $3.7
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TABLE 3-6
Selected Lending Characteristics of Savings and Loan Associations
with the Largest Concentrations of Loans Financing
Contract Sale Transactions
Combined Lending Concentrations,* all years
Sample number of loans, all years 169
Percent of all newly originated SLA
mortgages+ 48.2
Dollar volume of sample loans 1,871,283
Percent, dollar volume of sample loans 49.7
Average Mortgage Loan Characteristics for
Newly Originated Mortgages, 1959-64
Interest Rate (%) 6.83
Discount Fee (%) 4.71
Term-to-Maturity (years) 13.0
Loan Amount ($) 11,925
Loan-to-Purchase Price (%) 90.59
Appraisal-to-Price Ratio (%) 132.70
Number of observations 141
* Gotham Mutual Savings Association, Dividend SLA, Dusty SLA, Provident
SLA.
+ Newly originated savings and loan association mortgage loans represent
59 percent of the sample properties with mortgage financing; the
residual mortgages were placed with other institutional sources, or
privately.
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million. This magnitude of new loans corresponded to a period of
"substantial" increases in slow loans; as of the 1962 examination,
slow loans amounted to $674,000 or 2.1 percent of net assets compared
with $56,000 or 0.3 percent of net assets a little over one year
earlier. 68
Despite the heavy volume of delinquencies (including real
estate owned and in foreclosure) which had increased to 7,8 percent
of net assets by March, 1963, Gotham continued to "expand its lending
in this area to the same borrowers, albeit at a slower pace than in
previous years."69 Later that year, the depth of the delinquency
problem finally caused the association to revise its lending policy.
By the end of that year, loans outstanding in the Lawndale-Garfield
Park area had reached $11.7 million or 37 percent of all outstanding
loans. 70
Another smaller association following a similar pattern of
concentrated, high-risk loans to a few borrowers also experienced a
build-up of slow loans and real estate owned or in foreclosure in
the early sixties. 71 A 1963 report recommended that test appraisals
be made on a few properties securing loans granted by the association. 72
At the time, slow loans and contracts represented 1.5 percent of net
assets. In the next nine months, association officers approved 48
loans in the West Garfield and Englewood community areas; 26, or 54
percent were granted to realtors or other persons for speculation.73
Loans in these two communities then represented over 49 percent of
the association's loan portfolio:, 31 percent on the west side, 18
percent on the south side. During this period slow loans and contracts
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accumulated to 5.3 percent of net assets. Nonetheless, lending
practices in the next year, 1965, continued to reflect those of
the past; all loans were granted for properties in the older sections
of Chicago with fifty percent going to nonresident owners.
Provident SLA also followed the now familiar practice of
granting multiple loans to speculative real estate investors. Exami-
nation of this association's lending operations revealed a "situation
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of undue risk" to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.
Nonetheless, between 1959 and 1962, the number of such loans in force
to the two largest of seven speculator-borrowers increased from 51
to 132, or nearly $1.8 million, which represented 5.7 percent of the
association's total loans in force.75 One of these borrowers was
Boston, the single largest borrower at Gotham Mutual. 76
At a time when delinquencies on the west side had become
prevalent, the executive vice-president of yet another significant
financier of the contract market asked for some "cooperation" in
curing these loan delinquencies, given "all the consideration you got
from us over the past years." A month later he wrote: "Kindly send
me your check for the delinquency, I may be able to do something for
you some day."77  The letter is dated December 12, 1966, a time when
neighborhood deterioration was clearly evident in these west side
neighborhoods.
Why would an association continue to make loans of this
quality? One explanation is that management exercised poor judgment
in assessing the probable losses from loan concentrations; as the
number of nonearning assets increased, increases in SLA income from
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origination fees and high-rate loans provided a means to meet dividend
and reserve payments. Another reason is that there may have been a
conflict of interest between a savings and loan business and real
estate affiliate.78 Yet another is that those who controlled the
association concentrated on short-term profits at the expense of
long-term solvency. At the time most of these loans were granted,
Illinois State law and FSLIC insurance regulations did not prohibit
such concentrations of lending; beginning in February, 1963, federal
insurance regulations prohibited only the concentration of loans to
one borrower.79
As federally insured associations, the risks threatening
institutional solvency posed by concentrations of high-risk lenging
were ultimately shifted to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC). Between 1963 and 1971, 23 federally insured
savings and loan associations in Illinois80 (18 of which were state
chartered) experienced financial difficulties severe enough to
warrant financial assistance from the FSLIC.81 This group included
three of the four largest lenders discussed in the previous pages,
and eight other SLAs which were involved on a smaller scale in the
finance of contract properties. Only in the former cases can the
financial difficulties of the associations be attributed to specula-
tive loans on contract properties. Mortgage loans to contract sellers
granted by the latter eight associations were part of broader high-
risk loan policies which included speculative loans on land purchases
and new suburban housing developments. The demise of many associa-
tions in this latter group can also be attributed to criminal embezzle-
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ment and fraud. 82
One of the rescue actions taken by the FSLIC was to purchase
some or all of the assets of these "problem" associations. A court
document provides an estimate of the magnitude of FSLIC acquisition
of contract properties for five of the associations which failed
between 1963 and 1968; the document listed 668 properties.83 (This
figure does not include those properties subsequently acquired through
FSLIC actions taken to facilitate mergers for Dusty SLA and Colonel
SLA.)
Combined loan activity from the eleven "problem" associations
accounted for 42 percent of the contract sale sample properties (Table 3-7)
financed with newly originated mortgages from SLAs. Gotham respec-
tively provided mortgages for over 63 and 80 percent of the sample
contract properties of Boston and Hicks; Provident granted mortgages
to Cone for 51 percent of his sample contract properties. As pre-
eminent suppliers of capital for the west side's largest real estate
investors, the scale of participation in the contract market by these
associations reflected a short-term mutually beneficial arrangement
which undoubtedly accounted for the rapid growth in volume of contract
sales by these sellers. If a real estate investor can obtain favorable
financing he can sell more readily. Despite the high costs of the
loan, the high loan-to-purchase price ratio minimizes the cash invest-
ment and maximizes the return while the costs of this mutually bene-
ficial arrangement are passed along to the contract buyer. Since a
buyer with a small downpayment, particularly a black buyer, cannot
afford to be price conscious, contract prices can be inflated to cover
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TABLE 3-7
Selected Lending Characteristics of "Problem" Illinois Savings
and Loan Associations Involved in Mortgage Finance of Property Sold
on an Installment Contract
Combined Lending Activity, all years
"Problem" Associations* All Other Asso-
ciations
Sample number of loans, all years 145 231
Percent of all newly+ originated 42 58SLA mortgages
Dollar volume of sample loans ($) 1,545,133 2,189,800
Percent, dollar volume of sample 41 59loans
Average Mortgage Loan Characteristics
for Newly Originated Mortgages, 1959-64
"Problem" Associations All Other Asso-
ciations
Interest Rate (%) 6.79 6.53
Discount Fee (%) 4.52 3.89
Term-to-Maturity (years) 13.2 13.5
Loan Amount ($) 11,465 11,932
Loan-to-Purchase Price (%) 94.67 96.48
Appraisal-to-Price (%) 140.0 137.2
Number of observations 121 146
* "Problem" associations are those SLAs which became insolvent between
1963 and 1973 and required assistance from the FSLIC; their offices
were subsequently closed or merged with stronger SLAs. Three out of
the four major SLA lenders listed in Table 3-6 were "problem" associ-
ations.
+ Newly originated savings and loan association mortgage loans repre-
sented 59 percent of the sample properties with mortgage financing;
the residual mortgages were placed with other institutional sources
or privately.
144
high finance expenses yet still generate high returns.
The causes of several of these institutional failures stem
from following a policy of lending which represented three types
of concentration -- in a limited geographic area, in a few borrowers,
and in nonowner-occupied dwellings. The fact that these buildings
were also sold on contract at inflated prices compounded the risks.
In the case of Gotham Mutual, this combination had a synergistic
effect on loan quality.
Property values in the area declined, the principal borrower
died, and because of this, contract buyers abandoned their
property and tenants ceased paying rents. The buildings
securing the loans were in many cases vandalized or gutted
before the association could secure possession through
foreclosure.84
On an individual basis the high-rate, high-risk loan was not a
detrimental factor of loan quality.
We do not wish to take the position that no loans at all
should be made in the areas in question [Lawndale and Garfield
Park].. .We are confident that there are some which would stand
the test on a sustained quality basis. It is rather the con-
centration of these loans that is disturbing.85
Included in these [loans made in declining areas] were loans
made for nonresident speculative investment income purposes,
either through resale, contract agreement for deed or rental.
It is commendable for associations to recognize and assume
their responsibilities to their immediate neighborhood or
community. It is conceivable that such efforts through loans
for homesteads will affect to arrest any decline in values
within the area serviced. Such steps taken in some locali-
ties can be successfully attested to toward rehabilitation.
However, this office cannot agree that absentee ownership
in loans made in their behalf can be inducive to the elimi-
nation of blight and towards permanent efforts for improve-
ments.86
Rather, it was the concentration of such loans over time. One major
supplier of mortgage capital, Dividend SLA, did not develop into a
problem association, nor did its savings deposits grow as rapidly as
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those of Gotham Mutual. Its survival could have been due to a policy
of retrenchment instead of continued investment in high-yielding
risky loans.
All too often the literature analyzing the role of the specu-
lator as mediator between white and black housing markets overlooks
the financial connection, the source of capital necessary to sell the
transferred unit either with a mortgage or with a contract. The
availability of mortgage finance was a critical institutional deter-
minant supporting the contract market and a key factor maintaining the
segmentation of housing markets by race. A "no integration" policy
toward mortgage loans to black households seeking to expand beyond the
ghetto effectively controled this aspect of access to the larger white
market. And control of access determined the economic environment
of contract sales. Until 1965, the government, through its agent,
the Federal Housing Administration, implicitly supported policies and
practices that fostered the development of a realty and financing
vacuum in white neighborhoods adjacent to established black areas.
The contract sales market flourished in that vacuum.
Blockbusting activities and contract sales stand as counter-
vailing forces to the unwritten restrictions on black residential
expansion exercised by real estate and financial intermediaries. The
ability of the speculator to break through the white market's barriers
rests upon his willingness to reject the professional norms of the
real estate industry and his ability to find alternative sources of
mortgage finance, in a trade-off of reputation and professional
security for uncertainty and expected high short-term profits. His
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ability to exact high profits derives, not from individual controls
on market price, but from a superior bargaining position conferred
by the negative actions of institutions inhibiting direct access by
black home buyers.
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CHAPTER 4
Price and Profit in the Installment Contract Market
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Defendants in effect contend that this [price in excess of fair
market value .and of what whites pay for comparable housing]
is solely a matter of economics and not of discrimination. We
cannot accept this contention for although the laws of supply
and demand may function so as to establish a market level for
the buyer in the black housing areas, it is clear that these
laws are affected by a contrived market condition which is
grounded in and fed upon by racial discrimination -- that is,
the available supply of housing is determined by the buyer's
race.
U. S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit
Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., July 20, 1974.
The creation and support of a dual housing market evolves from
restricted access to the white market. Racial discrimination in this
context is less likely to manifest itself through overt refusals to
sell or through differential terms of sale, the traditional conceptu-
alization, but through numerous incremental, subtle actions and insti-
tutional practices which restrict direct black entry into the white
housing market. Racial barriers delay and shape the expansion of the
black neighborhood. An observable short-term consequence is a decrease
in the supply of housing and price increases within the restricted
market. To transfer a unit to the black market blacks must pay an
economic, and often psychological, premium... While economic and
political forces dictate that this expansion cannot be halted, institu-
tional restrictions place the black consumer in a captive market
position, one devoid of meaningful choice.
Given this situation, other individuals use their superior
economic and social position to profit from market inequities. Assum-
ing that one could empirically estimate a "white price" for a particular
transaction in this market, the economics of a restricted market makes
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it conceptually erroneous to look at the price differential between
white and black market price and attribute it to the discriminatory
actions on the part of the ghetto speculator. The comparison is one
between two different opportunity sets: the black market, with its
large demand and artificially restricted supply, and the white market
with its relatively free market adjustment of demand and supply.
If the ghetto realtor just accepts the highest bids as
offered he has done nothing to cause the prices to be
different from those in white areas. As long as he has
competitors in the black market, and absent a price-
fixing conspiracy, when a seller "charges what the market
will bear" he engages in auction-like activity in which
it is presumed that the market, not he, controls the price
level. There is an abundant supply of black buyers who
will outbid whites for property in ghettos and changing
neighborhoods. No white sales will occur unless that
supply is exhausted, because no rational businessman will
sell for less as long as there are customers willing to
pay the going rate.2
Unlike pure racial price discrimination, the causal link between
discriminator (market restrictor) and victim under the dual market
hypothesis is usually remote, with the discriminatory practice operating
more in the aggregate than in individual cases.3
The segmented structure of urban housing markets defines not
just the relative price black households must pay for housing, but
the conditions under which units are transferred between markets.
In a unified market buyer and seller begin with equal bargaining power;
in a racially divided market, the geographic level of competition
affects this parity. The metropolitan scale of competition of the
white market provides the buyer with a choice among neighborhoods, an
implicit bargaining chip. The closed nature of the black market
artificially funnels a buyer's decision to an intra-neighborhood level,
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thereby generating a sellers' market. Not from any rational delibera-
tion, but from race alone, the black buyer faces an economic predica-
ment which forces him to do business with the ghetto expansionists or
not at all. It is this strategically weakened position which allowed
the ghetto speculator in Chicago to impose upon black consumers land
installment contracts as the "price" of homeownership.
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PRICE AND PROFIT IN THE INSTALLMENT CONTRACT MARKET
The study of price and profit relationships in the contract
market is primarily a study of the price dynamics in racial transition
neighborhoods. The price level at which units are shifted from the
white market to the black market, and the existence of a premium, is
a significant determinant of the level of prices in ghetto areas.4
The short-term dynamics of racial transition are particularly signi-
ficant in the ownership submarket because the price level affects the
recapture of home equity by the departing white resident-seller and
the long-term investment of the black buyer.
The most prominent characteristic of the contract system is the
"inflated" nature of the contract purchase price compared to the white
market price. Due to a real or artificially stimulated belief that
prices will fall with black entry, or an increase in the supply of
homes in anticipation of black entry (decreased white demand), specu-
lators are able to purchase a unit at a depressed price in the white
market and transfer it to the black market with a considerable markup.
What factors determine gross markup and contract selling price? Is
the arbitrage profit totally attributable to racial constraints on
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access?
A beginning argument is that the white-black price comparison
is one between two different housing bundles. The joint product of
housing purchase and housing finance alters the standard conceptuali-
zation of price in the conventional cash (deed and mortgage) sale.
In a contract sale price is more than a function of locational access,
property and neighborhood characteristics. Regardless of the causative
agent, when housing finance is a component of the legal purchase
arrangement, price is additionally dependent upon the availability
and cost of credit associated with that sale. There is no independent
source of housing finance comparable to the mortgage loan.
The conjunction of housing purchase and finance means that the
price -- purchase price and contract loan terms -- must cover the
physical bundle of services, the time cost of deferred payment, and the
probability that the buyer may fail to complete payment. Theoretically,
the contract interest rate compensates the seller for financing the
transaction, a portion of the interest rate for the declining value of
future payment dollars, another for his capital investment. However,
when the desired return exceeds the permissible contractual interest
rate, the seller-lender must find a means to overcome mortgage usury
ceilings. By charging finance points, fully payable at the time a
loan is written, the mortgage lender increases the yield of the loan. 5
But in a contract sale, which is foremost a purchase by low-equity
buyers possessing little additional cash for up-front financing
charges, the alternative is to increase selling price so that the
interest portion of the monthly payment on this inflated price repre-
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sents a greater return than the contractual interest rate.6 This
method of recovery makes the finance premium- proportional to the
outstanding contract balance rather than a one-time charge.
Price in the contract market can be represented by the following
relationship:
pb = p (1+ ) (4-1)
where
pb = price in the contract market for housing type jci
p. = price in the cash market for housing type j
S = contract finance premium
is a function of the probability of repayment as well as the
opportunity cost of money.
In conventional housing finance markets, lenders use the equity
requirement as a pricing parameter; the greater the perceived borrower
risk, the greater the required downpayment, or else the interest rate
or mortgage origination fee is adjusted to compensate the lender for
the increased risk from a lower downpayment. But in the low-equity
contract market, the contract seller usually cannot demand a higher
downpayment and the usury ceiling commonly inhibits charging a contract
interest rate commensurate with the perceived risks of low-equity
finance. Contract downpayment, rarely an upwardly flexible price
variable, is an asset measure of the borrower's ability to meet
unexpected expenses and temporary income fluctuations. Change in
the average downpayment over time reflects a change in the character
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of credit demand in the contract market.
The dual housing market in Chicago was characterized by the
use of a different set of instruments and institutions to support
discriminatory activity. Discriminatory prices in the contract market
resulted not from the above financing premium but rather from con-
straints on black access to the white market. The constraints enabled
speculators to use the contract mechanism to charge a premium for
transferring units from the white to black market. By eliminating
independent lending activity, the contract sale allowed the speculator
to misrepresent the value of the property. For example, although
mortgaged at only $8,000- $9,000, the property could have sold for
approximately $18,000 in the contract market. There was no appraisal
process to provide the buyer with an independent assessment of market
value. Furthermore, when contract buyers shopped and compared prices,
they were comparing prices in a restricted market dominated by contract
sellers.
Price in the black contract market includes an additional term,
a discrimination premium:
pb = pw (1+ ) +ca (4-2)
where
a = a discrimination premium for housing type j
The size of the discrimination premium depends upon the instruments
available to control expansion of black residential areas and the
organizational structure of the black market.7
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The discrimination premium. is theoretically independent of
the finance markup; in the Chicago contract market this was not the
case. Speculators' blockbusting activities, their collective control
over transition properties and their exclusive use of land contract
financing to secure the maximum profit left those buying in the transi-
tional market little choice but to pay both the finance and discrimi-
nation markups.8 Price determination in this market assumed contract
financing regardless of a buyer's willingness or ability to buy on
a cash basis. Sellers either refused to sell on a cash basis or to
alter the price for cash sales. 9
Because purchase price in the contract market included finance
and discrimination components, there was a disparity between this
price and the appraisal value of the property made by a mortgage
lending institution. To compensate for a lower proposed loan-to-con-
tract price ratio, the buyer in the contract market attempting to apply
for a mortgage loan had to increase his downpayment to meet the require-
ments for this mortgage loan. This larger downpayment dramatically
decreased the probability of a cash sale.
Arbitrage transactions in transitional neighborhoods result
from a reluctance of white owners to deal directly with black households
and institutional realty and credit constraints on direct access and
purchase by black households. Restricted access increases the price
of the unit in the black market. The arbitrage incentive is the
difference between the acquisition price in the white market and the
sale price in the black market. Contract speculators capture this
dual market premium by transferring units between white and black
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markets. The acquisition price and speculator profit can be
written as follows:
p5 = (1 y) pw (4-3)
n.= p. (p. + t (4-4)
where
p = acquisition price paid by speculator for housing type j
y = acquisition discount
H. = net profit from sale for housing type j
t. = transaction costs for housing type j
Excessively large profits may exist in the installment contract
market for at least five, not mutually exclusive, reasons. The tradi-
tional explanation is that high returns represent a pure race premium ;
speculators charge blacks more than they would charge whites because of
discrimination. The second explanation focuses on "what the market will
bear."
Speculators have done nothing irregular to affect the level of
profits; anybody, even the white-resident seller, could earn the same
profits in this market. The third explanation attributes the high
returns to the financial nature of the real estate transaction. The
speculator engages in an arbitrage process in which he buys a property
for cash and sells it on a credit basis. The high return from such a
transaction, spread out over time and characterized by uncertain
profits, results from the costs of transferring units between credit
markets.
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The fourth explanation states that the high return compensates
the speculator for the higher risks in a low-equity contract sale.
The last explanation attributes high profits to a lack of competition
in the contract market which allows speculators to earn monopoly
profits.
The last argument, that contract sellers earn monopoly profits
simply by furnishing a service otherwise unavailable in these early
transitional neighborhoods, must be considered in light of the fact
that contract sellers are not always passive participants. Speculators
who blockbust aim at buying below fair market value through panic
peddling and pressure tactics, selling high, and capitalizing on very
high finance rates through the contract system. 10 Whether individual
ghetto speculators create the transitional neighborhood through these
blockbusting tactics is important in determining individual liability,
in addition to understanding differences in the gross profits of
operators in the contract market. However, whether a particular con-
tract sale is the first black sale or the last black sale on the block
would not affect the characteristics of economic behavior in the
contract market. As long as excess demand exists in the black market
and speculators act as intermediaries between the white seller and the
black buyer, they earn "racially tinted" profits derived from restricted
black access to the metropolitan housing market. The institutional
factors responsible for the dual market are external to any one indi-
vidual. Certainly a speculator can profit further to the extent he is
able to initiate transition, or, for that matter, to mislead, conceal
or defraud a buyer. However, these additional sources of profit result
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from the particulars of individual transactions. The conceptual
and empirical significance of an analysis of economic behavior in
the contract market stems from the nature and organization of the
market which generates a level of profit in excess of that which could
be earned in the white market. It is the racial characteristic of
the market, not the buyer, which is important.
Substituting equations (4-2) and (4-3) into (4-4), one can see
that there are three parameters determining the speculator's profit
a contract finance premium , 6; an acquisition discount, y; and a
discrimination coefficient, a.
= pw - ( -y) pw + a. - t (4-5)
This transaction price markup is the speculator's primary source
of profit. The second source of profit in the installment contract
sale comes from financing the purchase. It is the difference between
the cost of financing the credit sale and the interest receipts of
the installment sale. Since the basis for calculating interest on
the installment sale differs from the speculator's property acquisition
basis, interest profits are earned on the difference between these
sums and from the difference between contract and mortgage interest
rates.
Both the price markup and finance components of profit are
earned over the term of the contract. To realize the return, the
speculator typically holds the contract paper, leverages his position
with a mortgage loan, and collects monthly payments over the term.
From a cash flow perspective, the expected return, in nominal dollars,
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is the difference between the contract payments and the speculator's
mortgage finance obligations, minus administrative expenses.
t
l. = Z (c. - (m. +a.)) (4-6)J n=1 jn jn jn
where
c. = contract payment for housing type j, period n
m. = mortgage payment for housing type j, period n
a. = administrative cost for housing type j, period n
t = term of contract
The present value of this income stream adjusts for the time value
of money and provides a base for comparison with the profit from a
deed and mortgage sale.
The primary analytical goal in this case study of the installment
contract market is to empirically separate the conceptual components of
consumer price and speculator profit to determine the size of the
premium required to shift units from white to black market. A second
goal is to determine whether the observed tight market structure affects price-
setting behavior and expected profit. One can expect a discrimination
premium as long as excess demand remains a characteristic of the
market, but are these excess profits attributable to a lack of compe-
tition? Did the size of the contract arbitrage premium change over
time? Did large-scale sellers earn higher profits and if so, were they
able to sustain such profits over time? If contract selling was so
profitable, why weren't there many more sellers? These are some of
the important questions this chapter must address.
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ANALYSIS OF PRICE AND PROFIT IN THE INSTALLMENT CONTRACT MARKET
The study of economic relationships in the installment contract
market is primarily a study of the short-term dynamics of real estate
transfers between racial submarkets. Almost 80 percent of the sample
contract sales were located in neighborhoods experiencing the early
stages of transition. For the seller, the contract represented a
hedge against future rental price declines because it allowed him to
lock in the short-term, neighborhood price surges associated with
black residential expansion through the fixed-rate, long-term contract
payment stream.
Most often price studies of racial transition have closely
studied one neighborhood over time with detailed controls and docu-
mentation of price relationships before, during and after transition.
In contrast, the data for analysis in this chapter covers paired
transactions from white resident owner, to speculator, to black
purchaser, across many transitional neighborhoods and over a thirteen-
year period, 1956-1968. The breadth of this time period is justified
by the early transition characteristic of the contract neighborhoods
and the concentration of sales within a six-year period. Seventy-four
percent of the transactions occurred between 1959 and 1965. The
decision to pool the data reflects an assumption that the institutional
characteristics which shaped the contract market did not change signi-
ficantly during the thirteen years to alter the restrictions on direct
accessibility confronting black households purchasing homes outside
the established ghetto.11
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The data set used for analysis in this chapter is composed of
a sample of 565 installment contract transactions.12 It covers 105
census tract neighborhoods with 88 percent of all sample sales
occurring in 67 tracts, or 64 percent, of these neighborhoods, Fifty-
eight percent of the properties are located in three west side communi-
ties: West Garfield Park, East Garfield Park, North Lawndale; an
additional 30 percent, in three south side communities: Englewood,
Greater Grand Crossing, West Englewood.
Data for individual transactions on the purchase price and
terms of the installment sale, the characteristics of the property,
and the acquisition costs and characteristics of the mortgage loan
secured by the speculator was drawn from a number of original sources;
installment contract and mortgage documents, property and fire insurance
forms and appraisal reports. The acquisition price and cost data for
this analysis, transcribed directly from the original sale documents
and business records kept by the speculator, overcomes the common
methodological problem of relying on revenue tax stamps.13 Information
on neighborhood (census tract) characteristics was drawn from the
1950, 1960 and 1970 U. S. Census of Population and Housing.
Transaction markups, shown in Tables 4-1 and 4-2, were extremely
high. The average gross markup on a contract transaction exceeded
80 percent of the acquisition cost; after adjustments for the arbitrage
transaction costs (which included mortgage fees), the net markup was
just under 70 percent. Few if any improvements had been made on the
properties between acquisition and resale. 14 Indeed, there was little
time; the time lag between speculator purchase and resale, for those
TABLE 4-1
Mean Prices and Markups of Installment Contract Sales, 1956-1968
Large-Scale Small-Scale West Side South Side
Sellers Sellers Submarket Submarket
Speculator acquisition price ($) 11,224 11,401 12,187 10,139
(constant dollars*) (10,958) (11,208) (11,828) (10,038)
Contract buyer purchase price ($) 19,756 19,573 20,609 18,197
(constant dollars*) (19,153) (18,999) (19,966) (17,687)
Gross markup (%) 83.9 81.6 76.9 91.1
New markup (%) 68.0 66.5 64.0 74.5
Gross cash investment ($) 23 388 300 -123
Price per room Cs)
Acquisition 1,105 1,023 1,051 1,126
Resale 1,949 1,726 1,771 2,046
Differential 859 742 744 945
Contract downpayment (%) 5.07 6.66 5.88 5.30
Number of observations+ 353 212 350 215
* Constant dollars 1957-1959 = 100.
+ Number of observations may vary slightly for some variables.
C.)
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TABLE 4-2
Mean Prices and Expected Profits on Installment
Contract Sales Over Time, 1956-1968
Time Frame
1956-1958 1959-1961 1962-1965 1966-1968
Speculator acqusition 10,793 11,866 11,474 8,448price ($)
(constant dollars*) (11,075) (11,593) (11,069) (7,991)
Contract buyer pur- 19,738 21,225 19,087 16,045
chase price ($)
(constant dollars*) (20,024) (20,713) (18,204) (14,822)
Gross markup ($) 94.6 83.1 74.2 100.4
Net markup (%) 76.2 68.7 55.6 na
Gross cash investment 388 527 
-420 -279by speculator ($)
Price per room ($)
Acquisition 984 1093 1145 914
Resale 1866 1932 1869 1635
Differential 906 863 755 837
Contract downpayment (%) 8.60 5.60 4.53 3.86
Time lag between acqui-
sition and resale (days, 33 41 29 31for properties sold
within three months)
Monthly cash flow over 56 50 38 41term of contract ($)
Number of observations+ 90 216 200 59
LIC sale within six months
of acquisition and no
prior contract sale
Estimated expected present
value net profit ($) 2,777 2,635 2,609 3,033
Estimated equity ($) 1,406 1,710 667 1,593
Present value price ($) 14,274 15,408 15,565 12,594
Number of observations+ 54 142 85 9
* Constant dollars 1957-1959 = 100.
+ Number of observations may vary sl
na = information not available.
ightly for some variables.
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properties sold within three months, averaged 35 days. 15
As expected, these markups varied among speculators, community
areas, time periods, and type of housing. Based on the concentrated
pattern of property ownership among a few large-scale speculators,
particularly on the south side, one should not be surprised to find
that these speculators charged the highest prices. Although the prices
and expected profits of large-scale speculators were, on average,
higher than those of small-scale speculators, the variances of these
variables are substantial. Furthermore, there is no one-to-one cor-
relation between market share and gross markup or profit. It appears
that volume and property management strategy compensated for the
variation in average profit.
The transaction markups are paper profits representative of the
profits to be earned over the life of the contract. From an investment
perspective, the present value of the expected net profit at the time
of the contract sale presents a more accurate picture of the expected
return. 16 This figure is a discounted estimate of total transaction
profit over the life of the contract, after equity recovery, under the
assumption that the buyer does not default. It is the difference
between the present value of the contract payment stream (minus a five
percent annual administration charge) and the present value of the
seller's mortgage payment stream, minus the seller's initial cash
investment. The seller's equity is the difference between total cash
expenses (the sum of acquisition price, mortgage fees, legal fees, and
estimated overhead expenses prior to resale and sales commission) and
total cash intake (the sum of contract downpayment and first and second
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mortgage loans) at the time of the contract sale (see Table 2-7).
Because the estimate of the sales commission assumes that the
conmnission was based on the face-value contract price, and paid at
the time of the contract sale, 7 it may produce an overestimate of
the speculator's equity in the transaction.
Utilizing a 15 percent discount rate, a figure not unrealis-
tically high in this business sector,18 the expected net profit from
a transaction in which there was a positive equity averaged $2,211;
the estimated equity, $2,165. The annual rate of return for these
positive equity cases averaged 83 percent. The ability to secure
a negative equity position dramatically increased the profitability
of the transaction. For these transactions, the average expected net
profit was almost twice as great as the former figure, $4,019; the
annual net return, $511. The average negative equity was -$1,095.
These expected profits were greatest for large-scale, west side sellers
and south side properties. In light of the seller's relatively
insignificant risk exposure and the high discount rate, these expected
profits were very large.
Another way to evaluate the level of expected net profit is to
calculate the hypothetical rate of return the seller would have
received if, acting as a broker intermediary, he could have sold the
property on a cash basis. This return is estimated by dividing the
present value net profit by the sum of the acquisition and transaction
costs. This hypothetical rate of return averaged 24 percent.
The evidence presented in Table 4-2 shows the market weakening
during the 1960 decade but nonetheless capable of sustaining a high
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level of profit. The contract purchase price, in constant 1957-1959
dollars, declined from a high of $20,713 during the peak of market
activity to a low of $14,821 in the last significant phase of contract
sales. Per room price respectively declined from $1,866 to $1,635.
Contract downpayment, an asset barometer of buyer ability-to-afford
homeownership, also decreased over time; in the early period of sales
activity, between 1956 and 1958, speculators were able to take in an
average downpayment of almost 9 percent compared to less than 4
percent in the 1966-1968 period. However, despite the decline in
average markup, from a high of 95 percent in the early heightening
period (1956-1958) to a low of 74 percent during the initial decline
period (1962-1965), the present value of expected net profit remained
relatively stable -- between $2,600 and $2,780.
The above relationships suggest that the stability of expected
net profit was attributable to the ability of the speculator to secure
favorable financing. As evidenced by the markup averages, the arbitrage
profit from buying low and selling high was responsive to change in
market demand and supply; if the speculator's mortgage leverage had
remained constant over the time period, the expected net profit would
have declined. But during this period the speculator's average equity
decreased from a high of $1,710 during the peak of activity to a low
of $667 in the next period as the corresponding average mortgage loan-
to-price ratio increased to 97 percent from 87 percent.
In the installment contract market where profits are earned over
the life of the contract, large profits are a function of early cash
returns. The ability of the speculator to buy the property below fair
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market value produces greater immediate returns than the high contract
selling price because the mortgage loan based on the appraisal value,
not the purchase price, often produces very high leverage for the
speculator.
The Costs of Buying on an Installment Contract
About the only advantage the low-equity contract buyer receives
over the average homebuyer who uses mortgage financing is the low
move-in cost. This "savings" comes from the absence of numerous costs
associated with closing a standard deed and mortgage transaction.
These include fees for a title policy, a land survey, the document
recording, escrow and appraisal services, a credit report, and possibly
an attorney. 9 In 1960, the incidental costs of an FHA-insured mort-
gage on an existing home averaged $277, or 2 percent of the sale price.20
The higher costs of buying on contract are effectively hidden
from the purchaser because they are built into an inflated purchase
price. Unlike a cash (deed) transaction, in an installment contract,
the buyer is jointly purchasing the property and credit; yet he
believes he is buying a property with a value corresponding to the
sale price.
What is the difference between the contract price and the
hypothetical cash price, a variable we will call the credit arbitrage
premium ? To derive an estimate of this variable it is necessary to
calculate a cash price called the present value price (PVPRICE). This
hypothetical figure is an estimate of the price a seller would be
willing to accept for a cash transaction assuming he discounts the
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time value of money for the contract transaction at 15 percent.
According to the definition:
PVPRICE = SPURCHP + TRANS + PVNETPR (4-7)
where
SPURCHP = acquisition price paid by the speculator
TRANS = transaction costs associated with cash sale
(sales commission, overhead, legal fees)
PVNETPR = present value of the expected net profits from the
contract transaction payment stream discounted at
15 percent
A deed sale at the PVPRICE would provide a return equivalent to the
expected present value net profit of the installment contract transac-
tion.
The difference between this PVPRICE and the contract price,
the credit arbitrage premium,. measures the extra cost incurred by the
contract buyer to transfer units to the black market through the
contract sale mechanism given the organization of the local housing
market.
While the PVPRICE adjusts for the time value of money, it does
not adjust for the risks of contract nonpayment which vary with indi-
vidual borrower characteristics. Speculators need not discount the
payment stream at 15 percent and the discount rate may vary among
speculators. Because of these factors, the credit arbitrage premium
may contain part of the premium attached to certain housing attributes
unavailable in the ghetto, in addition to the expected price adjustment
for the risk of buyer forfeiture.
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The average credit premium , $5,541, or 27 percent of the
contract sales price, varied substantially over a number of different
market characteristics as shown in Table 4-3. It varied inversely
with the amount of buyer downpayment; for buyers with zero donwpayment,
$6,201, while for those with the highest downpayments (12 percent or
more), $4,439. Looking at the average premium across neighborhoods
classified by the stage of racial transition, we see that it was
highest for those neighborhoods in early transition,$7,150 and $5,419,
and lowest for those properties in consolidation and late consolidation
neighborhoods, $5,020, and $4,064.
This arbitrage premium is not a complete measure of the dis-
criminatory burden of the transaction. Part of the arbitrage profit
arises from the difference between the panic-free white market price
and the depressed price at which the speculator generally acquired
property from distressed white sellers. The hypothetical cash price
includes this first component of profit. The second part of the profit
is a capitalized financing and holding cost levied by the speculator
for the long-term purchase arrangement. To the extent that the
contract price exceeds the price of purchase in a white market free of
pressure-selling tactics (i.e., FHA appraised value), a discriminatory
premium exists in both the PVNETPR and the credit arbitrage component.
The conjunction of black buyers with low equities makes it
empirically difficult to isolate the component of contract price
which adjusts for the risk of nonpayment from the component which
represents a race premium . An independent race premium could not
be isolated without a sample of white buyers who bought on installment
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TABLE 4-3
Mean and Standard Deviation of Credit Arbitrage
for Selected Stratifications
Premi um
Premium Standard As a Per- Standard
Stratification ($) Deviation cent of Con- Deviation n
($) tract Sales
Price
All observations 5367 1737 27.0 6.3 290
Submarket
West side 5670 1791 27.3 6.0 193
South side 4765 1455 26.3 6.8 97
Time Period
1956-1958 5381 1449 28.0 6.4 54
1959-1961 5835 1831 28.1 5.9 142
1962-1965 4630 1295 24.1 5.3 85
1966-1968 4870 2915 30.0 10.5 9
Contract Downpayment
(%)
0 6201 3043 34.6 14.7 4
0-2.99 5972 1894 30.3 5.5 27
3-5.99 5261 1621 27.2 5.4 136
6-8.99 5541 1803 27.4 6.1 83
9-11.99 5060 1600 23.9 6.2 28
12 + 4439 1674 19.2 5.4 12
Stage of Racial
Transition
Penetration 7150 1245 29.7 3.9 13
Invasion 5419 1663 26.8 6.4 198
Early Consolidation 5316 1837 29.1 5.3 16
Consolidation 5020 1793 26.1 5.6 50
Late Consolidation 4064 1707 28.1 9.7 12
Piling Up 5725 -- 28.9 -- 1
Scale of Speculator
Large 5319 1631 26.7 6.1 199
Small 5472 1954 27.6 6.6 91
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contract in white neighborhoods. Yet the fact that blacks had little
choice but to buy on contract in these transitional neighborhoods
is a critical component of the race premium blackspaid to transfer
units to the black market.
Determinants of the Credit Arbitrage Premium
This section utilizes an ordinary least squares regression
model to explain variation in the credit arbitrage premium for each
geographic submarket of the black ghetto of Chicago. It is necessary
to stratify the sample in this manner because of the different organi-
zational structures of each submarket and its hypothesized effect upon
economic behavior.
The model was formulated upon the conception that the credit
premium is determined by two elements: (1) the variance in expected
return from the transaction, a function of the probability of buyer
forfeiture; and (2) the excess demand for housing bundle attributes
in short supply in existing black neighborhoods.
The variance in the expected profit of the transaction is a
function of uncertainty, the risk that the buyer will default on the
contract. Features of the installment contract determining the amor-
tization rate of the payment schedule, and the characteristics of the
borrower and the neighborhood which affect the likelihood of default
are expected to be significant determinants of the credit premium.
These variables include contract term, contract downpayment, borrower
monthly payment burden, and as a proxy for neighborhood risk, a set of
dummy variables measuring the extent of substandard housing in the
neighborhood. The measure of borrower income used in the payment
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burden variable is the 1960 median income for families in 1957-1959
constant dollars.
Five variables, 1960 median value of owner-occupied single-
family units in constant dollars (MD60), two dummy variables denoting
stage of racial transition of the neighborhood (ET, LT, proxies for
"better" neighborhoods), type of structure (BLD), and number of
apartments in the structure (NAPTATP) have been included to explain
variation attributable to characteristics of the housing bundle in
short supply in existing black neighborhoods. A dummy variable indi-
cating the scale of the operations of the speculator (LS or CANDG) has
been included to test for the possibility of differential speculator
pricing behavior. The model is completed with a series of dummy vari-
ables which define the time period of the sale. The definitions, means
and standard deviations of these 14 variables are presented in Tables
4-4 and 4-5.
In the linear form the credit premium is viewed as an additive
composite of the individual variables; the estimated relationship21
may be written:
CREDPREM = a+b 1 BLD+ b 2NAPTATP + b3MD60 + b SUB1 + b5SUB3
+ b6ET+ b7LT + b8LS + b9BURDEN+ b10KDP
+ b1KTERM+b 12TIME2+ b13TIME3+b 14TIME4 (4-8)
The primary focus of this model is on the coefficients of the risk
variables which measure the marginal effect of a change in a credit
characteristic upon the credit arbitrage premium.
The estimated models presented in Table 4-6 explain substantial
proportions of the variation in the arbitrage premium and the F-tests
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TABLE 4-4
Definition of Variables in the Credit Arbitrage Model
CREDPREM The difference between contract sale price and a hypothetical
cash price; measures the extra cost incurred by the contract
purchase as opposed to a deed and mortgage purchase.
BURDEN Ratio of monthly contract payment to family income. 1960
census tract income, 1957-59 constant dollars as proxy for
family income.
KDP Percent contract downpayment.
KTERM Term-to-maturity of contract, years.
SUB1 Dummy variable. 1 = less than 10 percent of housing units in
census tract substandard; 0 = otherwise (1960).
SUB3 Dummy variable. 1 = more than 20 percent of housing units in
census tract substandard; 0 = otherwise (1960).
The excluded category for substandard housing is 10 -20 per-
cent.
MD60 1960 median value of owner-occupied units in census tract in
1957-59 constant dollars.
ET Dummy variable. 1 = neighborhood in early stage of racial
transition (Penetration, Invasion); 0 = otherwise.
LT Dummy variable. 1 = neighborhood in late stage of racial
transition (Late Consolidation, Piling Up); 0 = otherwise.
The exclused category is neighborhood in intermediate stage
of racial transition (Early Consolidation, Consolidation).
BLD Dummy variable. 1 = multi-flat (2 -4 flat) structure; 0 =
single-family structure.
NAPTATP Number of apartments in structure at time of the contract sale.
LS Dummy variable. 1 = large-scale seller in west side market;
0 = small-scale seller in west side market.
CANDG Dummy variable. 1 = large-scale seller , Peck or Master,
south side market; 0 = other large-scale seller and all small-
scale speculators in south side market.
TIME2 Dummy variable. 1 = sale occurred between 1959 -1961;
0 = otherwise.
TIME3 Dummy variable. 1 = sale occurred between 1962 -1965;
0 = otherwise.
TIME4 Dummy variable. 1 = sale occurred between 1966 - 1968;
0 = otherwise.
Excluded time category is 1956 -1958.
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TABLE 4-5
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables in
the Credit Arbitrage Premium Regression Model
West Side Submarket South Side Submarket
Variable Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
CREDPREM ($) 5,673 1,782 4,775 1,467
Risk-related Characteris-
tics
BURDEN (%) 35.25 8.08 31.90 10.94
KDP ( ) 6.01 3.28 6.15 3.31
KTERM (years) 18.34 4.46 16.15 3.10
SUBI (yes= 1) .70 -- .51 --
SUB3 (yes= 1) .19 -- .19 --
Neighborhood and Build-
ing Characteristics
MD60 (hund. dol.) 137.72 22.37 136.60 21.71
ET (yes =1) .78 -- .62 --
LT (yes =1) .04 -- .07 --
BLD (multi-flat= 1) .86 -- .53 --
NAPTATP 1.36 0.93 .95 1.07
Other Variables
LS/CANDG (yes= 1) .62 -- .65 --
TIME2 (yes =1) .48 -- .51 --
TIME3 (yes= 1) .37 -- .15 --
TIME4 (yes= 1) .02 -- .04 --
Number of observations 189 95
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TABLE 4-6
OLS Regression Model of the Credit Arbitrage Premium
West Side Submarket South Side Submarket
Independent
Variable Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value)
Risk-Related Characteristics
BURDEN (%) 96.31a (7.56) 46.81a (2.53)
KDP (%) -94 .76a (-3.95) -27.69 (-0.62)
KTERM (years) 226.51a (13.15) 203.21a (4.85)
SUB1 -379.24 (-1.47) 147.16 (0.55)
SUB3 -526.97 (-1.80) -186.66 (-0.52)
Neighborhood and Building
Characteristics
MD60 (hund. dc.) 0.77 (0.24) 12.65 (2.07)
ET 596.16b (3.03) -45.66 (-0.19)
LT -108.36 (-0.23) -498.66 (-0.99)
BLD 382.69 (1.47) 65.82 (0.22)
NAPTATP -33.77 (-0.33) 203.12 (1.10)
Other Characteristics
LS/CANDG -263.89 (-1.76) -72.43 (-0.26)
TIME2 -441.48 (-1.94) -513.20 (-1.91)
TIME3 -1,668.37 (-7.09) -970.95 (-2.34)
TIME4 -1,508.89 (-2.80) 990.43 (1.43)
Intercept -762.76 (-1.03) -1,517.54 (-1.25)
DF 174 80
R .755 .597
F Ratio 38.26 8.46
Prob > F .0001 .0001
NOTE: Table notes signifi
simultaneous statistical
(BURDEN, KDP, KTERM, ET).
a. .05, one-tailed test
b. .05, two-tailed test
cance of t-ratios for four coefficients under
testing for overall level of significance
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prove that the model is statistically significant at the 95 percent
level of confidence. Most importantly, all of the risk-related
variables, except the dummy variable measuring the high proportion
of neighborhood substandard housing,22 display the expected coefficient
sign.
As expected, increasing the term-to-maturity of the contract
one additional year boosted the credit premiu m, $227 and $203,
respectively in the west and south side markets. The coefficients of
the downpayment and burden variables indicate that the west side
market was more responsive to changes in buyer risk characteristics.
A one percent increase in contract downpayment decreased the credit
premium. by $95 in the west side market, compared to $30 in the south
side market, ceteris paribus. An increase of one percent in the buyer
payment-to-income ratio increased the credit premium by $96
in the west side market,compared to $47 in the south side market,
These findings are consistent with the lack of price bargaining noted
by at least one large-scale, south side speculator during the trial
proceedings. 23
The marginal price effects from changes in borrower-risk vari-
ables are small compared to the neighborhood effects.24 Buying in
early transition tracts on the west side added almost $600 to the
arbitrage premium , compared to an equivalent transaction in clearly
established black neighborhoods (classified as consolidation or early
consolidation stage).25 On the south side, where contract properties,
classified by stage of transition, were more evenly distributed, there
was no statistically significant finding of a additional premium in
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early transition neighborhoods.
If the early transitional variable is a proxy for a "better"
neighborhood, the south side model suggests that such quality dis-
tinctions may not be unimportant, but that the transition stage
variable is not capturing the distinctions. An indication of the
effects of neighborhood quality can be gleaned from the small but
important marginal effect on the credit premiu~m from a change in the
neighborhood median value of owner-occupied units.26 (See Appendix
Table 1, for the standardized coefficients.)
Despite the difference in arbitrage pricing between these
submarkets, they were bound by a common trend, the decline in the size
of the credit arbitrage premium over time. Looking at the changes
implied by the time dummy variables, we see that after the early
period of contract sales, 1956-1958, speculators were unable to continue
charging the highest contract credit premi;ums to transfer units between
the white and black markets (except in period 4). For a contract
transaction on a two-flat building in an early transition neighborhood,
of average-valued homes and substandard housing for this sample, where
the buyer had put down 5 percent and signed a contract of 18 years,
which committed him to a monthly payment burden of 33 percent of
family income, the credit arbitrage premiu m. varied over time in the
following manner:
West Side Submarket South Side Submarket
Time Period 1: 1956-1958 $6,805 $5,418
Time Period 2: 1959-1961 6,363 4,904
Time Period 3: 1962-1965 5,136 4,447
Time Period 4: 1966-1968 5,296 6,408
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A Note on the Pricing of Large-Scale Speculators
Given the predominant position of large-scale sellers in both
submarkets, one would expect them to charge higher prices, certeris
paribus. The results of the regression model of installment contract
price, presented in Appendix Table 4, indicate that in the south side
market, where there were few competitors, the price increment attri-
butable to the large-scale speculator was large and statistically
significant. By contrast, the scale premiuirm on properties sold by
large-scale speculators in the west side market, where there were
numerous competitors, was insignificant and small, $213,compared to
$2,651 in the south side market. This is important because it affirms
the beneficial role of internal competition despite the restricted
nature of the black market.
Determinants of Profit within the Installment Contract Market
Profit in the contract market is derived from two sources:
the difference between acquisition costs and sale price, plus the
return from financing the sale. The deferred profit and contract
interest rate are the gross indicators of these components but each is
not necessarily a reliable quide to net profit. A return from the
finance component comes from two sources: the difference between the
contract price and the seller's investment finance (mortgage loan),
and the difference between the interest rates of these arrangements.
To the extent that the seller expects the risks of financing the buyer's
purchase to exceed the interest rate differential, he will discount
the profits from the sale component. Secondly, the seller secures the
joint return through a monthly cash flow stream over the term of the
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contract, similar to the way rental profit accrues. While the
difference between the present value of the payment stream discounted
at the respective mortgage and contract interest rates, in theory,
equals the deferred profit, the seller has increased the contract sale
price to compensate for the uncertainty of return and really may not
expect to realize the paper deferred profit figure. He may sell the
contract paper after a few years. Or, if he holds the paper to term,
contract payment delinquencies may alter the profit stream. Further-
more, the ability of the speculator to begin the repayment period with
a negative equity suggests that the actual earned profit may not
equal the observed paper profit.
One would of course like to know the extent to which profits
in the contract market exceeded those obtainable in an open market.
Given the fact that the sample data only consists of black purchases
on installment contracts, the average profit figure cannot be compared
to a profit figure for installment sales made in white neighborhoods.
One standard for evaluating the estimated returns obtainable in the
contract market comes from a group of contract sales made to whites
in the township of Broadview, a suburb of Cook County near the west
side boundary of Chicago. These seven sales, made by the largest
south side speculator, were similar to the black contract sales in
two respects: the low percentage downpayment (lower than the black
market average), and the high mortgage-to-purchase price ratio of
the speculator's loan. However, the average markup differed consi-
derably. 16 percent compared to an average 91 percent for this specu-
lator's black contract sales.
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This section focuses upon an analysis of the internal
determinants of profit in the contract market in an effort to isolate
the hypothesized dominant role of mortgage finance. In so doing,
it addresses three additional questions: Were neighborhood risk
factors capitalized into higher profit calculations? Did internal
competition inhibit large-scale sellers from earning higher profits?
Did expected profit decline over time?
To answer these questions, an ordinary least squares regression
model explaining expected net profit at the time of the contract sale
has been estimated. The model uses the estimated present value net
profit variable (PVNETPR) as the dependent variable. The PVNETPR
figure represents the discounted net return the speculator could expect
from the completed transaction at the time the installment contract
was signed. It simplifies the analysis by abstracting from the time
value of money and accounts for potential slowness in the contract
payment stream through the use of the 15 percent discount rate.
Transactions involving properties where there had been prior contract
sales or which had been used for more than six months as a source of
rental income were excluded from this analysis.
Expected net profit is viewed as a function of the characteris-
tics of the seller's mortgage financing, type of structure, neighbor-
hood housing stock attributes and stage of racial transition, and
speculator scale. Equity is obviously a predominant determinant of
net profits; however, its direct inclusion in the model would not
provide an understanding of the role of its individual components in
determining profit. Therefore, the following variables have been
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included to describe the equity position of the seller: the loan-to-
purchase price ratio (MTGLVR), a dummy variable indicating the
existence of a second mortgage (SECMTG), a dummy variable indicating
whether the seller had a negative equity position (NEGEQ), and the
percent contract downpayment (KDP). All are expected to have a posi-
tive effect on the level of expected profits. The importance of the
mortgage loan-to-purchase ratio goes beyond the obvious leverage
function because it picks up the effects attributable to the ability
of the speculator to purchase at a depressed white market price. Given
the nature of the institutional mortgage arrangements, it also picks
up the value of over-appraisals. In the absence of an independent
assessment or FHA-appraised value, there is no way to distinguish
these two occurrences.
Three variables proxy the neighborhood characteristics of
the housing stock: the two substandard housing dummy variables
utilized in previous analyses, SUB1 and SUB3, and the 1960 median
value of owner-occupied, single-unit buildings in constant dollars
(MD60). The hypothesis is that net present value profit is higher
in neighborhoods with poorer housing stocks and reflects a capitali-
zation of neighborhood risk factors independent of the credit
characteristics of the individual borrower. The same effect is hypo-
thesized with regard to the late transition neighborhood variable (LT).
Higher profits in early transition neighborhoods compared to those in
the intermediate stages of transition are also expected due to the
higher contract prices in these neighborhoods. However, the direction
of causation is unclear because speculators may incur higher acquisi-
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tion costs in the early transition neighborhoods.
The model also includes a dummy variable for the type of
structure, whether single-unit or multi-flat, to test for a higher
expected profit attached to an income-producing unit (BLD). The
speculator scale variable, LS for the west side and CANDG for the
south side, has been included to test for hypothesized higher returns
earned by large-scale speculators. To complete the model, the three
dummy variables for time have been included.
The definitions, means and standard deviations of these 14
variables are presented in Tables 4-7 and 4-8.
The estimated expected profit model may be written: 27
PVNETPR = a + b MTGLVR + b2NEGEQ + b3SECMTG + b4KDP
+ b5SUB1 + b6SUB3 + b7MD60 + b8BLD + b9ET
+ b lLT + b 1LS + b 2TIME2 + b 3TIME3 + b14 TIME4
(4-12)
The estimated model for each submarket is presented in
Table 4-9; the F test for each proves that the joint relationship
of all variables in the model is statistically significant at the 95
percent level of confidence.
The importance of mortgage finance is clearly shown in these
equations. The difference between a conventional first mortgage
MTGLVR of 70 percent and the average MTGLVR of 90 percent secured by
the contract speculator increased the present value profits by an
estimated $623 in the west side market and $938 in the south side
market. The profit-financing elasticity evaluated at the mean is 1.21
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TABLE 4-7
Definition of Variables in Present Value Net Profit.Model
PVNETPR Present value of net profit of contract sale calculated
at the time of contract sale closing.
MTGLVR Mortgage loan-to-purchase price ratio (percent).
NEGEQ Dummy variable. 1 = seller has negative equity position
in contract transaction; 0= otherwise.
SECMTG Dummy variable. 1= seller obtained second mortgage on
contract property within one year of purchase; 0= other-
wise.
KDP Percent contract downpayment.
SUB1 Dummy variable. 1 = less than 10 percent substandard
housing units in census tract; 0=otherwise.
SUB3 Dummy variable. 1= more than 20 percent substandard
housing units in census tract; 0= otherwise.
The excluded category for substandard housing is 10-20
percent.
MD60 1960 median dollar value of owner-occupied units in cen-
sus tract in 1957-59 constant dollars.
BLD Dummy variable. 1 = multi-flat structure; 0= single-
family structure.
ET Dummy variable. 1 = neighborhood in early stage of racial
transition (Penetration, Invasion); 0=otherwise.
LT Dummy variable. 1 = neighborhood in late stage of racial
transition (Late Consolidation, Piling Up); 0= otherwise.
The excluded category is neighborhood in intermediate
stage of racial transition (Early Consolidation, Consoli-
dation).
LS Dummy variable. 1 = large-scale seller in west side mar-
ket; 0= small-scale seller in west side market.
CANDG Dummy variable. 1= large-scale seller, Peck or Master,
south side market; 0= other large-scale seller and all
small-scale sellers in south side market.
TIME2 Dummy variable. 1= sale occurred between 1959-1961;
O= otherwise.
TIME3 Dummy variable. 1 = sale occurred between 1962-1965;
O= otherwise.
TIME4 Dummy variable. 1 = sale occurred between 1966-1968;
0= otherwise.
Excluded time category is 1956-1958.
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TABLE 4-8
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables in the
Present Value Net Profit Regression Model
West Side Submarket South Side Submarket
Variable
Mean Standard Mean Standard
Deviation Deviation
PVNETPR ($) 2,574.08 1,363.57 3,159.69 1,615.96
Equity Characteristics
MTGLVR 90.51 16.89 91.46 22.05
NEGEQ (yes=1) .22 -- .35 --
SECMTG (yes= 1) .07 -- .22 --
KDP 6.12 3.30 6.16 3.25
Neighborhood Characteristics
SUB1 (yes =1) .70 -- .52 --
SUB3 (yes =1) .19 -- .17 --
MD60 (hundred dollars) 137.54 22.62 136.69 21.91
ETl (yes =1) .78 -- .63 --
LT (yes =1) .03 -- .06 --
Other Characteristics
BLD (yes =1) .85 -- .54 --
LS (yes =1) .63 -- CANDG .65 --
TIME2 (yes = 1) .49 -- .52 --
TIME3 (yes= 1) .36 -- .15 --
TIME4 (yes= 1) .02 -- .03 --
number of observations 181 93
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TABLE 4-9
OLS Regression Model of Present Value Net Profit
Independent West Side Submarket South Side Submarket
Variable Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value)
Equity Characteristics
MTGLVR (%) 31.15 (4 .18) 46.89 (4.75)a
NEGEQ 1,196.44 (4 .46 )a -317.33 (-0.75)
SECMTG 716.84 (2.25) 693.15 (1.75)
KDP (%) 6.99 (0.27) 121.30 (2.36)a
Neighborhood Characteristics
SUBi -157.99 (-0.56) -158.94 (-0.46)
SUB3 284.06 (0.89) 390.91 (0.89)
MD60 (hundred dollars) -10.91 (-3.00) 3.09 (0.38)
ET 170.69 (0.75) 209.02 (0.64)
LT 384.69 (0.77) 100.71 (0.15)
Other Characteristics
BLD 675.30 (3.00) 322.76 (1.03)
LS/CANDG 302.13 (1.78) -589.12 (-1.63)
TIME2 -541.56 (-2.24) 7.38 (0.02)
TIME3 -772.17 (-2.77) 61.24 (0.11)
TIME4 -375.91 (-0.64) 1,904.24 (2.11)
Intercept 591.72 (0.65) -2,327.09 (-1.57)
Degrees of Freedom 166 78
R2 .507 .458
F Ratio 12.17 4.71
Prob> F .0001 .0001
NOTE: Table notes indicate significance of t-values for five coeffici-
ents under simultaneous statistical testing for overall
significance (MTGLVR, NEGEQ, KDP, SUB3, LS)
a. .05 one-tailed test
b. .10 two-tailed test
level of
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and 1.48, respectively, for the west and south side submarkets.
The increase in profits resulting from second mortgage financing
was approximately the same in both submarkets, an additional $700
in present value profits. While the use of second mortgages was not
commonplace, it was characteristic of several large-scale speculators;
Boston, Peck, and Master had second mortgages on 38, 23 and 27 percent
of their respective sample transactions.
The ability of west side speculators to operate with a negative
equity position was a significant factor explaining expected net
profits; this characteristic increased the expected profit, on the
average, $1,196. This is quite significant in light of the predominant
role savings and loan associations played as financiers of over-
appraised mortgage loans in the west side market. The standardized
b-value also reveals the greater relative importance of this variable
for the west side (Appendix Table 5). The incorrect sign and in-
significance of the NEGEQ variable in the south side equation can be
attributed to modest multicollinearity between this variable and
MTGLVR.28  It should be remembered that MTGLVR is a measure of the
leverage from first mortgage financing and NEGEQ measures negative
equity resulting from the net difference between total cash intake and
total cash expenditures. The conceptual importance of NEGEQ neces-
sitates its retention in the model; to omit it would result in bias in
the MTGLVR coefficient.29
Another major difference in market behavior between the west
and south sides is seen in the contribution of contract downpayment
toward expected profits. Evaluated at the mean downpayment, which is
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approximately 6 percent for both submarkets, an increase of one percent
would have led to a .27 percent increase in profits i.n the west side
market, compared to 3.8 percent in the south side market. Although
mortgage finance and contract downpayment both increased profits by
maximizing early returns, the importance of financing in the west side
market minimized the downpayment contribution.
Given the large standard estimates of error and low t-values
for the neighborhood variables, these- coefficients should be inter-
preted to be merely suggestive of the real relationships. The sign of
the high neighborhood substandard housing variable indicates that
speculators aimed for higher returns in these neighborhoods to com-
pensate for greater uncertainty in areas where the risks of property
deterioration were greater, other factors held constant. The fact that
contract prices were on average lower in late transition neighborhoods
suggests that the expected higher profits came from lower acquisition
costs. Conversely, higher contract prices in early transition neigh-
borhoods and neighborhoods where the incidence of standard housing is
less than 10 percent suggest that the lower expected profits came from
higher acquisition costs than in established black neighborhoods.
The additional findings from the model emphasize the differences
between west and south side markets. A contract sale of a multi-flat
building was expected to yield a higher return than a single-unit
building, but there was no significant difference on the south side
where the number of single units was proportionately greater. The most
important differences involve the higher expected profits earned by
west side large-scale sellers (despite the lack of evidence of higher
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prices in the contract price model). The incorrect sign for this
factor in the south side market is hard to understand.
Although both markets experienced a noteable decline in the ex-
pected present value net profit over the three periods of major con-
tract activity, this decline was largest in the west side market.
Expected present value net profit from a basic transaction in which
the buyer had put down 6 percent on a two-flat building in an early
transition neighborhood, where the stock contained less than 10 percent
substandard housing and the median value of owner-occupied homes was
$13,700, and where the large-scale speculator had secured 90 percent
first mortgage financing with no second mortgage (resulting in a
positive equity position), varied as follows:
West Side Submarket South Side Submarket
Time Period 1: 1956-1958 $2,933 $2,828
Time Period 2: 1959-1961 2,391 2,835
Time Period 3: 1962-1965 2,160 2,318
Time Period 4: 1966-1968 2,557 4,732
The fourth period of contract market activity deviated from the
decline pattern; there was an increase in markups and expected profits
which can be attributed to several factors. During this period a
number of sellers had dropped out of the market, which decreased the
level of competition. Secondly, the increase in markups and profit
expectations may have reflected an awareness of a weakening market and
a lower probability of holding the contract to term. Hence an increased
capitalization of finance and holding costs would lead to higher prices
and higher expected profits.
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Price and profit relationships in the installment contract
market reflected a complex interaction of factors: the lack of
mortgage money in transitional neighborhoods, the low-equity position
of the average contract buyer and the "risks" of repayment, and the
relationship of the supply of housing units in these transitional
neighborhoods to movements in the larger metropolitan housing market.
The latter factor historically has had an important impact on the
aggregate supply of units in transitional neighborhoods in Chicago.
Over time this supply has been related to the scale and pace of new sub-
urban construction.30 To leave a neighborhood, whites must have other
neighborhoods to move to.31 In the absence of a fluid supply in the
white market or an ability to buy into a new neighborhood, whites stead-
fastly,and sometimes violently,guard their turf. Speculators generally
skip over these pockets of housing because the total costs of acquiring
such units are higher, the profits lower, and blacks on the average are
not interested in incurring the additional psychological costs of
moving into such neighborhoods. 32
Over time, the price relationships in the contract market
reflected the increased supply of units in older white neighborhoods.
While prices and markups declined, the profit from arbitraging the
differences between white and black markets nevertheless remained
high, due to the favorable financing terms speculators were able to
secure from institutional mortgage lenders.
This chapter has advanced the hypothesis that blacks in transi-
tional neighborhoods pay a discrimination premium to transfer units
between white and black housing markets. Part of this premium is
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attributable to the segregated structure of the metropolitan housing
market, to the gap between the price in the white border market and the
price the black market "will bear". The other component of the
premium is attributable to the nature of the finance instrument
involved in the transaction -- the installment sales contract.
The analysis of contract prices and profits in this chapter
provides an estimate of the jointly determined premium for the black
contract market in Chicago between 1956-1965. Although theoretically
independent, in the black market the finance and discrimination com-
ponents were intertrelated . Therefore, two estimates are presented,
one for the hypothetical "cash" transaction which is a lower bound
estimate, and one for the contract transaction which is an upper bound
estimate.
TABLE 4-10
"Cash" and Contract Price Averages of the White-Black
Market Transfer Premium , for Penetration and Invasion
Stage Neighborhoods by Submarket, 1956-1968
"Cash" Price Percent Contract Percent
Premi um Net Price Net
Markup Premi um Markup
West Side Market
Penetration (n= 13) $2,842 19.8 $9,596 70.3
Invasion (n= 139) 2,316 18.7 7,291 60.7
South Side Market
Invasion (n= 63) 3,125 30.3 7,201 73.0
The lower bound estimate is the difference between the hypothe-
tical cash price the speculator would accept in the black market (as-
suming a 15 percent discount rate) and his acquisition costs; this is
Pagination error: 191-199
omitted.
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the estimate of the present value of the expected net profits (PVNETPR).
The upper estimate is the difference between the contract price and
the speculator's acquisition and finance costs. (The difference
between these two estimates represents the credit arbitrage premium
plus fees paid by the speculator for mortgage finance.) While the
credit arbitrage premium has been shown to be a function of borrower
risk characteristics and contract credit terms, risk of repayment is
a small factor explaining the difference between "cash" and contract
prices.
This distinction between "cash" and contract price premiums
is useful for understanding the extra costs of contract buying, but,
nonetheless, it is an artificial distinction. Buyers did not have the
"cash" option. Speculators in the contract market had one price,
the contract price. While speculators relied on the risk argument to
justify the large disparity between acquisition and resale prices,
they also, paradoxically, stated that the price would not change for a
cash sale.33  Indeed, one speculator who now sells on FHA says he gets
"the same price, or more, in many cases than.. .on contract."34
The market price charged by speculators was a black market
price; all buyers in this market were considered as a class, a type of
buyer, black. Price variations due to individual borrower risk charac-
teristics were minor. Given the price and profit relationships in the
black contract market and the protection the contract sale offered the
seller, the risk argument appears weak. How weak? How risky were
these transactions? Chapter 5 addresses these questions.
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CHAPTER 5
The Nature and Extent of Risk in the Installment Contract Market
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And if Purchaser fails, and if said default shall continue for
a period of more than thirty days, to make any of the payments,..
this contract shall, at the option of the Seller, be forfeited...
and the Purchaser shall forfeit all payments made on this contract,
and such payments shall be retained by the said Seller in full
satisfaction and as liquidated damages.. .and in such event the
Seller shall have the right to re-enter and take full possession
of the premises aforesaid.
Articles of Agreement for Deed Installment Contract As Revised
May 1954 by Crane & Goran.
The land installment sales contract has traditionally func-
tioned as the legitimate financing instrument of the low-equity
homebuying sector. The scope of this sector has historically covered
the inverse of what institutional lenders considered "safely mort-
gageable". Prior to the emergence of the FHA, which stimulated the
acceptance of liberal loan terms, installment contracts were often
utilized as short-term purchase instruments with a provision for con-
version to mortgage finance when the paid-up principal reached 40 or
50 percent, the conventional downpayment required by institutional
lenders in the early part of the twentieth century.
If black contract purchases had occurred in an open market,
free of racial barriers, a buyer might have been able to secure
conventional financing after a few years of contract payments, or at
least after his "equity" matched the contractural mortgage conversion
point and he had proven himself a reasonable risk. Yet prior to 1966,
few purchasers were able to do so.I
The conjunction of below-average income borrowers and racial
discrimination poses difficulties in separating the effects of dis-
crimination from the evaluation of risk in housing finance markets.
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In particular it poses an ambiguity regarding the "credit-worthiness"
of contract buyers. On the basis of which price does one evaluate
the contract buyer's downpayment -- the inflated contract price or
a fair market cash price? In the absence of racial discrimination,
would these buyers have qualified for FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed
mortgage loans, or did they represent a separate risk cohort?
Because land contracts and mortgages are characterized by
different risk parameters, and price relationships in the contract
market distort buyer purchasing power, these questions cannot be
answered directly.
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate differences in
these risk characteristics and explain how they affect the behavior of
contract seller and buyer. The discussion then turns to empirical
evidence of repayment experience in the contract market. The high
risk of low-equity finance repeatedly cited by both contract sellers
and institutional lenders stands as the primary explanation for their
respective behavior in this market. Just how prevalent was contract
default and forfeiture? To what extent did forfeiture result from
individualistic management policies? What characteristics of the
buyer and the neighborhood are correlated with payment delinquency
and forfeiture? How do these factors compare with conventional
predictors?
If contract buyers successfully coped with higher carrying
charges under contract financing than required with mortgage financ-
ing, the case study provides evidence that the economic risks of
lending in transitional neighborhoods have been distorted by specu-
203
lative contract sales activity.
How can a black buyer who pays from $130-$165 a month to a
speculator be a poor credit risk at $90 to $100 for a house
with a legitimate mortgage at a fair market price?2
RISK IN RESIDENTIAL FINANCE MARKETS
Risk in Mortgage Markets
A mortgage under Illinois law is an interest in land given as
security, usually in return for a loan of money. The borrower secures
cash by selling, and the lender by buying, a future set of payments.
The party who gives the mortgage (mortgagor) and receives the loan
usually retains title to the property "subject" to the mortgage. The
lender (mortgagee) has a lien against the property which he may
enforce by invoking Illinois foreclosure and sale statutes if the
mortgagor defaults. 3
An investor lending funds on a mortgage faces three types of
risk. First, there is the risk of loan delinquency and default. The
factors determining this risk relate primarily to the individual
borrower and the probability that he will repay the obligation. The
risk of mortgage default is generally a function of the initial equity
investment and rate of loan amortization, the borrower's capacity to
repay the mortgage, and the risk attached to the asset itself which is
determined by conditions in the local real estate market. The obvious
major concern of credit analysis is that the borrower should have
adequate income throughout the life of the loan, and a good attitude
toward his debts. While there are several key predictors of default
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risk, the loan-to-price ratio (correspondingly, the owner's equity)
is the most significant theoretical and empirical determinant of
default risk. The higher the ratio, the greater the probability of
default.4
In the event the mortgagor defaults, the mortgagee is exposed
to the second type of risk -- that the realized value 5 of the colla-
teral may be insufficient to cover the outstanding balance of the loan.
The extent of the lender's exposure to loan loss is determined by the
economic factors governing the local real estate market and the insti-
tutional procedures regulating foreclosure and redemption. Features
of both the mortgage instrument and the asset also affect the ability
of and the cost to the lender of evaluating risk, hence his willingness
to extend mortgage credit. First, with a long-term contract there is
uncertainty regarding future economic relationships. The lender can
reduce exposure to loan loss on an ex ante basis by limiting the loan-
to-price ratio of the agreement. Second, because of its durability
and its geographical location, housing is a unique good. Lenders
are obviously concerned with changes in neighborhood characteristics
which affect the price of the collateral because the asset is not
mobile. 6
The third type of risk, market risk, is beyond the control of
the individual lender. Inflation and the possibility of rising in-
terest rates are the primary market risks which affect the profitabi-
lity of the long-term, fixed loan and create capital losses for the
lender on the mortgage contract.7  This study considers only the first
two types of risk.
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Over the term of the contract, the lender's risk exposure
corresponds to the sum of the outstanding loan-to-contemporaneous
property value and the cost of foreclosure. The latter includes
the opportunity costs of foregone loans on the outstanding debt as
well as the dollar costs associated with foreclosure proceedings.
The lender controls his risk exposure through five means: (1) bor-
rower downpayment, (2) institutional underwriting criteria, (3) quality
of appraisal process, (4) collateral appreciation, and (5) mortgage
insurance. The first two effectively define the range of risk a
lender accepts. The third acts as an independent check on property
value against market price. Any deviation perceived by the lender is
reflected in the relationship between appraisal value and purchase
price, and any deficit is absorbed by the borrower in the form of a
higher downpayment requirement. The fourth and fifth elements are
implicit and explicit forms of insurance against risk. By granting
loans only on those properties which the lender expects to appreciate
in value, his investment is protected through the direct reduction in
risk exposure over time corresponding to the estimated neighborhood
price trend. Mortgage insurance guarantees the lender recovery of
the outstanding loan balance, regardless of the market value of the
collateral, in the event of default and foreclosure.
The distribution of risk from delinquency and default incorpo-
rated in the contractual agreement is shared between mortgagor and
mortgagee. In addition to the mortgagee's primary lien against the
property, in the event of collateral insufficiency, Illinois law
allows him to go against the mortgagor personally for a deficiency
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judgment. For the borrower, the loss of home and investment represents
the main risk of default. Yet the mortgage contract affords him
significant institutional protection which balances the lender's
property lien.8 Within a reasonable time (in chancery's discretion)
after default, the mortgagor can tender the amount of the outstanding
debt and keep his property -- this is the equitable right to redeem.
Even after a judicial sale, the mortgagor has a "statutory period of
redemption" of 6 to 12 months during which he can tender the amount
bid at the sale and keep his home. If the property goes to someone
else, the mortgagor is entitled to the excess of the sale proceeds
over and above the amount satisfying his debt to the mortgagee.9  In
summary, the mortgagor's position is protected by the legal expenses
of a foreclosure, the long delay before he is dispossessed, during
which he may redeem, and the possibility of some return of his invest-
ment from the judicial sale.
The shared distributional burden of mortgage finance is a
prime example of a balanced "progressive transferal structure". 10
In all long-term contracts, except those where the consideration passes
between the parties virtually instantaneously, such a progression go-
verns how the object each side contracted for will be transferred over
time. With home purchase under a mortgage, the amortization schedule
regulates the increase in the purchaser's "ownership"; to the mortgagor
this is "building equity". The progressive structure calls for a big
step in the borrower's rights to the property when the downpayment
(possession plus a portion of the value of the house) is made, an
accumulation of interest in the property in accord with the repayment
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schedule, and finally, a warranty deed, free and clear. For the
lender receiving the loan repayment according to this schedule there
is a direct reduction in risk over time. Each structure is nearly
congruent with the other as shown in Figure 5-1. For a given loan
amount, the slope of the amortization schedule is a function of the
mortgage term and the interest rate.
Risk in the Contract Sales Market
The installment contract sale is a conditional sales agreement
in which the seller fulfills the dual role of owner and financier.
As a financier he buys a future set of payments, and is exposed to
the same default risk and market risk as a mortgage lender. But unlike
a mortgage lender, he does not relinquish any tangible goods other
than immediate occupancy rights. While the financial risks of a low-
equity mortgage transaction are higher, certeris paribus, retention
of the owner role distinguishes an LIC seller from a mortgage lender
and provides the former with greater economic and institutional pro-
tection against the last type of lending risk -- loan loss.
First, in the event of default, a seller-financier does not
have to liquidate the asset to recover his "loan"; he generally retains
title until the probability of payment failure reaches zero. Second,
in Illinois, the time requirement and direct costs of foreclosure under
an installment sales agreement are minimal compared to those under a
mortgage contract. Third, while a seller-financier is still subject
to the risks of property depreciation, this is a risk he faces as a
property owner, not as a lender. As an owner, he still has multiple
property management options: (1) to resell on an LIC, (2) to resell
FIGURE 5-1
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on a cash basis, (3) to rent.
The risks of residential finance do not change with an install-
ment sales contract, but the distribution of the risk burden changes.
In Illinois, the greater protection afforded the seller comes totally
at the expense of the buyer. The most salient characteristic dis-
tinguishing the position of the contract buyer from that of the mort-
gagor is the lack of institutional protection in the event of a default.
Similar to the mortgage loan, the amortization schedule of the
contract payment stream regulates the cash flow from the buyer to the
seller. But unlike the mortgagor, the rights of the buyer are not
congruent with this progressive transfer structure. The contract
buyer lacks "equity rights". The downpayment and monthly payments
only maintain the right to possession; ownership is conferred all at
once upon payment of the last installment.12 This distribution is
shown in Figure 5-2.
If a payment default occurs and continues for 30 days or more,
the lawl3 permits the contract seller to declare the contract for-
feited, retain all payments as liquidated damages, and demand immediate
possession. The entire process can take as little as 60 days. 14 In
1961, the Illinois legislature increased the rights of contract buyers
purchasing homes thereafter by providing for a flexible statutory
period of redemption of at least 60 days if the buyer had paid in more
than 25 percent of the purchase price.15 Nevertheless, in the eviction
proceedings the contract buyer still could not raise defenses and the
judge would direct the verdict.16
FIGURE 5-2
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In economic terms, the land contract represents a poor alloca-
tion of rights and risks over the long term of the contract. Over
time the "windfall" to the seller in the event of a default increases,
while the risk to the seller decreases. The longer the buyer performs,
the more tragic his loss if he defaults. 17
Additional Risk Borne by the Contract Buyer
The lack of equity protection affects not only the delinquent
buyer but also one current in his payments primarily because the equity
of the buyer is not liquid -- it cannot easily be cashed in if he
desires a different housing bundle. If the buyer chooses to move he
has three options: (1) to assign his interest in the property to
another for a negotiated sum (often only with the seller's consent),
(2) to negotiate a property trade with the seller (assuming the latter
has additional properties), or (3) simply to let the house revert to
the seller and forfeit his entire equity.
The contract sale agreement subjects the non-delinquent buyer
to another risk. Independent of his actions, the buyer's investment
is vulnerable to acts of the seller that could inhibit or complicate
title conveyance notwithstanding complete repayment. The buyer's
greatest title disability is that he cannot be assured of receiving
a "good" title from the seller. Furthermore, he cannot buy a standard
title policy to protect himself as owner of the land because he does
not hold title and his interest is vulnerable to the seller's actions.18
The seller's death or assignment of contract interest can cause pro-
cedural trouble for the buyer, but if there is a bankruptcy or an
additional property lien(s), the buyer's complete interest stands
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vulnerable. 19
Expected Behavior of a Buyer Under an LIC Agreement
The decision to default is not confined to an inability to
repay the loan or a sudden change in income status. If one abstracts
from moral commitments and social values, there is an economic rationale
to default rather than repay the loan. With the constant monthly
repayment schedule, the amount applied to the reduction of principal
is at first very small; it grows progressively with the declining
outstanding mortgage balance. Consequently, for several years after
origination, selling costs exceed equity in a declining, or at least
not rapidly rising, real estate market. A mortgagor with a negative
equity has a rational incentive to default rather than repay, and any
event that triggers a household move is likely to induce default.20
While the equation for the contract buyer does not include a
selling cost component, the contract buyer's decision is complicated
by the all-or-nothing characteristic of installment buying. How the
contract buyer behaves with respect to the desire to avoid default
and foreclosure depends upon his perception of his housing status --
homeowner or renter -- in addition to the extent of his investment.
All evidence this writer has seen suggests that contract buyers con-
sidered themselves homeowners; most made substantial efforts to pay
(often at the expense of family life)21 and substantial investments in
home improvements.22 Hence, one would expect buyer correlates of for-
feiture to be consistent with those of mortgagors. Of course, all
else equal, one would expect higher default rates in this market be-
cause of the lower average equity.
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Although the buyer considers himself a homeowner, his legal
status is closer to the privileged renter. The installment contract
transaction is more than a rental but only superficially a sale. As
a rental agreement, the contract offers the buyer a long-term, fixed
rental payment. As a sales contract, the buyer receives possession
and the homebuyer's entitlement to federal income tax deductions for
interest and property taxes. It is this latter characteristic that
distinguishes the contract sale from a rental agreement and offers
the low-equity buyer the potential23 benefits of homeownership despite
his lack of equity rights. With equivalent rental and LIC payments,
the buyer theoretically secures a positive long-term cash benefit from
the LIC agreement when the sum of the present value of the annual tax
deduction savings exceeds the downpayment, all else equal. At that
time, the effective LIC payment would be less than the contract rental
cost. The lower the downpayment, the sooner the buyer realizes net
benefits.
Whether the contract buyer's status is closer to the status of
a renter or a homeowner depends on the distribution of risk established
by an individual state's legal protection for mortgagors and contract
buyers. In California and Maryland, the contract buyer receives
protection similar to that of the mortgagor. In general, however, the
LIC resembles a rental transaction in that (1) the buyer moves in with
little or no downpayment, (2) if a payment is missed, he may be evicted
summarily under a rental eviction procedure, and (3) given default, he
has no "equity", all previous payments are forfeited.
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Expected Behavior of a Speculator Under an LIC Agreement
The increased security provisions of the installment sale and
the low cost of foreclosure proceedings provide the speculator with
alternative property management options which affect his decision to
foreclose or to forbear on a delinquent contract buyer. Unlike mort-
gage foreclosure, installment contract foreclosure does not represent
the final disposition of the loan transaction. It is a selective
management option after which the speculator can resell or rent the
property. To decide upon the best course of action, the speculator
is likely to have greater contacts with the buyer and more knowledge
of the buyer's financial position than a mortgage lender, and thus
is likely to exercise more forbearance. 24 The decision also becomes
less predictable since it is based on subjective assessment rather than
on clearly defined indicators.
The contract seller's institutional protection may conversely
make him less concerned than the mortgage lender with individual
borrower risk. In a strong market, the seller can potentially earn
higher profits from repossessions and may in fact decide to use forfei-
ture and rapid eviction as an operating strategy. By seeking out the
least credit-worthy buyers, collecting whatever downpayment possible,
and evicting at the first instance of default, he could maximize pro-
fits by successive sales and evictions. During the peak of market
activity, eviction and rapid resale appears to have been a profitable
strategy for certain speculators.25 In a letter to a business associ-
ate, the largest speculator in the west side market noted:
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It would be nice if these contract purchasers would
stop paying so we could get the buildings back.26
Variation in the average downpayment received by contract
sellers strongly suggests that several sellers, large-scale speculators
in particular, were greater "risk-takers" than others. These specu-
lators had disproportionately high numbers of forfeited properties
and multiple contract sales of the same property. In total, 25 percent
of the repossessed properties in the case study had been sold at least
once before; 9 percent two or three times prior to the sample trans-
action. (Because of the effect of the statute of limitation ruling
on the distribution of properties in the sample, these percentages
understate the evidence of forfeiture strategy during the peak period
of market activity.)
Nevertheless, as an aggressive, long-term strategy, the rapid
forfeiture-and-resale pattern did not persist. By the late sixties
changes in market demand led to an increase in the time lag between
repossession and resale and to a reduction in the profits from this
strategy, as the high costs of vandalism in deteriorated west side
neighborhoods made a management policy of delinquency forbearance and
partial payments a more realistic alternative to abandoned buildings
and property destruction.
Speculators learned that "carrying" delinquent payments was
not the end of the world. Vacant buildings are quickly van-
dalized; often beyond repair. A repossessed vacant two-flat
or three-flat building [in Lawndale], if not reoccupied
within a maximum of five days, would be vandalized to the
point of no return. For this reason, it is a matter of
record that some 60 percent of Black American contract pro-
perty purchasers are permitted to continue living in their
homes despite payment delinquencies running from one to six
months in arrears. 27
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In all fairness, it must be said that such delinquencies were
not detrimental to those sellers who had outstanding delinquencies
on their mortgage loans.28 Which delinquency occurred first is unclear.
It would not have been uncommon in this market for the seller to be
the initial delinquent, particularly if he had stopped speculating in
real estate and no longer needed additional mortgage capital.
In an installment sale, the probability of default remains a
function of the ability and willingness of the buyer to complete
payment; however, given delinquency, the decision to forbear or to
foreclose depends upon the seller's alternative management options as
well as the probability that the buyer will cure the delinquency.
Sepculators may forbear longer than the mortgage lender but they are
less likely to do so in those cases where the property is of good
quality with good resale value, cash investments are high, and the
partial payments from a chronic delinquency are insufficient to cover
mortgage expenses. 29
ANALYSIS OF PAYMENT PERFORMANCE IN THE INSTALLMENT CONTRACT MARKET
An analysis of lending risk in the installment contract market
should compare the characteristics of borrower credit risk and the
incidence of forfeiture with mortgage market equivalents to determine
whether these credit markets actually service mutually exclusive risk
cohorts. In the absence of racial discrimination, one would expect
this type of segmentation since the higher costs associated with high
loan-to-value ratio loans would naturally direct buyers into different
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sectors, all else equal. But given the constraints on housing
decisions underlying the dual housing market hypothesis, one would
expect the risk characteristics of buyers in the installment contract
market to overlap with those in mortgage markets.
A comparative analysis of default experience is complicated
by several factors. First, an unbiased default rate cannot be calcu-
lated from the case study sample data; the annual sale weights for
the legal "universe" are unknown. Second, the increased incidence
of foreclosures after 1969, on relatively old as well as new contracts,
suggests that external factors affected the default decision. Third,
the economic and institutional arrangements of installment contract
sales affect the integrity of a comparative risk profile assessment.
Since the inflated price characteristic of contract sales deflates
the value of the downpayment, it distorts an evaluation of the contract
buyer's purchasing power in other credit markets.
The Contract Downpayment
The average downpayment for the case study transactions, $1,152,
or 5.7 percent of the installment purchase price, does not conform to
the conventional notion that contract downpayment represents "little
more than a rent security deposit."30 Only 20 percent of sample buyers
put down less than 3 percent and 15 percent put down more than 9 percent
of the purchase price. High downpayments were common in the early years
of sale activity, but the average declined dramatically -- from 9 per-
cent between 1956-1958 to 4 percent between 1966-1968 -- in the last
years of significant activity (Table 4-2).
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There is little doubt that the black contract market on average
serviced the low-equity homeownership market. The average loan-to-
price ratio established the fact that buyers lacked sufficient cash
assets for conventional mortgage loans at the contract price. The
cash downpayment remained insufficient even when the percentage was
recalculated on the assumption that the property could have been pur-
chased at the estimated cash price (PVPRICE). The median loan-to-price
ratio corresponding to this hypothetical downpayment was significantly
lower than the national figure for conventional mortgages on existing
homes. In 1958 the figures were 91 versus 69 percent; in 1960, 92
versus 72 percent; and in 1964, 93 versus 76 percent.31
Contract buyers did not lack sufficient cash assets for FHA-
insured mortgage eligibility. As shown in Table 5-1, the downpayment
of the installment contract equaled or exceeded that necessary
to meet the FHA maximum allowable loan-to-value ratio. 32  In 1960,
FHA regulations permitted mortgages of up to 97 percent of appraised
value on the first $15,000, 90 percent on the next $5,000, and 75
percent on any remaining value up to a maximum loan of $22,500. The
minimum downpayment on a loan equivalent to the purchase price of the
average installment contract in 1960 would have been 4 percent. Even
at the inflated installment contract price, the average contract
downpayment of 6 percent more than matched the program's statutory
minimum.
Because the installment contract price was inflated and thus
higher than FHA appraisal value, the purchasing power of the contract
downpayment in a cash market is understated. If one assumes for dis-
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TABLE 5-1
Mean Characteristics of FHA-Insured Mortgages and Installment
Contract Sales, Existing Homes, Selected Years,1956-1964
1956 1958 1960 1964
Existing Single-Family
Homes: FHA Section 203
Mortgages, U. S.
Purchase Price ($) 12,991 13,133 13,284 14,540
Loan-to-Value Ratio 81.1 88.5 90.8 93.1(%)
Loan-to-Acquisition 77.5 85.8 88.7 92.3Cost Ratio (%)
Term of Mortgage 22.5 24.2 25.8 28.4(years)
Mortgagor's Invest- 2,993 1,915 1,532 1,146
ment ($)
Maximum Allowable Loan- 93 93 97 97to-Value Ratio (%)*
Existing 1-4 Family
Homes: Installment Con-
tract Sales, Chicago
Purchase Price ($) 22,632 18,633 21,642 18,863
Loan-to-Price Ratio 88.0 92.8 93.9 95.2(%)8809.93992
Term of Contract 13.8 16.3 18.6 19.7(years)
Contract Buyer's 2,921 1,289 1,334 874Investment
Contract Buyer's In-
vestment as a Per- 22.5 9.8 10.0 6.01
cent of FHA Value
Home
SOURCE: FHA data from U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
1967 Statistical Yearbook (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1968), FHA Table 33.
* Individual maximum allowable loan-to-value ratios are calculated on a
sliding scale according to set increments. In 1960, FHA regulations
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TABLE 5-1, continued
permitted 97 percent of appraised value on the first $15,000, 90
percent on the next $5,000, and 75 percent on any remaining value up
to a maximum loan of $22,500. See Henry J. Aaron,Shelter and Subsidies
(Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1972), Table B-4.
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cussion purposes that the availability of FHA finance would have
enabled contract buyers to purchase at the PVPRICE, the application
of the same cash assets would have effectively raised the average
downpayment to 8 percent. If the black contract buyer had had access
to the lower cost, average FHA home, this would have similarly
increased the purchasing power of his cash assets.
Payment Status of Contract Buyers
Long before the advent of the Contract Buyers League, black
contract purchasers realized the pitfalls of contract buying and
experienced a "souring" of their expectations for homeownership.33
Many quickly discovered that monthly payments exceeded anticipated
levels because sellers failed to mention the payments for taxes and
insurance. Given the condition of some homes, there were additional
expenses for new heating equipment and repairs to remedy building code
violations. These repairs were often financed by the seller. In
addition, the expectation of additional income from apartment tenants
often failed to reach anticipated levels or to provide a reliable
souce of income. Over time there were problems with vandalism and
securing "good" tenants; some buyers decreased the rent to get "good"
tenants, others tried to avoid renting.34 But for most, the latter
solution was impossible. Just to meet the payment obligation, rooms
were rented to lodgers, moonlighting jobs became more frequent, and
wives went to work if that was not already the family norm.
It is impossible to statistically measure how often contract
obligations altered family relationships and strained financial re-
sources. However, there is little doubt among those personally
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familiar with contract buyers that the strains were intense and
widespread.
We had to let everything go to pay. We didn't do anything
but pay. We paid food, the housenote, and repairs. That
was all. Even then we was late with our payments...There
was all this strain. We was going like mad just to keep
up. I was afraid to miss a day's work and my husband was
the same.. .Thre's nothing relaxing about buying your home
on contract.
The inflated nature of the contract purchase price contributed to
the buyer's burden to remain current and avoid forfeiture. The high
burden for non-forfeited as well as forfeited contracts testifies to
the tenacity with which most buyers held on to the belief in home-
ownership.
The belief in homeownership surmounted negative feelings about
contract buying. Contract buying had developed a "bad" reputation
among many blacks and at all times there was widespread reluctance to
admit that one had bought on contract. Buyers felt that they had been
"caught" by an "exploitative situation," taken by "the man. ,36 Pride
and pressure kept many quiet and paying. Others learned to adapt
to the reality of poor deals because they had "too much invested to
throw away," "they would stay until the children grew up," or they
had fixed up the house "the way they wanted."37 Others simply walked
away from the property.
The vast majority of contract buyers, however, persisted in
paying on the contract agreement. Ten percent of the buyers in the
sample succeeded in completing payment and received property deeds,
although at least half of these buyers had formally been delinquent
several times during the payment term. Table 5-2 presents this infor-
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TABLE 5-2
Status of Sample Installment Contract Sales,
Number
Terminated
Buyer completed payment,
received deed
Conversion of contract to
mortgage loan, received
deed
Conventional mortgage
FHA-insured mortgage
Purchase money mortgage
Forfeiture-repossession
Still in Force
Original buyer paying
Assigned interest to
another
Total number of contracts
48
158
98
166
11
481*
* Information missing for 84 cases.
+ Total may not add to 100 due to rounding.
1973-1975
Percent
10.0
32.9
29
74
55
18.2
47.2
34.6
20.4
34.5
2.3
100.0+
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mation on the status of sample contract sales between 1973 and
1975. 38 Thirty-five percent of the buyers were still paying under
the terms of the original contract;39 33 percent of the buyers
managed to have their contracts converted to mortgage arrangements,
although 35 percent of these mortgages represented purchase money
mortgages given by the contract seller. While the terms of the
payment in these mortgages did not differ from the LIC, the buyer
secured title to the property.
Ninety-eight contract properties were repossessed between 1963
and 1975 out of 482 sales during the 1956-1968 sample period. It
is impossible to determine how many of these cases were attributable
to factors which unpredictably altered family circumstances, events
such as illness, death, divorce and unemployment. The data on forfei-
ture is limited to ex ante characteristics of the transaction. Any
conclusions about individual factors made from this evidence of
contract performance must therefore be interpreted as correlates with
the probability of default and forfeiture, rather than determinants
of buyer default.
In exploratory regression analyses of forfeiture status, only
two variables -- the identity of the speculator holding the contract
paper and contract downpayment -- were significantly related to for-
feiture status. Five large-scale speculators held a disproportionate
number, 58 or almost 60 percent, of these "bad" contracts and only 36
percent of the sample properties. Contract downpayment for the for-
feited cases, shown in Table 5-3, averaged 4.5 percent compared to
5.9 percent for non-forfeited properties. However, not all defaulting
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TABLE 5-3
Mean Characteristics of Sample Installment Sale Transactions
by Forfeiture Status
Non-Fofie
forfeited Forfeited
Before After
All 1969 1969
Time lag between LIC pur-
chase and repossession
(years)
Outstanding contract
balance (%)
Risk Characteristics
Contract downpayment (%)
Contract term (years)
Arbitrage premium ($)
Contract payment burden (%)
Borrower Characteristics
Age at time of LIC sale
(years)
Number of children at
time of LIC sale
Price and Profit Charac-
teristics
Contract purchase price ($)
(1957-59 constant dollars)
Net markup (%)
Present value expected
net profit ($)
Monthly net cash flow ($)
Neighborhood Characteristics
Percent housing units
substandard (1960)
Number of observations*
5.7
78.7
5.9
17.6
5,263
31.8
40
3.0
19,583
(19,029)
66.5
2,612
45
12.2
465
18.3
,123'
33.7
3.5
89.5
4.1
17.8
6,448
35.6 c
37b
3.5
20,183
(19,409)
75.4b
3,058 b
49
11.0
98
35
3.3
21 ,48 7c(20,671 )c
68.0
2,997
50
9.7
55
5.0
18.8
5,688
31.2
38
3.6
18,514
(17,793)
85.3
3,139
47
12.8
43
* Number of cases may vary for individual variables.
8.4
71 .9
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TABLE 5-3, continued
a. Difference in
statistically
b. Difference in
statistically
c. Difference in
statistically
d. Difference in
statistically
means between forfeited and nonforfeited cases
significant at.05 level.
means between forfeited and nonforfeited cases
significant at .10 level.
means between before and after 1969 forfeiture
significant at .05 level.
means between before and after 1969 forfeiture
significant at .10 level.
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buyers had low downpayments; in 5 percent of these forfeited contracts
downpayments exceeded 9 percent. Other differences between forfeiting
and non-forfeiting buyers were small, but they conformed to the
expected pattern for mortgage default. Those buyers who forfeited their
contracts were, on average, younger, had a greater number of dependents
under the age of 18, and accepted a larger contract payment burden.
These findings are important because they imply that the
correlates of contract buyer behavior are similar to those in mortgage
markets. The predictive power of the loan-to-price ratio in mortgage
markets would seem to carry over into the private finance, low-equity
sector. In addition, the low average age of the contract at the time
of repossession, 3.5 years for properties repossessed prior to 1969,
conforms to loan-seasoning behavior in mortgage markets.40
Nevertheless, the incidence of property repossession is not
an accurate index of the extent to which buyers encountered difficulty
meeting the payment burden. Rather it is an index of the relative
profits and risks from continued seller forbearance. Forfeiture was
as much a function of how accounts were serviced as of borrower credit.
Payment delinquency was not uncommon in the contract market. The short
30-day default period written into the contract increased the proba-
bility of formal delinquency. However, the cash-flow spread between
the mortgage commitment and the contract generally provided the
speculator with sufficient flexibility to meet his mortgage expenses
from sizeable partial payments. The speculator could afford to forbear.
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Permissive Delinquency or Repossession: The Choice of the Speculator
Given that delinquency was not uncommon, what were the pre-
cipitating conditions for repossession? What characteristics dis-
tinguished the delinquency non-repossession cases from the repossession
cases?
Data on payment performance over the life of the contract was
available only for those cases where a contract payment ledger
remained on file. These records could be obtained for only 113
contracts written by two large-scale south side speculators, former
partners who maintained similar business operations.
Professional ghetto landlords and contract sellers, Peck and
Master managed delinquency for profit. Contract buyers were charged
for delinquencies in accordance with the duration of the late payment.
Thirty days after payment was due, the buyer was charged $10 and
received a Notice of Payment Default. After an additional 30 days,
the buyer was charged $25 and sent a Notice of Intent to Declare
Forfeiture; this was followed by a $60 charge for Declaration of For-
feiture proceedings. These fines and "legal fees" were deducted
from the monthly contract payment prior to principal and interest
allocations. Given Peck and Master's choice of cost-recovery taxation
for deferred capital gains, these charges represented "expenses" which
increased the basis of recoverable costs and extended the period of
deferred taxation.
Table 5-4 presents evidence of Peck and Master's practice of
"permissive delinquencies". Technically these sellers could have fore-
closed on the average delinquent buyer several times during the course
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TABLE 5-4
Mean Characteristics of Purchase, Delinquency and Default for
Peck and Master Subsample of Installment Sales
Non-forfeited Forfeited
No Delinquencies Before After
Delinquencies 1969 1969
Forbearance Characteristics*
Number delinquency notices -- 26.9 11.5 28.5
Number forfeiture intent -- 3.0 4.5 5.5
notices
Number forfeiture suits -- 0.8 3.0 1.6
Risk Characteristics
Contract downpayment (%) 5.8 5.2 0.7 6.1
Contract payment burden (%) 30.6 31.7 29.1 30.0
Borrower Characteristics
Age at time of LIC sale 47 43 32 43
Number of children at 1.8 2.7 na 3.7
time of LIC sale
Price and Profit
Characteristics
Contract purchase price ($) 18,383 18,809 14,900 18,005
(1957-59 constant dollars+) (18,073) (18,460) (14,248) (17,472)
Net markup (%) 65.3 75.9 na 75.7
Monthly net cash flow ($) 46 45 38 51
Neighborhood Characteristics
Percent housing units sub- 15.2 11.9 16.0 14.3
standard (1960)
number of observations+ 28 69 2 20
* Number of times which a speculator charged a fee for the respective
situation.
+ Number of cases may vary for individual
na= information not available.
variables.
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of the contract. The incidence of delinquency did not appear to
be a determining factor for repossession since the incidence of
delinquency on average did not differ for forfeited and non-forfeited
delinquent contracts.
In interviews with members of the Contract Buyers League con-
ducted by volunteer researchers, many buyers noted that delinquencies
were caused by sporadic inabilities to meet monthly payments due to
unemployment or illness.42 One west side speculator considered such
forbearance altruistic:
I like the people on the west side. I was good to them.
I lent them money. I did them favors. And I acted as
a father confessor. I didn't know I was doing any harm
to them.43
Being "nice" to "worried" contract buyers was not without
its financial rewards. This was particularly evident for the Peck and
Master cases because they had an established policy on late payments.
The additional income from late fees and legal charges for preliminary
notifications of default proceedings often provided a significant
additional component of profit. In one particularly striking example,
representative of at least 12 other cases, the increase in buyer debt
over a 13-year period exceeded $1,000 or 8 percent of the sale price.
This figure covered 98 charges for 30-day notices and 3 charges for
forfeiture notices.
A pattern of chronic late payment would lead one to expect a
slow reduction in the outstanding balance. This was not necessarily
the case. Many buyers were delinquent but diligent and continued to
consistently pay both late charges and contract obligation, thereby
steadily reducing the contract debt. In the above example, monthly
231
contract payments of $115 (principal and interest) on an initial
balance of $12,700 at 7 percent interest implied a term-to-maturity
of almost 15 years. Fourteen and a half years later the outstanding
balance totaled $866; it would take only 8 months of regular payments
to complete contract payment.
One observer of the declining west side market cited continued
occupancy as the biggest advantage to forbearance. In several
neighborhoods which had experienced severe deterioration, the costs
of vandalism following buyer eviction exceeded the benefits of property
repossession if resale did not immediately follow eviction.44 The
geographic distribution of repossessed porperties before and after 1969
supports this view of the west side market. The earliest sample
properties repossessed are disproportionally west side properties;
after 1969, south side properties predominate.
It is difficult to determine the precipitating conditions for
repossession. At the present time there is no way to determine how
many buyers walked away from contracts and how many cases represent
the seller's decision to terminate long-term delinquencies. Normally
one would assume that the buyer's actions determine loan default. How-
ever, the high incidence of delinquency for both repossessed and non-
repossessed delinquent contracts and the lack of distinguishing
differences in buyer characteristics for these subgroups caution
against relying upon this assumption as the total explanation.
There are two observations which conform to this writer's
expectations of speculator motives for repossessing a particular pro-
perty. First, the slightly larger cash flow evident in the repossessed
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properties may have provided a greater incentive to try and resell the
property instead of continuing to forbear. Of greater significance
is the fact that a large proportion of the repossessed properties had
a history of previous repossessions. Twenty-five percent of all
forfeited contracts had been repossessed from a single previous con-
tract sale; 7 percent had been repossessed twice, and 2 percent, three
times. An additional 17 percent of the repossessed properties pro-
vided the speculator with rental profits for a year or more prior to
the contract sale. For the Peck and Master subsample these proportions
exceeded 27 percent for properties with prior contract sales and 45
percent for those with prior rental profits.
A large number of repossessions occurred between 1970 and 1971
and were concentrated on the south side among three speculators, Peck,
Master and Engle. Their combined total accounted for 65 percent of
all post-1969 repossessions. Several of these repossessions were
properties sold in the late 1950s, while only three out of the 55
pre-1969 repossessions had been sold during this time period. The
Peck and Master delinquency data further suggest that the post-1969
repossessed contract buyers were different because they had a history
of late payments.
The long time lag between purchase and repossession for these
post-1969 properties, and the lack of distinguishing buyer characteris-
tics between the two periods suggest that the precipitating events for
both buyer and seller relate to significant institutional changes in
the contract market in the late 1960s. For some buyers, the extensive
market pattern of seller "exploitation" and transaction markups re-
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vealed by the Contract Buyers League shattered any remaining hopes
for homeownership, of ever paying off the contract balance. 45 The
availability of FHA mortgage money in these neighborhoods altered
the sellers' options by providing a means with which to cash out of
numerous properties. This incentive evidently increased after the
CBL payment strike, as some sellers pressed on buyers with long-term
delinquencies which had previously been ignored. 46
Assessing the Risks of Installment Sales
A major argument in the contract speculators' defense against
charges of discriminatory price setting rested on the proposition
that prices charged in this market reflected the additional risk of
credit transactions. For individual owners selling directly on con-
tract without benefit of excessive mortgage leverage, this was a
credible argument. However, the marketing and management strategies
of the speculators' operations effectively minimized the ascribed
risks of contract sales. High mortgage leverage limited a seller's
absolute risk exposure at the outset and subsequent refinancing of
mortgage loans maintained high leverage throughout the term of owner-
ship. Second, the land trust vehicle limited personal liability.
Third, multiple turnover of properties testified to the effectiveness
of title ownership as a risk-compensating feature of the contract sale.
But most importantly, institutional financing shifted contract loan-
loss risk to the mortgagor; a speculator could default on the mortgage
without sacrificing his accumulated profit.
The rewards of contract selling in the black contract market,
by any standard for "prudent" rates of return, were enormous. The
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annual rate of return, based on the conservatively estimated equity,
averaged 72 percent for the west side and 110 percent for the south
side.
For the contract buyer, the risks of installment purchase were
not confined to his deferred title claim or his legal eviction status
as a renter. Homeownership has traditionally served as the primary
means by which low- and middle-income families built an asset base,
moving up a social mobility ladder by increasing the quality of
housing purchases. For the first-time black homebuyer, the unantici-
pated consequence of contract buying was the inability to fully
recapture stored equity. The lack of equity rights inhibited trading-
up and geographic mobility often entailed an investment sacrifice
unless the buyer could find another willing to purchase the contract
"rights".
A contract buyer having successfully attained title ownership
was still liable to sustain capital losses from a property sale.
Because contract sale prices adjusted for credit constraints parti-
cular to a neighborhood or borrower, the terms of the contract did not
reflect a cash market relationship between the value over time and
debt payoff which was common with mortgage finance. Unless the contract
homeowner subsequently sold on contract, there was a high probability
that he would sustain capital losses unless there had been an increase
in neighborhood property values.
The social costs of contract buying can be seen in the neigh-
borhoods of Lawndale, Garfield Park and Englewood. A decade after
racial transition, the neighborhoods of heavy contract activity had
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become an established part of the black ghetto. The socio-economic
gains sought by contract buyers dissipated with the deterioration of
their neighborhoods. Having sought homeownership as a means of
improving their environment, individual contract buyers became "inno-
cent victims of their surroundings" unable to overcome the tide of
subsequent decline. While neighborhood decline might have resulted
despite an availability of mortgage finance, speculative contract
activity accelerated the decline. It is clear that the inflated
price structure of contract sales did not increase the probability
of neighborhood stability commonly associated with owner-occupancy.
This had less to do with individual motivations and lack of property
appreciation than with the deferred maintenance and overcrowding
which resulted from the severe financial burden of contract payments,
a burden which would have been less straining with FHA-insured
mortgage finance.
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CHAPTER 6
FHA's Inner-City Mandate and Redlining:
Lessons from the Installment Contract Market
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In areas where speculators constitute the principal means by
which properties are marketed and FHA is the principal source
of financing, this [modified cost] approach to value will help
to prevent unreasonable disparities between net sellers'
prices plus typical costs and FHA values with the attendant
implications of excessive speculator profits.
FHA Circular HPMC-FHA 4035.8 Change 1
March 4, 1971.
The analysis of installment contract sales is a case study of
economic and institutional relationships in the dual housing market
in Chicago during the two decades following World War II. The install-
ment sales market developed as a specialized response to institutional
discrimination. Are the lessons of this market tied to the specific
financing instrument? What generalizations about the characteristics
of racially divided housing markets can be drawn from this experience?
Since 1968, installment contract sales have not been a signi-
ficant feature of the black housing market in Chicago. As a consequence
of FHA policy reforms in the late 1960s sanctioning mortgage insurance
on property in older inner-city neighborhoods, this type of mortgage
has been the principal form of mortgage credit in these neighborhoods,
particularly those experiencing racial transition. In an historic
reversal, the effectiveness of its reform actions has stimulated cri-
ticism of its new role as an agent of racial change and its mortgage
processing operations as a source of speculative profits.I
As a case study of the dynamics of housing market changes in
transitional neighborhoods, contract selling provides a foundation for
exploring the pattern of market behavior in these neighborhoods which
followed the change from installment sales to FHA-insured mortgages.
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Did the availability of mortgage credit alter the circumstances under
which units in the white market were transferred to the black market?
Critics of the effects of FHA reforms in inner-city mortgage
markets have defined the housing finance problem in the negative as
the "lack of institutional involvement in the community." In so doing,
they have narrowed the historical definition of redlining -- the denial
of conventional mortgage money by local lenders. First defined in
the late 1950s as the absence of all institutional mortgage credit in
selected geographic locations regardless of borrower credit, the term
redlining now connotes the absence of conventional mortgage credit in
selected geographic locations regardless of borrower credit.
As the precursor to FHA-insured mortgage credit in older
inner-city neighborhoods, the contract market experience provides the
historical foundation for understanding the current redlining contro-
versy. Until 1966, contract sales filled the credit void when both
FHA and conventional lenders openly redlined neighborhoods experiencing
racial transition. The involvement of financial institutions as mort-
gage lenders for contract speculators provides a basis for understand-
ing the origins of several conventional mortgage lending procedures
and regulations which have been cited as negative incentives for
inner-city lending.
The Legacy of Illinois "Problem" Savings and Loan Associations
Beginning in 1963, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)
promulgated a number of administrative regulations designed to prevent
"unsafe or unsound lending practices." Administrative regulations
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controlling loan volume to a single borrower, appraisal policy, loan
application record keeping, deferred income accounting for loan fees
and discounts, and the type of loans to be used as collateral for
loan advances from regional FHL banks were directed toward preventing
lending practices typical of those Illinois "problem" associations
involved in the finance of speculative contract sales.
Three years later, Congress passed the Supervisory Act of 1966
which significantly increased the supervisory powers available to the
FHLBB for a "campaign of preventive supervision." 2 The Act granted the
FHLBB "intermediate" powers to issue cease and desist orders, to
suspend and remove association officers, and to appoint conservators
or receivers for financially threatened institutions.3 These powers
were designed to complement the stronger but drastic powers to termi-
nate insurance of accounts or seize an institution.
The Illinois experience provided supervisory agents and regu-
latory examiners with a costly lesson in the problems which result
from inner-city lending to real estate investors. 4 A 1969 memo care-
fully detailed the investment problems of speculative mortgages,
5
procedures for examination detection and suggested supervisory responses.
FHLBB examination procedures reflected an increasing concern with con-
centrated geographic lending. The development of institutional per-
formance measures, designed as inputs for determining the frequency
and type of supervisory examinations, included an evaluation of the
"economic environment" of the association's lending area. This latter
measure would monitor more closely "potential or incipient operating
weaknesses before they affect significantly overall association
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performance."6
Two other regulations, soft-spot examinations and differential
reserve requirements for certain classes of mortgages, were also
designed to catch speculative investment patterns and other lending
problems in the early stages of development before they became "appa-
rent and inescapable."' The soft-spot examination procedure, initiated
in 1970, increased the frequency of scheduled examinations for associ-
ations in "economically depressed areas," regardless of an association's
loan record. Earlier reports noted that associations in these older
inner-city areas were "obviously most likely to have a number of loans
on old properties"8 and the areas were considered "on the average more
vulnerable than others and might have internal difficulties generated
by adverse conditions in their areas." 9
Beginning in 1964, the Board revised the basis for credits to
loss reserves which insured institutions must make before payment of
dividends. It required higher reserves for those associations with
abnormally large amounts of slow loans and real estate owned. 10 In
the seventies there were reports of differential reserve requirements
for inner-city mortgage loans based on zip code designations.11
Many of these regulatory actions and supervisory procedures
were a natural product of increasing self-monitoring following a
decade of growth within the savings and loan industry. Nevertheless,
the timing of and perceived need for these specific regulations were
significantly determined by the regulatory frustrations and monetary
costs incurred in the disposition of Illinois "problem" associations.
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In his report to the industry on the causes of association
failures, Bartell concluded:
Thus, in one sense, it could be said that all associations
engage in concentration of loans by geographic area and by
type of security. The principal cause of failure is not
concentration per se, but concentration in risky loans.
Experience indicates that a large portfolio of loans in a
growing middle class suburb is not risky; the same degree
of concentration in a deteriorating neighborhood of the
central city is. 12
This conclusion minimized the additional risk attributable to the
speculative nature of the mortgages financing inner-city contract
sales. These were riskier loans in part because they were two-tiered
loans in which payment had to pass from the contract buyer to the
speculator to the lending association. The contract neighborhoods
were older neighborhoods but all were not "deteriorating" when the
loans were initially written. While the decline in property values
underlying mortgage loan losses in the Lawndale-Garfield Park area was
likely a function of "unemployment and income instability," loan loss
was also a function of unsound lending practices. The nature of the
property sale transaction exacerbated a difficult situation. By
omitting consideration of the speculative process underlying these
property transfers, Bartell's conclusion implicitly extends the high-
risk classification to all inner-city neighborhoods and reinforces
the organic life cycle theory of neighborhood decline.
From "Economic Soundness" to "Acceptable Risk": The Short-Term Effects
of a New FHA Underwriting Policy
In 1966, FHA amended the National Housing Act through the addi-
tion of Section 203(1), which relaxed the "economic soundness" require-
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ment for mortgage insurance and substituted the "acceptable risk"
standard. Stimulated by the urban riots of 1965 and 1966, the intent
of the change was to offer insured mortgage financing to " credit
worthy" individuals who had been innocent victims of their surround-
ings... [to make] it possible for responsbile citizens to remain in an
area and to form a stable nucleus of home owners."13 In operational
terms, this meant that if the particular unit met the minimum property
standards and the mortgagor qualified, the mortgage was insurable under
non-subsidized Section 203(b) even though certain neighborhoods would
not permit a finding of economic soundness. 14 In 1968, Section 203(1)
was replaced with Section 223(e), which expanded the areas in which
exception to the economic soundness criterion could be made by liberal-
izing the location criterion to "reasonable viable" areas. 15
Because the FHA "was never a financial vehicle in the city of
Chicago until 1968 as far as single family homes or properties were
concerned,"16 the policy revisions created technical and administrative
problems for the Chicago field office. Older appraisers could not
abandon their previous training to disregard the economic life of the
surrounding neighborhood; new appraisers had to be hired and trained.1
The increased demand and heavy workload which resulted from the policy
switch necessitated the hiring of fee appraisers for the single-family
work. Some of these fee appraisers were real estate brokers and a
conflict of interest developed,since they appraised in their local
market areas. 18
Reports of alleged bribery, kickbacks, and other irregularities
involving HUD employees and private individuals doing business with the
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Chicago office began to surface in the early seventies, "choking" the
capabilities of the federal district prosecutor's office.19 By 1973,
the regional administrator of Region V had concluded that many of the
programmatic abuses were a "direct result of both a lack of training,
experience, and expertise, and in many instances, dishonesty of fee
appraisers. Accordingly, all use of fee appraisers in the city of
"20Chicago was terminated.
One immediate effect of the FHA policy change and laxity in
administrative procedures was the renegotiation of numerous contract
sales in deteriorated neighborhoods on the west side of Chicago.21
By 1969, 12 percent of the sample contract sales had been converted
to FHA-insured mortgages; another 4 percent would be converted within
as many more years. At least two large-scale speculators used FHA
finance to divest themselves of those contract-backed mortgage loans
for which they were personally liable or those contracts with collec-
tion problems. Many more viewed FHA conversion as a means of minimizing
their liability in the pending CBL lawsuit.22
The broader inpact of the FHA policy change in Chicago and
other cities occurred in those urban neighborhoods contiguous with the
1960 ghetto experiencing racial and economic transition. By the mid-
seventies, numerous case studies had shown that FHA-insured mortgage
credit had become a racial border phenomenon differentially serving
blacks. 23 How would the availability of FHA-insured mortgage credit
affect neighborhood racial transition? By one account, FHA financing
was likely to increase the demand for housing in these neighborhoods
relative to that obtaining in its absence, reverse the depressing
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price effects attributable to the absence of mortgage credit, and also
accelerate the speed of transition. The path of neighborhood develop-
ment, however, would continue to depend upon the anticipations of
social, economic and racial change held by buyers, sellers and other
lenders. 24 Therefore, neighborhood decline or stability would not be
predictable solely on the basis of the availability of FHA finance.
If the FHA policy change promoted neighborhood change through a
relaxation of the neighborhood homogeneity criterion for inner-city
lending, at the same time it limited and even reversed the rising
levels of cash and private transactions characteristic of this real
estate market.25 With the availability of FHA credit, an installment
contract sale was clearly not the best instrument with which to shift
housing units between white and black markets. A cash transaction
utilizing mortgage credit would yield an immediate return to the spe-
culator at the time of the real estate closing.
The availability of FHA-insured mortgage credit, however, did
not alter the economic incentives or regulatory inhibitions confronting
conventional lenders evaluating loans in these neighborhoods. There
was no change in attitude regarding "no integration" loans. The
availability of FHA credit insurance produced a change in the cast
of lenders, but only one form of mortgage credit remained available.
The significant difference was that the availability of mortgage
finance theoretically increased the probability of direct transactions
between white seller and black buyer and thus reduced one incentive
for credit arbitrage.
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In the past, the lack of institutional mortgage finance in
transitional neighborhoods, not the type of institutional mortgage
finance, was viewed as the critical element permitting the contract
sale market to flourish in a finance vacuum. The changeover in FHA
insurance criteria. had a striking effect upon the perception of the
housing credit problem in racial transition neighborhoods. Communities
contiguous to established black neighborhoods continued to experience
pressure applied by the real estate industry to sell "block by block
and turn over these neighborhoods." 26 The difference between the
1960 situation and the one in 1973 was that in 1973, the social and
economic fate of these neighborhoods, as described by community spokes-
persons, was tied to the fact that FHA financing was the only type of
mortgage finance available. Neighborhoods became impacted by the
stigma of federal mortgage insurance programs: "We have FHA money
for quick sale."27
White community groups at hearings on the oversight operations
of FHA programs in Chicago complained about racial steering tactics
of real estate agents, disinvestment by conventional lenders, excessive
points paid by resident owners to sell homes with FHA-insured mortgage
credit, profits by panic peddlers, and collusion among these parties.
The abuse of FHA has become the syphilis infecting society.
Mortgage houses align themselves with the program by with-
drawing conventional loans from areas which are changing
and insurance companies follow suit by redlining these areas
-- determining them to be high risk, thereby withdrawing
their policies or jacking up the rates. FHA falls right
in line by mothering these policies through granting loans
in the area determined by -ealtors. This is going to stop.
We don't want our cities a lives planned by the people
who are out to make a fast buck. 28
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The singular availability of FHA-insured mortgage credit was now
responsible for a situation whereby speculators could "palm off"
inferior buildings on "unsophisticated buyers, people who were
desperate for a home but didn't know much about quality housing." 29
Liberal financing allowed low-equity buyers to acquire a home "without
the experience that was necessary to maintain that home, to take care
of it."30
These community groups complained about the concentration of
minorities in only certain areas of Chicago, the "resegregation" of
communities that was not "in line with the Federal program" which
"was never meant to be used that way." 31 FHA was not "careful" with
the way it made funds available for mortgages.
The solution to this "drastic FHA problem" was a modified
quota system. Court orders would define fringe areas of Chicago, stop
FHA sales in these areas, and force the FHA 203 program to be utilized
throughout the remaining Chicago metropolitan area.
They should spread out the availability of FHA mortgages
so that in any given community, any given census tract,
there would never be more than 5 percent of the available
housing per year sold, exchanged through FHA.
This would give you a 95 percent of the stability
of the existing community.32
With a clear understanding of what forms of finance would be utilized
in the absence of FHA mortgages, these groups further called for a
ban on contract sales in the court-defined fringe areas. To support
real estate activity, these groups called for credit rationing of
conventional mortgage loans to prevent panic selling and other psycho-
logical abuses which occur with FHA and contract sales. 33
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The anger of white residents of older, inner-city neighborhoods,
directed at the FHA as a force of social change, sparked the current
redlining debate which focuses on the withdrawal of conventional funds.
FHA was now culpable for doing what it was accused of not doing in the
past. At least one minority group said so much when a representative
attributed the "violent attacks against the FHA" to its policy of
financing real estate without discrimination." 34
Black representatives did not define the problem in these terms.
The changeover in FHA policy immediately altered the financing vacuum
in transition or impending transition neighborhoods and increased the
opportunities for black homeownership. Black representatives at the over
sight hearings notably did not comment on FHA's administration of inner-city
mortgage programs,but lamented the moratorium on the Section 235 sub-
sidized homeownership program.35 Despite the abuses of the FHA pro-
grams, a mortgage was better than a contract.
Several sources indicated that the availability of FHA mortgage
finance did not alter the established pattern of blockbusting panic
selling and speculative transactions common to Chicago transition
neighborhoods. 36
The speculators' markups are fantastic. On
Hubbard Street...a speculator bought one place for
$7,500 from a white family. He sold it to a black
family for $14,500, and it was riddled with code
violations...
The same speculator bought another house for
$5,000 and sold it for $14,500 FHA. 37
Collusion among market actors was not uncommon either. If a
speculator acted as a broker-intermediary in a black-white transaction
with FHA finance before May, 1972, he probably received a kickback
from the mortgage banking house originating the FHA-insured mortgage,
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in addition to his regular sales commission. 38 In some instances,
speculators benefitted in two capacities -- broker and loan originator,
by virtue of their ownership or association with mortgage companies.39
FHA recognized the significant impact of speculative transac-
tions upon its inner-city lending program in a series of administrative
directives aimed at tightening procedures and improving financial
performance in areas dominated by speculator activity. A July, 1970,
circular titled "Intensive Valuation Review in Problem Areas" empha-
sized that "FHA has done more harm than good" to low-income purchasers
in those cases where the liberalized FHA procedure for Section 223(e)
resulted in insurance of mortgages "the physical security for which
is far below the stated objective of the FHA Minimum Property
Standards." The circular stressed that 223(e) was not to be inter-
preted as permitting the waiver of FHA minimum property standards. 40
Another circular dated December, 1970, required the delineation
by the Chief Appraiser of "all inner-city, transition and problem areas
where there is evidence of substantial speculator activity," and added
stricter regulations for review of appraisals in those areas. The
enumerated review procedures suggested that previous procedures entailed
a cursory review after the FHA commitment had been issued.41
Another directive was issued in December, 1970, in which FHA
initiated a "modified cost approach" for existing property appraisals
in speculator-dominated areas to "facilitate more realistic appraisals"
and to prevent "excessive speculator profits." The modified cost
approach was to be used as a supplement to the market approach for the
valuation of properties owned less than two years by a non-occupant
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seller and located in a delineated area. 42  It limited the selling
price to the lower of either comparable market value or the seller's
acquisition price plus repair costs, holding costs, sales commission,
and an allowance for overhead and profit.
A reasonable profit is one which is required in order to
attract legitimate enterprises to engage in the purchase,
repair or rehabilitation, and resale of older properties
in the locality. The profit allowance must be such that
it will discourage the "speculator" or "suede shoe"
operator. The purpose is to exclude from FHA insured mort-
gages the possibility of exorbitant profits at the pur-
chaser's expense.43
This "reasonable" profit allowance, pegged at 25 percent of total
modified cost value prior to an adjustment for the broker's commission,
provides a lower bound estimate of average speculative markups.
FHA Loan Origination and Discount Points: The New Instrument for
Capturing Profits from Racial Change
FHA-insured mortgages are usually originated by specialized
mortgage companies and subsequently sold to large permanent institu-
tional investors such as insurance companies, mutual savings banks,
and FNMA. Mortgage companies earn a profit first through loan
origination,and second through loan servicing.44 Since FHA mortgages
are generally sold at a discount, for example 97 percent of face value,
the originator increases the number of front-end points to generate a
profit so that when the loan is sold in the secondary market a cash
balance remains. These points, paid by the seller of the home, can
be absorbed in either of two ways: through an increase in the sale
price so that the discounted, inflated sale price matches the original
price estimate, or through a partial reduction on equity recovery.
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The point system has been a constant feature of FHA financing,
It is designed to compensate for the FHA-fixed interest rate ceiling
which historically has been less than the prevailing market interest
rate. Rather than increase the interest rate ceiling, FHA has per-
mitted lenders to charge discount points as an inducement to make
loans at the FHA-approved interest rate. By indirectly raising the
effective rate of return, the system encourages investment in the home
mortgage market. 4 5
A mortgage lender maximizes FHA mortgage origination profits
by concentrating mortgage lending on those properties which will gene-
rate the highest discounts yet conform to FHA underwriting criteria.
After 1966, these have been mortgages in areas considered "too risky"
by conventional lending standards. Neighborhoods of impending or early
racial change have historically fit this characterization.
In the past, the underwriting criteria and portfolio preferences
of permanent institutional investors, factors which effectively pre-
cluded loans to blacks and loans in transitional areas,46 constrained
placement of profitable but non-conforming FHA mortgages. In the mid-
1960s as mortgage banker-correspondent ties began to weaken, mortgage
originators' dependence on FNMA purchase commitments grew. During this
period, the FHA policy revisions were implemented. Any FHA-insured
loan became acceptable to FNMA and thereby assured mortgage originators
of an outlet for all FHA loans. 47  This combination of factors lifted
the locational constraints on loan origination and precipitated volume
FHA lending in changing areas and accelerated the transition process.48
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The system of FHA loan origination became a vehicle with which
to profit from the social and economic uncertainties of racial change
much the same way installment contract sales were used prior to FHA
mortgage availability.49 Both instruments guaranteed a high return
with little or no risk to the originating party. FHA loan originators
benefitted from racial change because, in the absence of conventional
financing, it provided a captive market, one in which they could charge
a discrimination premium to transfer units from white to black markets.
To the extent that mortgage originators or real estate agents could
create, manipulate, and intensify the psychological and economic
environment of racial change, or increase the mortgage basis of the
property through bribery of FHA officials, inflated appraisals, or
falsified credit reports, they could increase the profits of loan
origination.50 Such abuses scandalized the FHA programmatic reforms. 51
The availability of FHA-insured mortgages significantly altered
the financial medium for real estate transfers in transitional neigh-
borhoods. Few would argue that compared to the installment contract,
the black buyer was relatively worse off despite the programmatic
abuses and fast foreclosure processing of delinquent FHA mortgagors. 52
Nevertheless, the availability of FHA-insured mortgage finance did not
alter the two fundamental characteristics of the dual housing market
in Chicago: restricted black access to white suburban housing markets and
uncertain expectations of neighborhood change held by white sellers,
mortgage lenders, and brokers. These factors allowed intermediaries
to earn large profits at the expense of both white seller and black
buyer. The FHA policy change was notably an inner-city mandate; FHA
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programs in Chicago were not used to facilitate suburban open housing.53
The anger of white inner-city community groups in the early and
mid-seventies over the active lending role of FHA and its programmatic
abuses focused on the "disinvestment" of conventional lenders. For
the first time there was a precise, quantitative measure of the
perceived capital losses sustained in the process of racial transition.
FHA discount points, clearly recorded in the mind of the seller and
on the mortgage document of the buyer, provided the former with an
index of individual loss independent of the relationship between sale
price and city-wide property values. Sellers were "willing" to pay
these points since there was no alternative financing for the buyer
and they feared greater losses if they delayed the sale.54
The presence of conventional mortgage money, more than anything
else, has come to symbolize future investment potential and a stable
real estate market. At least one writer has argued that the availabi-
lity of alternative conventional credit would reduce the price effects
55-
from FHA points and the potential for origination profits. However, in
the absence of an open housing market,"discriminatory" origination
profits would still exist. If conventional lenders perceived additional
risks of lending in transitional neighborhoods, they too would charge
loan origination points. However, the incidence of the burden would
differ; as mortgagor, the black buyer would generally pay these costs.
Unlike the price effects with FHA mortgage finance, the costs would
not be absorbed into a higher sale price, but would be payable at the
time the conventional loan was written.
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Lessons for Public Policy
The analysis of installment contract transactions presented in
this study detailed a frequently noted, but rarely documented, pattern
of real estate transactions in inner-city transitional neighborhoods
where mortgage money was unavailable. The characteristics of specula-
tive behavior and the terms of contract sales testify to the vulnera-
bility of buyers in such markets. First-time contract homebuyers were
particularly vulnerable to the sale tactics of speculators because
either racial discrimination, low income, or both placed them in an
inferior bargaining position.
Installment contracts were and continue to be legitimate instru-
ments for the transfer of property, particularly high-risk sales.
As such they are likely to remain a characteristic of real estate
markets where mortgage money is not available but where the housing
stock is suitable for non-professional resident owner-occupancy. A
real estate investor continues to benefit from selling on contract as
opposed to renting because of the reduced maintenance, tax and
insurance liability and to the extent he can capitalize on the desire
for homeownership and secure a downpayment in excess of the rental
security deposit. Indeed, it would not be at all surprising to find
an increase in the incidence of contract sales and other types of
private financing transfers if there is a credit vacuum in the low-
income homeownership market due to the revisions of federal subsidy
programs for low-income homeownership. Nevertheless, from the seller's
perspective, contract sales are a substitute for rental arrangements
only in those states where the foreclosure process is rapid and in-
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expensive.
In the absence of discrimination, the major inequity of
installment sales is the poor allocation between rights and risks.
The "windfall profit" to the seller in the event the buyer defaults
increases over time while the risk to the seller decreases. All
legal reforms of installment sales are within the province of the
individual states. As evidenced by the relative differences between
mortgages and installment contracts in California and Maryland compared
to Illinois,56 there is a wide range in which to redefine the minimal
rights of the contract buyer in Illinois. Legislative reformation
of contract transactions in Illinois should increase the institutional
protection of the buyer commensurate with his increased equity accumu-
lation. Without destroying the extra protection afforded by install-
ment contracts for high-risk sales, the rights of the buyer should be
safeguarded through provisions for mortgage-like protection as soon as
the buyer has accumulated a "substantial" investment and the risk to
the seller has been reduced.
Institutional safeguards, however, are not a substitute for
consumer knowledge. The contract buying experience revealed that
buyers had a poor understanding of homebuying; many consulted lawyers
but not on the value of the property. First-time buyers were unfamiliar
with home-buying procedures, criteria for property selection and pro-
fessional assistance (legal advice, appraisals, repair estimates),
price negotiation and the mechanics of loan amortization. Funding
for buyer counseling should be available but directed toward assistance
for local consumer advocacy organizations, fair housing organizations,
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non-profit housing sponsors, and neighborhood services groups, as a
counterforce to the unequal seller-buyer bargaining relationship
which develops in declining neighborhoods and those transition neigh-
borhoods dominated by speculative real estate activity.
Unfortunately, the black contract market did not develop
independent of racial discrimination. Policies to increase buyer
safeguards in installment sales transactions and buyer knowledge of
homebuying only affect the superficial manifestations of discriminatory
housing burdens. Insomuch as the pattern of Chicago's segregated
residential market is characteristic of other urban areas, this case
study provides an example of how market barriers create opportunities
for intermediaries to arbitrage supply constraints facing the black
household buying outside established black residential areas.
The pattern of speculative behavior at the interface between
white and black housing markets in Chicago suggests that black resi-
dential expansion continues to be funneled into selected neighborhoods,
despite the availability of FHA-insured mortgage finance. Funneling
results from the economic incentives present for regular housing
market actors (real estate brokers and lending institutions) to dis-
criminate by providing services on a segregated basis. Since estab-
lished local housing market actors are reluctant to initiate inter-
racial sales, new market actors emerge as dominant forces. This
results in a turnover of real estate brokers and financial institutions
in transitional neighborhoods. Price differentials between white and
black markets, concentrated at the point of transition, result from
restricted access to the larger white market. Policies aimed at
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eliminating the discriminatory component of the arbitrage profit must
focus on these barriers to an open market.
If in the past restrictive actions were highly organized and
open, the techniques today are more subtle and harder to detect.
Discrimination often takes the form of restrictions or distortions in
the information given to black households. Much of the information
provided by sellers and real estate brokers is either subjective or
unrecorded. This combination makes enforcement of open-housing
legislation costly, difficult and of limited impact in affecting the
broad forms of market discrimination.57 Research must be directed
at the search process of black households to determine the most
effective means to increase accessibility without excessive search
costs. Anti-discrimination policies must focus on increasing the flow
of available market information and thereby eliminating the economic
incentives of realty institutions to discriminate. Policies designed
to increase access of minority brokers to multiple listing services
will, as one researcher noted, change the incentives facing brokers
since white buyers and sellers presumably could no longer avoid brokers
who sold to blacks in white neighborhoods. 58
The main controversy concerning housing finance in urban areas
today revolves around allegations of the lack of conventional sources
of mortgage credit in older neighborhoods. Unfortunately, race still
appears to play a part in the loan decision. In a recent study of
this problem, Schafer has concluded that in the State of New York
race is still a factor in differential access to housing credit.59
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Since 1966, the availability of FHA finance has brought
institutional mortgage credit to inner-city transitional neighborhoods,
The qualitative difference between contract sales and FHA mortgage
finance is significant; the abuses in the implementation of the program
do not negate the importance of the policy change. To the extent that
black suburban housing choices are limited and new construction
continues to play a small part in the supply of units to the black
market, transfers of existing homes from the white to black market
will continue to shape the price and transaction characteristics of
housing available to blacks. Whether, with FHA-insured mortgages,
the premium required by intermediaries to transfer these units between
markets is greater than, less than, or equal to the premium required
with contract finance is a subject for future research. However,
because the risk of non-payment is removed from the purchase arrange-
ment, one would expect that FHA-insured mortgage availability would
represent a distinct improvement over contract finance.
00C\I
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
Standardized b-values: Credit Arbitrage Model
Independent Variable West Side Submarket South Side Submarket
BLD .075 .023
NAPTATP -.018 .147
MD60 .010 .187
SUB1 -.098 .050
SUB3 -.116 -.050
ETl .139 -.015
ET3 -.011 -.089
LS -.072 -.024
BURDEN .437 .349
KDP -.175 -.062
KTERM .567 .430
TIME2 -.124 -.176
TIME3 -.453 -.236
TIME4 -.122 .136
NOTE: The standardized b-value adjusts for the differences in measure-
ment units of the independent variables. It is obtained by multiplying
the regression coefficient by the ratio of the standard deviation of
the independent variable to that of the dependent variable.
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APPENDIX TABLE 2
Definition of Variables in Contract Price Model
CONPRICE Installment contract sale price in 1957-59 constant
dollars.
LROOMS Number of rooms in the structure in natural logarithms.
BLDLR LROOMS*BLD where BLD= dummy variable. 1 =multi-flat
structure; 0= otherwise. The coefficient, when added
to LROOMS, measures the additional price effect of rooms
if the structure is a multi-flat building.
NAPTATP Number of apartments in the structure at the time of the
contract sale.
CONSTM Dummy variable. 1= construction type of building, frame;
0= construction type of building, masonry.
OCCP Percent owner-occupied units in census tract (1960).
SUB1 Dummy variable. 1= less than 10 percent substandard
housing units in census tract; 0= otherwise (1960).
SUB3 Dummy variable. 1= more than 20 percent of housing units
in census tract substandard; 0= otherwise (1960).
The excluded category for substandard housing is 10 -20
percent.
ETTIME12 Dummy variable. 1= early transition neighborhood
(Penetration, Invasion), sale during market period 1 or
2; 0= otherwise.
ETTIME3 Dummy variable. 1= early transition neighborhood, sale
during market period 3; 0= otherwise.
ETTIME4 Dummy variable. 1= early transition neighborhood, sale
during market period 4; 0= otherwise.
LT Dummy variable. 1= late transition neighborhood (Late
Consolidation, Piling Up); 0= otherwise.
The excluded variable is neighborhood in intermediate
stage of transition (Early Consolidation, Consolidation).
CTY60 1960 median family income of census tract in 1957-59
constant dollars.
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APPENDIX TABLE 2 , continued
KDP Percent contract downpayment.
KTERM Term-to-maturity of contract, years.
LS Dummy variable. 1= large-scale seller in west side
market; 0= small-scale seller in west side market.
CANDG Dummy variable. 1= large-scale seller, Peck or Master,
south side market; 0= other large-scale seller and all
small-scale sellers in south side market.
TIME2 Dummy variable. 1= sale occurred between 1959-1961;
0= otherwise.
TIME3 Dummy variable. 1= sale occurred between 1962-1965;
0= otherwise.
TIME4 Dummy variable. 1= sale occurred between 1966-1968;
0= otherwise.
Excluded time category is 1956-1958.
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APPENDIX TABLE 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables in the Contract
Price Regression Model
West Side Submarket South Side Submarket
Variable Standard Standard
Mean Deviation Mean Deviation
CONPRICE ($) 20,247 4,771 17,778 6,478
Building Characteristics
LRO0MS ln) 2.46 .31 2,18 .37
BLDLR (ln) 2.19 .91 1.28 1,24
NAPTATP 1.32 .91 .91 1.17
CONSTM (yes =1) .04 .20 .59 .49
Neighborhood Charac-
teristics
OCCP 22.00 7.47 30.29 13.78
SUB1 (yes = 1) .70 -- ,58 --
SUB3 (yes = 1) .19 -- .18 --
ETTIME12 (yes=1) .38 -- .34
ETTIME3 (yes =1) .26 -- .11 --
ETTIME4 (yes =1) .03 -- .06 --
LT (yes= 1) .05 -- .12 --
CTY60 (hundred dol.) 55.46 6.68 56.17 7.53
Risk-Related Charac-
teristics
KDP (%) 5.83 3.37 5.04 3.60
KTERM (years) 17.95 4.29 17.92 4.38
Other Characteristics
LS (yes = 1) .55 -- .80 --
TIME2 (yes=1) .40 -- .35 --
TIME3 (yes=1) .41 -- .31 --
TIME4 (yes=1) .09 -- .15 --
Number of
observations 276 142
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APPENDIX TABLE 4
OLS Regression Model of Installment Contract Price
West Side Submarket South Side Submarket
Independent Variable
Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value)
Building Characteristics
LROOMS (ln) 6,172.86 (6.11) 12,135.53 (7.62)
BLDLR (ln) 855.16 (2.89) -1,236.53 (-2.96)
NAPTATP 876.73 (3.76) 893.07 (2.19)
CONSTM -1,751.13 (-2.45) -2,707.42 (-4.07)
Neighborhood Character-
istics
OCCP -3.87 (-0.13) -52.30 (-1.50)
SUB1 1,079.33 (2.23) 1,320.87 (1.70)
SUB3 1,173.22 (1.96)c 898.77 (0.80)
ETTIME12 314.28 (0.67) 844.03 (1.00)
ETTIME3 1,108.58 (2.15)c 708.33 (0.63)
ETTIME4 -79.16 (-0.07) 1,105.62 (0.68)
LT -2,014.88 (-2.64)a -193.05 (-0.19)
CTY60 (hundred dol.) 20.64 (0.56) 128.83 (2.10)
Risk-Related Character-
istics
KDP 3.14 (0.07) 356.09 (3 .30 )b
KTERM 261.89 (7.29)a 226.36 (2.98)a
Other Characteristics
LS 213.40 (0.75) 2,651.00 (3.39)a
TIME2 217.52 (0.42) -751.49 (-0.87)
TIME3 -1,912.47 (-2.65) -1,531.11 (-1.30)
TIME4 -4,011.88 (-4.76) -3,538.87 (-2.62)
Intercept -4,041.74 (-1.57) -19,976.60 (-4.78)
Degrees of Freedom 257 123
R2 .794 .777
F-Ratio 52.92 23.74
Prob > F .0001 .0001
NOTE: Table notes indicate significance of t-ratios for eight coeffici-
ents under simultaneous statistical testing for overall level of signi-
ficance (ETTIME12, ETTIME3, ETTIME4, LT, KDP, KTERM, SUB3, LS).
a. .05 one-tailed test
b. .05 two-tailed test
c. .10 one-tailed test
d. .10 two-tailed test
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APPENDIX TABLE 5
Standardized b-values: Expected Present Value Net Profit Model
Independent Variable West Side Submarket South Side Submarket
MTGLVR .386 .640
NEGEQ .365 -.094
SECMTG .116 .117
KDP .017 .244
SUB1 -.053 -.049
SUB3 .082 .092
MD60 -.181 .042
BLD .177 .100
ETl .052 .063
ET3 .051 .015
LS .107 CANDG -.175
TIME2 -.199 .002
TIME3 -.272 .014
TIME4 -.041 .209
See Note, APPENDIX TABLE 1.
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Notes: Chapter 3
1. The Supreme Court did not outlaw the enforcement of racial
restrictive covenants in deeds until 1948. Furthermore, the Code of
Ethics of the National Real Estate Board openly discouraged integrated
housing and several members of the Chicago Board felt that formal
sanctions such as denial of membership, suspension, or expulsion could
have been applied to nonconforming realtors who violated the Code.
Informal sanctions included spreading "unsavory rumors" about the
realtor and harming his business by defaming his character.
Rose Helper, Racial Policies and Practices of Real Estate Brokers
(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1969), pp. 253-54.
For a formal representation of these informal sanctionssee John
Yinger, "Economic Incentives, Institutions, and Racial Discrimination:
The Case of Real Estate Brokers," Discussion Paper D78-4, Department
of City and Regional Planning, Harvard University (Cambridge: DCRP,
February 1978).
2. Institutional involvement in the process of racial change
would additionally include fostering expectations of change, not only
through the withdrawal of funds prior to change, but with direct en-
couragement to prospective white buyers to look in suburbia. The
current policy debate on redlining focuses on the withdrawal issue.
See Urban-Suburban Investment Study Group, The Role of Mortgage
Lending Practices in Older Urban Neighborhoods: Institutional Lenders,
Regulatory Agencies and Their Community Impacts (Chicago: Center for
Urban Affairs, Northwestern University, 1975); Illinois Legislative
Investigating Commission, Redlining: Discrimination in Residential
Mortgage Loans, A Report to the Illinois General Assembly (Chicago:
ILIC, May 1975).
3. Chicago Commission on Human Relations, Mortgage Availability
for Nonwhites in the Chicago Area: A Report (Chicago, CCHR, April
1963), pp. 5-6.
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4. There is some difficulty in actually ascertaining the full
extent of the reluctance of banks to lend to black buyers in transi-
tional or all white neighborhoods. McEntire cites some evidence that
blacks could not get mortgages in Chicago in "transitional" neighbor-
hoods (pp. 226-27). Winkler attemted to research the practices of
Chicago banks in the early 1960s , and was basically unable to obtain
any cooperation. The few banks who answered his questionnaire claimed
they did not discriminate against blacks, but did mention the problems
blacks had in meeting "credit standings" at other lending institutions.
They also mentioned a reluctance to lend to blacks in "white or
transitional areas". (R. A. Winkler, "Some Aspects of the Negro
Housing Market in the Chicago Area: Savings and Loan Financing," in
Open Occupancy vs. Forced Housing Under the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Symposium on Anti-Discrimination Legislation, Freedom of Choice, and
Property Rights in Housing, Alfred Avins, ed. (New York: Bookmailer,
1963), pp. 271-72.) The dubious nature of even this limited evidence
of some finance being available for blacks is revealed by the fact
that one of Winkler's respondents was [Provident] SLA which claimed
that 95 percent of its business was with "non-whites". Yet this
institution was one of those making a lot of money available to the
speculators in the Lawndale area. It may well be that a good part of
the 95 percent went to white speculators in changing neighborhoods.
As far as "credit standing" is concerned, many buyers reported that
they were denied mortgage consideration without even being asked for
credit information.
5. The role of the real estate community has been amply treated
elsewhere. See in particular Helper, Racial Policies and Practices;
and Yinger, "Economic Incentives, Institutions, and Racial Discrimina-
tion." For a discussion of the legal system and the contract buying
issue see Jeffrey M. Fitzgerald, "The Contract Buyers League and the
Courts: A Case Study of Poverty Litigation," Law Society Review 9
(Winter 1975), pp. 165- 95.
6. There are other economic reasons for the observed lack of
lending in black and transitional areas. The objective risk factors
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associated with credit-worthy borrowers (occupation, working wives,
moonlighting jobs, age of housing, credit references) may systematically
discriminate against black borrowers because of discrimination in
other sectors, and cause the "objective" risk of a black buyer with
the same income as a white person to be higher on average. Also,
lenders may imperfectly perceive the costs and risks of lending in
certain submarkets due to inadequate knowledge and high search costs.
For a general discussion of these issues, see Dwight M. Jaffee, "Credit
for Financing Housing Investment: Risk Factors and Capital Markets,"
Housing in the Seventies, U. S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1976), pp. 491-511; Brimmer &
Company, Inc., Risk vs. Discrimination in the Expansion of Urban
Mortgage Lending, prepared for the U. S. League of Saving Associations
(Chicago: U. S. League of Savings Associations, April 1977).
7. Kain and Quigley, Housing Markets and Racial Discrimination,
Table 3-2, p. 63; Brian J. L. Berry, "Short-Term Housing Cycles in a
Dualistic Metropolis," The Social Economy of Cities, Harold M. Rose,
ed. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1975), p. 171.
8. Anti-Negro violence accompanying residential expansion of
the ghetto was commonplace for at least ten years following World War
II, a period corresponding to housing shortages resulting from war
restrictions. Nineteen hundred and fifty-seven is the last year that
the Chicago Commission on Human Relations published information on
racial tension areas in the city; after that the publications concen-
trated on the finance problems of Negro buyers, panic peddling and
contract buying. Chicago Commission on Human Relations, Reports of
Incidents 1949-1952 (Chicago: CCHR, 1952); idem , The Trumbull Park
Home Disturbances: A Chronological Report, August 4, 1953 to June 30,
1955 (Chicago: CCHR, 1955); idem , Profiles on Present Racial Tension
Areas in Chicago (Chicago: CCHR, 1957). For a map showing the location
of personal violence and property damage associated with anti-Negro
incidents between 1946-1952, see David Wallace, "Residential Concen-
tration of Negroes in Chicago" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
Regional Planning, Harvard University, 1953), Figure 55, p. 406.
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Based on research of metropolitan Chicago housing trends, Brian Berry
also advanced the hypothesis that resistance to transition was lowest
when new construction exceeded that needed to meet the demand of new
household formation. Berry, "Short-Term Housing Cycles in a Dualistic
Metropolis," in The Social Economy of Cities, p. 166.
9. The best known of these studies was completed by Luigi
Laurenti, Property Values and Race (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1960). Also see David H. Karlen, "Racial Integration and Pro-
perty Values in Chicago," Urban Economics Report # 7, University of
Chicago, April 1968; Donald Phares, "Racial Change and Housing Values:
Transition in an Inner Suburb," Social Science Quarterly 52 (December
1971), pp. 560-73; Joseph P. McKenna and Herbert D. Werner, "The
Housing Market in Integrating Areas," Annals of Regional Science 4
(December 1970), pp. 127-33.
10. McEntire, Residence and Race (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1960), p. 226.
11. Ibid., p. 225.
12. Chicago Commission on Human Relations, Mortgage Availability
for Non-whites in the Chicago Area, p. 10.
13. McEntire, Residence and Race, p. 225.
14. U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Housing: Hearings Held in
Chicago, Illinois, May 5-6, 1959 (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1959), p. 756.
15. As quoted by Karen Orren, Corporate Power and Social Change
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 127.
16. McEntire, Residence and Race, p. 301. The FHA need not have
started its career with this position, but several factors strongly
influenced its racial policy. The legislative decision to provide
mortgage insurance and to rely upon the existing set of market
institutions to initiate loans rather than offer mortgage loans
directly reflected an acceptance of prevailing philosophy and pro-
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cedures. In general, at the time of the legislative discussion,
federal involvement in housing markets was opposed for many reasons
by many interests, not the least of which was because its direct
involvement could potentially lead away from residential patterns of
segregation. As a national program, the FHA was apt to formulate
policies which would be acceptable throughout the nation, thereby
gaining maximum Congressional support. A laissez-faire attitude toward
local implementation of the FHA programs was the quid pro quo for
passage. As Weaver noted, the financial institutions through which
the FHA operated and its key personnel were recruited from the finan-
cial and real estate interests and institutions which led the campaign
to spread race covenants and residential segregation. Robert C.
Weaver, The Negro Ghetto (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1948),
p. 70. Given the FHA's goals to foster homebuilding and mortgage
lending during the depression (with particular emphasis on middle-
class homeownership), and their method of program implementation
(straight-line as opposed to variable insurance fees, and debentures
as opposed to cash reimbursement in case of foreclosure); reliance on
the standardization of risk through the standardization of a major
factor contributing toward product heterogeneity -- property location
-- is not surprising. Orren, Corporate Power and Social Change,
p. 135.
17. Since the VA adopted many of the FHA minimum property
requirements by reference in their lenders' handbook, it may be assumed
that the VA similarly adopted the FHA restrictions on lending in
racially changing and black areas. Because VA benefits seem to have
been available to more low-income home purchasers and hence to more
non-whites than FHA benefits, and because VA financing was a major
potential source of mortgage finance for black veterans, the restric-
tions had a binding effect on serving the program's intended clientele.
Jenner & Block Law Offices Memorandum, To: Thomas P. Sullivan, From:
Larry Gavin, Re: CBL Veterans Administration Home Loan Guaranty
Procedure, April 19, 1971 (hereinafter cited as J & B Memo #3).
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18. See Charles Abrams, Forbidden Neighbors (New York: McGraw Hill,
1955), pp. 227-37; U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1961 Report:
Part IV, Housing (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1961), pp. 16-80.
19. The complaint, originally brought against real estate
speculators, their assignees, and savings and loan associations, was
amended to include the Federal Housing Administration as a defendent.
"Third Amendment to the Complaint," Contract Buyers League v. F & F
Investment, No.69 C15, Chicago, U. S. District Court, Northern District
of Illinois, Eastern Division, Chicago, Count VII, paragraphs 16(e)
(f), 19(a) (b), cited by Jenner and Block Law Offices, "The Contract
Buyers League Case Against the Federal Housing Administration,"
Chicago, undated manuscript.
20. Jenner & Block Law Offices Memorandum, To: Thomas P.
Sullivan, From:John G. Stifler, Re: Baker v. F & F Investment, FHA
Discovery [Interview with former FHA employee, name withheld in
confidence], April 16, 1971 (hereinafter cited as J & B Memo #2),
p. 5.
21. There was probably no property in the west side contract
sale neighborhoods which could have met such requirements. The legal
strategy would have to show that FHA insured in other areas in which
homes did not meet the minimum property requirements. Letter to
Thomas P. Sullivan, from Lawrence M. Gavin, September 14, 1971; Jenner
& Block Law Offices Memorandum, To: Thomas P. Sullivan, From: Larry
Gavin, Re: FHA Discovery, February 9, 1971 (hereinafter cited as J &
B Memo #4), p. 5.
22. J & B Memo #2, p. 2; Baker v. F & F Investment, pretrial
deposition of a former FHA employee [name withheld in confidence]
February 18, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as pretrial deposition,
FHA employee), pp. 61-2.
23. J & B Memo #4.
24. This latter date was limited by the interviewee's knowledge
of such practices based on his position in the field insuring office
until December 1961; he could not speak from experience about the
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rest of the sixties. However, the chief appraiser at the local office,
under whom this person worked until that time, remained in the top
position until his retirement in 1969. Therefore, without a special
directive from Washington, D. C., there is little reason to believe that
the automatic rejection policy was altered prior to 1965.
25. At times the chief underwriter for the Chicago field office
would make a field trip to examine areas to see if they would be
acceptable. After the field trip, he would send a memo around with his
determinations of the area and would give the boundaries of the areas
in which FHA would not insure. Copies of these memos went to lenders
and appraisers and copies were kept at the receiving desk. Between
1955 and at least 1961, the inner-city areas were considered econo-
mically unsound. Pretrial deposition, FHA employee, pp. 61-6.
26. "Plantiffs' Pre-Trial Memorandum," Wells v. F & F Invest-
ment, No. 69 C15, U. S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, Chicago, February-March 1975, p. 14.
27. J & B Memo #2, p. 6. The interviewee, an acting assistant
regional administrator of the FHA at the time of the federal official's
visit, was responsible for destroying the regional office's redlining
maps. In his pretrial deposition, however, he would not explicitly
state whether the FHA Chicago office had redlining maps; he did state
that the Detroit office had such maps as late as 1968 or 1969.
Orren also noted that no redlining maps were available for her
research but that the FHA maps developed after the "economic soundness"
policy reversal, which indicated "A" and "B" riot-prone areas, in the
opinion of several institutional mortgage officers, represented the
mirror image of FHA's prior readiness to extend insurance. Orren,
Corporate Power and Social Change, p. 136.
28. See p. 217-21, supra.
29. FHA Manual Sec. 1320, cited in J & B Memo #2, pp. 61-2.
30. See Chapter 2, note 27. The analysis in this section
utilizes the 1960-61 sample to represent insured loan activity con-
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current with the period of greatest contract sales activity, To the
best of our knowledge, this sample represents both inactive and active
FHA files, since FHA was approximiately five years behind in pulling
the inactive files from the active ones. Jenner and Block Law Offices
Memorandum, From: Mary Gavin, Larry Gavin, Al Worley, Re: Procedure
for FHA Study 1960-61, August 5, 1975 (hereinafter cited as J & B
Memo #5).
31. Evelyn M. Kitagawa and Karl E. Taeuber, eds., Local
Community Fact Book Chicago Metropolitan Area 1960 (Chicago: Chicago
Community Inventory, University of Chicago, 1963), p. 103.
Additional conclusions from the Jenner and Block FHA study in-
cluded the following: the racially changing and black areas in which
FHA insured in Chicago in 1960 and 1961 had comparable or lower median
family incomes than the predominantly all white areas in which FHA
insured in the same period; FHA did not insure loans in any census
tract where the median family income in 1960 was less than $5,000.
Furthermore, they found no substantial difference in the age of the
buildings in the racially changing, black areas, or white areas in
which FHA insured in Chicago in 1960-61. The FHA insured in areas
where a great proportion of the homes were built prior to 1930, and
in some instances, insured loans on homes which were built prior to
1920. Based on a limited sample, there appeared to be no substantial
differences between the average terms for loans insured in any of the
areas. Jenner and Block Law Offices Memorandum, To: Thomas Sullivan,
et al., From: Lawrence M. Gavin, Al Worley, Mary Gavin, Re: Study
on FHA Insured Loans, Chicago, June 26, 1975, (hereinafter
cited as J & B FHA Study), pp. 1-2.
32. Pretrial deposition, FHA employee, p. 102.
33. U. S.,Congress, House, Committee on Banking and Currency,
Second Mortgages, Land Sale Contracts, and Other Financing Devices
Employed in Conventional Mortgage Lending, 86th Congress, January 1960,
p. 14.
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34. J & B Memo #2, p. 5. In the opinion of the FHA administra-
tor , many of the contract sellers had connections with City Hall and
were not willing to budge an inch in negotiations.
35. See U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1961 Report: Part IV
Housing, pp. 62-74. While the announced policies of both the FHA and
VA were in favor of equal housing opportunity, few positive, affirma-
tive actions were taken to insure that the benefits of these govern-
ment programs reached all home buyers on an equal opportunity basis.
"Both agencies will, under limited circumstances, withhold the benefits
where discrimination is demonstrated. But they will only do this in
States which have antidiscrimination housing laws; and only after the
State enforcement authorities have found a violation of State law and
the violator has not satisfactorily complied -- a combination of cir-
cumstances which has not yet occurred. But where States lack anti-
discrimination legislation, members of the private housing industry
are free to utilize the credit of the Federal Government in aid of
housing discrimination if they choose. Many so choose." Ibid., p. 79.
36. Irving Schweiger and John S. McGee, Chicago Banking: The
Structure and Performance of Banks and Related Financial Institutions
in Chicago and Other Areas (Chicago: Graduate School of Business,
University of Chicago, 1966), pp. 70-6.
37. Ibid., p. 79.
38. Ibid., pp. 74-5.
39. U. S. Federal Housing Administration, Commissioner Letter
No. 38, November 8, 1965, reprinted in U. S., Congress, House,
Committee on Banking and Currency, Real Estate Settlement Costs, FHA
Mortgage Foreclosures, Housing Abandonment and Site Selection Policies:
Hearings, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1972, pp. 270-71.
40. It is interesting to note that in the late 1960s when the
FHA revised its underwriting criteria (at the time of the implementa-
tion of the Urban Investments Program), appraisers for the involved
government agencies, instructed to disregard the economic life of the
surrounding neighborhood and look only at the individual home, were
told to look through "rose colored" glasses. Knowing that the older
appraisers could never abandon their previous training, a key adminis-
300
trator of the program suggested that the FHA hire new people and train
them in this new method of appraising. This procedure continued as
FHA policy until at least mid-1971. J & B Memo #2, p. 6.
41. Schweiger and McGee, Chicago Banking, p. 70.
42. Ibid., pp. 80-1; J & B Memo #2, p. 4.
43. U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Housing: Hearings Held in
Chicago, p. 750.
44. A set of 565 contract sales has been used for the case study
analysis of contract transactions. This data set is larger than the
data set used in Chapter 2, for Table 2-1 (419 cases) due to the
inclusion of 180 additional installment sales which were the basis for
the Wells v. F & F Investment trial proceedings (1975). The two data
sets have been merged to increase the number of observations for
analysis,since missing data items in the CBL sample of 419 sales
invalidated the reliability of the statistical sample. Eliminating the
sales which took place prior to 1956 reduced the number of observations
to 565. The inclusion of the trial set of installment sales increased
the data set proportion of large-scale sellers and properties located
in south side community areas.
45. Interview with Mr. Tom Boodell, one of the attorneys for
the CBL lawsuits, April 1978.
46. U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Housing: Hearings Held in
Chicago, p. 741.
47. Gross cash investment represents the difference between the
acquisition costs of the property (purchase price plus mortgage fees)
and the sum of the mortgage loan(s) and contract downpayment.
48. The names of associations and persons (SLA officials, real
estate speculators) in this dissertation are disguised, although some
information about them is available in court records, newspaper ac-
counts and public reports by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
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49. Since large-scale sellers are underrepresented in the
sample and they were financed more frequently by these four associ-
ations, this percent probably underestimates the extent of their
participation.
50. H. Robert Bartell, Jr., "An Analysis of Illinois Savings
and Loan Associations Which Failed in the Period 1963-1968," in
Study of the Savings and Loan Industry, Irwin Friend, ed. (Washington,
D. C.: GPO, 1970), p. 414.
51. Ibid., p. 376.
52. Wells v. F & F Investment, TP, pp. 2195, 3137, 3183-187,
3208, 3985.
53. Federal regulations for conventional mortgages prohibited
loans in excess of 80 percent of the value of the property. 12 CFR
545.6-1(a), cited by Jenner and Black Law Offices Memorandum, To:
D. C. Roston, From: P. Gans, Re: The Regulation of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, August 12, 1970, p. 5 (hereinafter cited as J & B
Memo #6). Illinois regulations before 1964 permitted 100 percent
loans of appraised value for single-family homes (after 1965, 90
percent).
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however, on average mortgage loan-to-purchase price exceeded the regu-
lation ratio (Table 3-5).
54. Bartell, "An Analysis of Illinois Savings and Loan Associa-
tions," p. 375.
55. Ibid., p. 380.
56. Ibid., p. 375.
57. Ibid., p. 380.
58. Ibid., p. 391.
59. Wells v. F & F Investment, TP, p. 2293.
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60. Helper, Racial Policies and Practices of Real Estate Brokers,
pp. 180-81. In the course of this study's data collection, incon-
sistencies between the discount fees stipulated on the mortgage docu-
ment and discount payments recorded in the speculator's books pointed
to such practices.
61.
tions," p.
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377.
62. Ibid., pp. 415-16.
63.
confidenti
Mortgage application forms used by three different SLAs,
al source material, Items.1-5.
64. Confidential source material, Items 6, 7.
65.
tions," p.
Bartell, "An Analysis of Illinois Savings and Loan Associa-
379.
66. Confidential source material, Item 8.
67.
tions," p.
Bartell, "An Analysis of Illinois Savings and Loan Associa-
380.
68. Ibid., p. 381.
69. Ibid., p. 383.
70. Ibid., pp. 383, 385.
71. Confidential source material, Item 8.
72. In 1963, the FHLBB instituted a new policy of test ap-
praisals to be applied to selected real estate collateral when:
"specific facts or information with respect to mortgage loans on
lending, or with respect to operations in general, given evidence that
an institution's appraisals may be excessive, that lending may be a
marginal nature, that appraisal policies and practices may not conform
with generally accepted and established professional standards, or
that'assets secured by real estate are overvalued." Code of Federal
Regulations, 31 FR 8004, June 7, 1966, cited by J & B Memo #6, pp.
3-4.
This and other actions taken on the part of the FHLBB represent
a tightening of lending operations and supervision in response to the
growing problems of an increasing number of SLAs. See Chapter 6 for a
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further discussion of this point.
73. Confidential source material, Item 8.
74. Confidential source material, Item 9.
75. Ibid.
76. Boston was a heavy borrower from two of these three SLAs
under discussion. In addition, he had multiple mortgage loans out-
standing in a minimum of six other associations.
77. Confidential source material, Item 10.
78. Such conflicts of interest existed in at least two instances;
confidential source material, Items 8, 11. In particular, the
secretary-treasurer of Dusty SLA was a principal involved in numerous
corporate identities which bought and sold contract paper (Hoover,
et al., see Figure 2-2 supra).
Conflicts of interest within the savings and loan industry are not
new occurrences. The link between savings and loan and real estate bus-
inesses has been of "long standing and great intimacy;" lending
associations were often organized by real estate interests and
domiciled in the same building. Real estate sales affiliations,
finance and investment links continue as a significant characteristic
of the Chicago FHLB District. The subject of such affiliations
elicits conflicting opinions from supervisory examiners. The threat
is that the affiliation will affect the association's standards of
evaluation of investment quality. Edward S. Herman, "Conflict of
Interest in the Savings and Loan Industry," in Study of the Savings
and Loan Industry, see in particular pp. 833-47.
79. The regulation in the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR)
defines one borrower in such a way that the SLA must know the benefi-
ciary of the trust and the stockholders of the corporation, if they
are dealing with a trust or corporation (12 CFR 563, 9-3 amended by
28 FR 1629, February 21, 1963), J & B Memo #6, p. 2. The section
limits the amount of monies an association insured by the FSLIC can
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lend to one "borrower" to the lesser of 10 percent of withdrawal
accounts or the sum of nonwithdrawal accounts. It does not take
effect until the amount owed by one borrower exceeds $100,000.
80. Nineteen of these cases occurred in the six-year period
between 1963-1968; during this period more SLAs in Illinois were closed
due to financial difficulties than in all other states combined.
Bartell, "An Analysis of Illinois Savings and Loan Associations," p.
349.
81. An additional two associations were given FSLIC rehabilita-
tion assistance and remained in operation without undergoing mergers
at that time. See the 1971 Annual Report of the Feden Home Loan Bank
Board for a discussion of types of assistance given by the FSLIC.
Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal 5 (April 1972), pp. 29-36.
82. Ibid., pp. 355-71, 402-7. As Bartell noted, the similar
character of the problems in most failed associations suggested that
the line between criminal activity and poor management was difficult
to draw (p. 408). The line drawn in the Bartell Report reflected
a division based on the sufficiency of evidence for legal prosecution.
83. "Plaintiffs' Answers and Objections to the Federal Defen-
dants' Contention Interrogatories," Wells v. F & F Investment, No. 69
C15, U. S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division, Chicago, May 30, 1974. This number does not include all the
contract properties with mortgages financed by these five particular
associations because numerous loans, particularly those of Gotham
Mutual, were liquidated in salvage operations prior to formal acquisi-
tion of assets by the FSLIC. Also,there had been numerous demolitions
following abandonments in the late sixties in the west side contract
neighborhoods.
84. Bartell, "An Analysis of Illinois Savings and Loan Associa-
tions," p. 371.
85. Ibid., p. 382.
86. Confidential source material, Item 8.
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Notes: Chapter 4
1. To estimate a "white price" for a particular transaction,
that is, to determine whether there is a difference in price paid by
whites and blacks for comparable housing, it is necessary to stan-
dardize the complex and heterogeneous bundle of residential services
so that the effect of the buyer's race can be tested. Empirical
estimates must include neighborhood, buyer credit and unit quality
characteristics in addition to the standard controls for the
physical characteristics of the structure. The methodological com-
plexity of this task usually provides sufficiently fertil basis for
criticism of regression results which indicate that blacks pay more
than whites for comparable housing. Such results are usually
attributed to omitted or poorly specified attributes of neighborhood
municipal services or neighborhood amenities.
2. "Discriminatory Housing Markets, Racial Unconscionability,
and Section 1988: The Contract Buyers League Case," Yale Law Journal
80 (1971), pp. 524-5.
3. Ibid., p. 528.
4. John F. Kain and John M. Quigley, Housing Markets and
Racial Discrimination (New York: Columbia University Press for
The National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975), p. 63.
5. Mortgage finance has in the past adapted itself to different
price-risk relationships in transitional areas. Given the willingness
of lenders to consider the pricing of mortgage finance and the
absence of panic selling, discount points act as an important market
support. These points, commonly paid by the seller if FHA financing,
represent a trade-off between a direct, cash sale and an arbitrage
transaction. See Chester Rapkin and William G. Grigsby, The Demand
for Housing in Racially Mixed Areas (Los Angeles and Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1960), chapter VI.
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6. During the trial, one speculator noted that the ability to
charge 18 percent interest would have resulted in a different contract
selling price. "Transcript of Proceedings," Wells v. F & F Investment,
N. 69 C15, U. S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, Chicago, pp. 6279-81 (hereinafter cited as Wells v.
F & F Investment, TP).
7. Kain and Quigley, Housing Markets and Racial Discrimination,
p. 68.
8. Black persons were not the only ones to buy on contract.
Speculators also sold to "whites" in changing neighborhoods. The
characteristics of these sales, often to mixed couples or persons of
Latin descent, were not dissimilar to black contract sales. The gross
markups on 7 sales to all-white couples ranged between 61 and 132
percent. Contract terms matched those recorded for black sales, but
interestingly, these particular transactions all took place prior to
1955, before the large-scale expansion of the contract market.
9. Wells v. F & F Investment, TP, pp. 893, 1013, 1149, 4295-
4302, 6446.
10. Norris Vitchek as told to Alfred Balk, "Confessions of a
Blockbuster," Saturday Evening Post 235 (July 14-July 21, 1962).
11. The change in FHA underwriting criteria beginning in Novem-
ber, 1965, did not result in full-scale implementation of that policy
in Chicago until 1968. U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Housing
and Urban Affairs of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, Oversight on Housing and Urban Development Programs, Chicago,
Illinois: Hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., March 30-31, 1973, p. 249.
(Beginning in 1966, at least one major west side speculator began to
convert his contract sales into FHA mortgages.)
The cases in the 1966-1968 period are predominantly resales of
defaulted properties or those sold after a long rental status. 'These
cases naturally drop out of all regression analyses except the contract
price model. For the contract price model, the increased sample
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variation resulting from the broader time coverage should improve the
explanatory power of the model.
12. See notes 13 and 14, Chapter 2, and note 44, Chapter 3,
supra.
13. See notes 61, 62, Chapter 1 and note 9, Chapter 2, supra.
14. The subject of repairs on contract properties was a contro-
versial issue in trial litigation. There was a paucity of data to
substantiate speculators' claims of repairs; furthermore, there was a
conflict between IRS tax requirements and the bookkeeping procedures
of certain speculators who claimed to have incurred substantial monies
in in "rehabilitation".
To begin with, detailed data on the transactions existed only
for the 198 cases brought to trial (representing 7 large-scale and
one small-scale speculators). These records indicated that 60, or 30
percent, of the properties had received some repair work between
purchase and resale. Only 19 of these cases were sold within six
months of purchase and the evidence suggests that the repairs made
in the other cases were made prior to renting the unit.
Only two speculators, Peck and Master, kept detailed building
ledgers on individual properties in accordance with IRS tax regulations.
They had a strategy of buying in advance of racial change, holding
the property, with interim rentals, and selling at the point of racial
transition. Repair work on their properties was generally performed
in connection with rental operations. Repairs just prior to the
sample contract sale were made in only six cases; the average repair
bill totaled $266. Furthermore, Peck and Master typically included
two types of repair clauses in the installment sales contract. One
provided that any repairs were to be started within 5 to 15 days of
occupancy. Another clause provided for sweat equity as a substitute
for a small downpayment. Both clauses often signaled the purchase
of a less-than-average quality property. Wells v. F & F Investment,
TP, p. 927.
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Peck and Master's bookkeeping procedures were the primary
subject of the repair controversy. Peck claimed that his rehabilita-
tion work was the key to his mortgage financing and contract profits.
He claimed to have maintained two companies for service and repair
work on his rental and contract properties, but that his building
ledgers would not indicate all repairs made to individual properties.
Therefore, the ledgers would underestimate the repairs, and overesti-
mate the profit. He further stated that the IRS permitted him to
allocate the repair expenses from these service companies against the
taxable income from individual properties. (This resulted in zero
profits, for tax purposes, for numerous properties, year after year.)
Wells v. F & F Investment, TP, pp. 760-940.
However, the IRS tax regulations in effect in 1960 strongly
suggest that Peck's claim of repairs not shown on the building ledgers
did not conform to tax procedures and that he would have lost the tax
savings from making such repairs.
"In computing the gain or loss from the purchase and sale of a number
of properties, the gain or loss must be computed separately as to each
such purchase and sale. [Peck] met this requirement by keeping indi-
vidual building ledgers with identification numbers. His gain on a
particular purchase and sale must be computed as follows: (Contract
sale price) - (purchase price and adjustments chargeable to the capital
account) = gain. Repairs other than those for maintenance must be
charged to the capital account and thereby reflected in the property's
tax base. Unless [Peck] charged the cost of repairs to the capital
account of the particular property repaired, he lost any tax savings
he might have had by reason of making such repairs. The cost of
repairs (other than for maintenance) can only be reflected in the
capital account of the particular property repaired; and further, the
cost of repairs cannot be taken as an expense deduction. As soon as
[Peck] shows a profit with respect to a particular property, he admits
that he has recouped his capital investment and tacitly admits that
all repairs are reflected on the building ledger."
Memorandum from the office of Boodell, Sears, Sugrue, Giambalvo &
Crowley, To: John Tucker, From: Lawrence M. Gavin, Re: [Peck's] Claimed
Repairs, December 18, 1975.
15. Forty-eight percent of the sample transactions were-com-
pleted within three months. The speculator may have received rental
income from these properties, but such income was most likely on those
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properties held for a longer time period. Eighteen percent of the
sample properties were held between 3 and 12 months prior to sale;
13 percent, two years. Nineteen percent of the sample transactions
had been sold at least once prior to the sample transaction.
16. Calculation of the present value of the expected net profit
(PVNETPR) did not assume a prepayment factor, although this is a
common feature of mortgage loans, precisely because installment
contracts inhibited mobility and sellers did not anticipate conversion
to mortgage finance apart from the possibility of a seller purchase
money mortgage after 50 percent of the principal had been paid.
17. Data was insufficient to distinguish the sales commission
practice of individual speculators for individual transactions;
instead, it was estimated for all sales and based on the standard
rate set by the Chicago Real Estate Board. Between 1955 and 1965,
this rate was 5 percent for properties of less than $25,000 with a
minimum charge of $100; after 1965 (and for our purposes until 1968),
this rate was 6 percent on the first $50,000 with a minimum charge
of $300.
The sales commission estimate could be an overestimate of the
actual cost incurred because,first, not all sellers secured buyers
through real estate agents. Second, several sellers were also real
estate brokers and the commission could have been paid to their own
offices, thereby increasing the real profit from the transaction for
these sellers. Third, some sellers, noteably Peck and Master, did
not pay out a full sales commission at the time of the closing; they
paid the commission in small equal monthly payments, typically $25
or $35, provided the contract buyer did not default on the contract.
If a default occurred, these payments stopped.
18. Any discount rated used would have to be equal to or greater
than 10 or 12 percent, since that was the prevailling cost of funds
sellers paid for privately secured operating funds.
The primary justification for using a 15 percent discount rate
comes from the prevailing belief among real estate agents that contract
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sales would increase the selling price of a property 10- 20 percent
to compensate the seller for the deferred payback. Wells v. F & F
Investment, TP, pp. 5121, 7896. Also
see, Michael Stegman, Housing Investment in the Inner City (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1972), p. 206.
19. See John Mixon, "Installment Land Contracts: A Study of Low
Income Transactions, With Proposals for Reforms and a New Program to
Provide Home Ownership in the Inner City," Houston Law Review 7
(May 1970), pp. 530-35 for a full discussion of the cost differences.
20. U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1967
Statistical Yearbook (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1968), FHA Table 33,
p. 116.
21. This is the equation for the west side market; for the south
side, the variable CANDG has been substituted for the LS variable
because there is insufficient variation between small-scale and large-
scale sellers in the south side market. CANDG distinguishes between
the two long-time large-scale speculators, Peck and Master, and the
additional large-scale speculator and two small sellers.
22. The set of substandard variables behaved in an opposite
manner in the OLS regression model of installment contract price
presented in Appendix Tables 2-4. For both submarkets the coefficients
of substandard housing variables indicate that prices were higher in
neighborhoods with fewer than 10 percent and more than 25 percent
substandard units. As a proxy for neighborhood risk, this finding is
inconsistent with its sign in the credit arbitrage model. Why should
it have a negative effect in the credit model and a positive effect
here? One reason may be that the neighborhood risk effects are capi-
talized into higher prices independent of borrower risk characteristics.
23. Wells v. F & F Investment, TP, p. 494.
24. The marginal price effect of contract downpayment was also
small in the regression model on installment contract price (Appendix
Table 4). Two characteristics of economic behavior in the contract
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market help explain this finding. First, contract prices were set
prior to certain knowledge of the cash downpayment, and speculators
rarely made credit checks on the buyer which would alter their per-
ception of the risk in the transaction. Second, there was little
price negotiation, particularly on the south side.
25. The marginal effect of buying in transitional neighborhoods
on the full installment contract price varied over time. The results
of the regression model of contract price, presented in Appendix Table
4, indicate that price differentiation in the west side market, among
neighborhoods classified by stage of racial transition, was more pro-
nounced than in the south side market. In particular, buyers in early
transition neighborhoods in period 3 on the west side paid over
$1,109 more for this type of neighborhood than for an equivalent hous-
ing bundle in an intermediate transition neighborhood. The proportion
of properties sold in these early transition neighborhoods in this
period had declined from the earlier periods. The south side market
exhibited some price differentiation across neighborhood stage types,
but the differentials between time periods were not strong. Further-
more, the discount in neighborhoods of late transition was considerably
smaller than in the west side market, $193 versus $2,015.
26. This difference in price behavior between submarkets is
further reflected in the relative importance of the CTY60 variable,
which is a proxy for neighborhood socio-economic status in the con-
tract price regression model (Appendix Table 4). An increase of
$100 in the median income of a south side neighborhood would increase
contract price $129, compared to an insignificant $21 in the west side
market. The socio-economic differentiation between submarkets is also
reflected in the comment of a black federal official who had consider-
able contact with contract buyers. He noted that "[t]he aspiring
middle-class black does not remain on the west side for more than ten
years after he becomes an adult. He tries to get to the south side."
Jeffrey M. Fitzgerald,"The Contract Buyers Leaaue: A Case Study of
Interaction Retween a Social Movement and the Legal System"(Ph.D. dis-
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sertation, Northwestern University, 1972), p. 183. Otis D. Duncan
and Beverly Duncan's analysis of the socio-economic characteristics
of the population in Chicago's "invasion" tract between 1940 and
1950 further confirms this differentiation between west and south
side submarkets. The Negro Population of Chicago: A Study of Resi-
dential Succession (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957),
p. 229.
27. See note 20, Chapter 4, supra.
28. The sample correlations between NEGEQ and MTGLVR for the
west side and south side markets respectively are -.69 and -.59.
29. See Rao and Miller, Applied Econometrics (Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1971), pp. 46-52.
30. Brian J. L. Berry, "Short-Term Housing Cycles in a Dualistic
Metropolis," in The Social Economy of Cities, Harold M. Rose, ed.
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1975), pp. 165-82.
31. John Yinger, "Racial Transition and Public Policy,"
Policy Note 78-1, Department of City and Regional Planning, Harvard
University (Cambridge: DCRP, March 1978), p. 9.
32. Private individuals acting alone or in small groups continue
to make black families moving into a white area feel unwelcome.
See Robert Schafer, "Discrimination in Housing Prices and Mortgage
Lending," Working Paper 59, Joint Center for Urban Studies of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University (Cambridge:
JCUS, June 1979), p. 6.
33. Wells v. F & F Investment, TP, pp. 893, 1013, 4295- 302,
6446.
34. Deposition of [Peck], taken at the law offices of Jenner
and Block, April 14-15, 1970, p. 146.
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Notes: Chapter 5
1. In the opinion of one researcher, conversion to mortgage
finance appeared to be a "matter of the seller's episodic behavior."
It was precipitated by a number of factors; a sudden source of financ-
ing (FHA), a desire to move out of the neighborhood and discontinue
managing property, or a sale or transfer of contracts. Although buyers
eligible to convert were at times more likely to actually convert
their contracts compared to those not eligible, this researcher
found that over half of those entitled to convert were still on con-
tract (Colvin, p. 28). He concluded that buyer ignorance or reticence
was not necessarily responsible for this fact, but that most conversion
requests were met by uncooperative responses, delay, refusal, demands
for more money. Very few entitled buyers got offers of mortgages or
even notices of entitlement. Sellers were reluctant to convert for
four reasons: inability to produce clear title, high mortgage commit-
ments of their own on the property, inability to procure conventional
financing for the buyer and preferences for the superior remedies of
the contract seller. The increased frequency of conversions after
1966 resulted from FHA mortgage availability, CBL litigation pressure
and business termination. Greg Colvin, "The Provision for Mortgage
Conversion and Title Conveyance in Installment Contracts For The Sale
of Residential Property to Blacks in Chicago," unpublished paper,
Contract Buyers League files, Chicago, April 10, 1970.
2. Edmundson Village Under Seiqe (Baltimore: Activists, 1969),
p. 5.
3. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95, Sections 17-23 and ch. 77, Sections
18-27 (1967), cited by "Discriminatory Housing Markets, Racial Un-
conscionability and Section 1988: The Contract Buyers League Case,"
Yale'Law Journal 80 (1971), footnote 11, p. 520.
4. George M. vonFurstenberg, Technical Studies of Mortgage
Default Risk: An Analysis of the Experience with FHA and VA Home Loans
During the Decade 1957-66 (Ithaca: Center for Urban Development Re-
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search, 1971); John Herzog and James Early, Home Mortgage Delinquency
and Foreclosure (New York: Columbia University Press for National
Bureau of Economic Research,1970).
5. The realized value of the collateral adjusts the return
from the sale of the foreclosed property for the dollar costs associated
with foreclosing on the loan.
6. Dwight M. Jaffee, "Credit for Financing Housing Investment--
Risk Factors and Capital Markets," in Housing in the Seventies, Volume
1, U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (Washington, D. C.:
GPO, 1976), p. 499.
7. See Donald R. Lessard and Franco Modigliani, "Inflation
and the Housing Market: Problems and Potential Solutions," in New
Mortgage Designs For Stable Housing In an Inflationary Environment,
F. Modigliani and D. Lessard, eds., Conference Series No. 14, Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston (Boston: FRB Boston, 1975), pp. 13-45.
8. John Mixon, "Installment Land Contracts: A Study of Low
Income Transactions, With Proposals for Reforms and a New Program to
Provide Home Ownership in the Inner City," Houston Law Review 7 (May
1970), pp. 535-54.
9. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 77, Sections 18(e) (1967), cited by
"Discriminatory Housing Markets," footnote 11, p. 520.
10. Colvin, "The Provision For Mortgage Conversion," p. 2.
11. See Touche Ross & Co., "The Costs of Mortgage Loan Fore-
closure: Case Studies of Six Savings and Loan Associations," prepared
for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Washington, D. C.: FHLBB, April
1975) for an example of the long delay and high cost of mortgage
foreclosure in Illinois.
12. Colvin, "The Provision For Mortgage Conversion," p. 3.
13. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 57, Sections 1-22 (1967), cited by
"Discriminatory Housing Markets," footnote 11, p. 520.
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14. Robert Kratovil, "Forfeiture of Installment Contracts in
Illinois," Illinois Bar Journal 53 (1964), pp. 188, 197.
15. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 57, Section 13 (1967), cited by
"Discriminatory Housing Markets," footnote 11, P. 520.
16. Jeffrey M. Fitzgerald, "The Contract Buyers League and
the Courts: A Case Study of Poverty Litigation," Law Society Review 9
(Winter 1975), pp. 174-5, see for a discussion of the court procedures
in suits for "possession only."
17. Colvin, "The Provision For Mortgage Conversion," p. 38.
This author notes that the mortgage in the sixteenth century had the
same fault but it was cured by the doctrine of the mortgagor's equity
interest, which included the equitable right to redeem and the right
to the proceeds of the foreclosure sale over the amount of the debt.
18. Mixon, "Installment Land Contracts," pp. 544-48.
19. Ibid., pp. 544-45.
20. vonFurstenberg, "Default Risk on FHA-Insured Home Mortgages
As A Function of the Terms of Financing: A Quantative Analysis," in
Technical Studies, p. 13.
21. Gamaliel Foundation, "Progress and Prospects," unpublished
paper, Chicago, revised July 1969, p. 10. (Status report of the
community organization project, originally known as the Presentation
Church Community Organization Project, which initiated the events
leading to the organization of the Contract Buyers League.)
22. Contract Buyers League, "The History of The Contract Buyers
League," Chicago, unpublished, undated, p. 3. Evidence reviewed by
this writer for 148 cases showed that 42 percent of the buyers had
invested more than $3,000 for home repairs. Many had large expenses
for repairs of heating equipment, roofs, plumbing, and other types
of capital repairs.
23. The word potential should be stressed for it is by no means
clear that contract buyers took advantage of this tax benefit. Con-
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tract sellers presumably did not send end-of-the-year statements of
accounts detailing the payment allocation between interest and
principal. Furthermore, contract payment books may not have been
kept by the buyer or only updated sporadically when sent in with the
monthly payment.
24. Michael Stegman, Housing Investment in the Inner City
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972), p. 208.
25. See page 88 , Chapter 2, supra.
26. Private correspondence between Boston and an associate,
August 8, 1957.
27. Joseph Noviki, "Real Estate Appraisal in the Ghetto," The
Real Estate Appraiser 35 (September-October 1969), pp. 6-7.
28. There were numerous defaults on mortgages held by west
side speculators, in particular those of the largest two operators.
"Transcript of Proceedings," Wells v. F & F Investment, N. 69 C15,
U. S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
Chicago, p. 3258 (hereinafter cited as Wells v. F & F Investment, TP).
H. Robert Bartell, Jr., "An Analysis of Illinois Savings and Loan
Associations Which Failed in the Period 1963-1968," in Study of the
Savings and Loan Industry, Irwin Friend, ed. (Washington, D. C.:
GPO, 1970), pp. 383-402.
29. Contract buyers who were able to make partial payments were
more likely to benefit from forbearance, since the seller's decision
to foreclose depended upon his own mortgage commitments and business
cash flow needs as well as local market demand for housing.
30. deVise, "Housing Construction In The Suburbs And Housing
Demand And Prices In The Inner City," Working Paper 11.23, Chicago
Regional Hospital Study (Chicago: CRHS, April 1976, revised November
1976), in U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, Home Mortgage Disclosure and Equal Credit Opportunity:
Hearings, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., November 23, 1976, p. 226.
31. Herzog and Early, Home Mortgage Delinquency and Foreclosure,
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Table 2, p. 10.
32. Value for FHA mortgages represents the appraisal value.
This includes closing costs other than the broker's commission;
these closing costs averaged about two percent of the purchase price
in 1960. U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1967
Statistical Yearbook (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1968), FHA Table 33.
33. Jeffrey M. Fitzgerald , "The Contract Buyers League: A Case
Study of Interaction Between a Social Movement and thp Legal System"
(Ph.D. dissertation, Northeastern University, 1972), pp. 26-31.
34. Ibid., p. 29. This type of trade-off is the underlying
hypothesis of Krohn and Fleming's paper on the dual economy and its
relationship to the urban housing market. Roger G. Krohn and E.
Berkeley Fleming, "The Other Economy and the Urban Housing Problem:
A Study of Older Rental Neighborhoods in Montreal," Working Paper
No. 11, Joint Center for Urban Studies of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology and Harvard University (Cambridge: JUCS, 1971-1972).
35. Fitzgerald,"The Contract Buyers League,"pp. 36-7.
36. Ibid., p. 37. In fact, this was a major stumbling block
for the white Jesuits and college students organizing contract buyers
into an activist group.
"There was a stigma attached to contract buying, a certain implication
of helplessness and ignorance. Public meetings were organized in the
basement of Presentation Church, with twenty to twenty-five people in
attendance. But they were all silent. Few people wanted to expose
their scars to a tall blond white man with piercing blue eyes, sur-
rounded by white helpers..."
The contract issue smoldered and the number of involved west side
families remained small until the organizers were able to enlist the
active leadership of a black buyer who told her story. James Allen
McPherson, "In My Father's House There Are Many Mansions -- And I'm
Going to Get Me Some of Them Too," Atlantic Monthly 229 (April 1972),
pp. 56, 58. Also see, Alan Boles, "The Contract Buyers League: A
Personal Evaluation," Yale Review of Law and Social Action 1 (Spring
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1970), pp. 85-7; Gregory L. Colvin, "The Contract Buyers League:
The Legal Listening Process," Yale Review of Law and Social Action 1
(Spring 1970), pp. 88-91.
37. Fitzgerald,"The Contract Buyers League," pp. 33, 37.
38. These dates reflect the data collection periods for the
two samples of data, 1973 for the "random" sample and 1975 for the
plaintiff sample. See note 44, Chapter 3, supra.
39. Occasionally a seller would modify the terms of the
agreement if the buyer was having payment difficulty. One seller,
Cone, did reduce the interest rate on some contracts from 7 to 5
percent. Wells v. F & F Investment, TP, p. 4064.
40. vonFurstenberg, "Default Risk on FHA-Insured Home Mortgages,"
in Technical Studies, p. 15.
41. Information on delinquency charges came from individual
contract ledgers kept by Peck and Master. Few other speculators
were as consistent in their management of contract delinquency. In
general, delinquency charges appear to be more characteristic of the
south side market. Jenner & Block Memorandum, To: Peter Flynn, From:
Mary Gavin, December 23, 1975, Re: [Church's] Default Procedures;
Dissertation research notes on individual cases.
42. Dissertation research notes on individual cases.
43. Fitzgerald, 'The Contract Buyers Leaque," p. 35.
44. Noviki, "Real Estate Appraisal in the Ghetto," pp. 6-7.
45. See Fitzgerald, 'The Contract Buyers League.' pp. 194-410
for a detailed discussion of buyers' perspectives toward paying off
the contract which prevailed during the heat of the CBL controversy.
46. Ibid., p. 196. The acceleration of repossessions after
1968 further supports this observation.
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Notes: Chapter 6
1. U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, Oversight on Housing and Urban Development Programs,
Chicago, Illinois: Hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., March 30 and 31,
1973, pp. 26-41, 203-229, 311-322; F. Lawlor, FHA Report, Chicago City
Council, August 1974; Judith D. Feins , "Urban Housing Disinvestment and
Neighborhood Decline: A Study of Public Policy Outcomes"(Ph.D. disser-
tation, University of Chicago, 1977); L. Chatterjee, D. Harvey and
L. Klugman, FHA Policies and the Baltimore City Housing Market, Center
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